

NO. XXXIX.

THE
CHRISTIAN EXAMINER
AND
GENERAL REVIEW.

NEW SERIES.—NO. IX.

JULY, 1830.

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THE CHRISTIAN EXAMINER.

NO. XXXIX.

NEW SERIES—NO. IX.

JULY, 1830.

ART. I.—*On the Future State of Man.* For the CHRISTIAN EXAMINER.

[Concluded from page 132.]

By the Moral Powers, which I now intend to consider with a view to the future state of man, I mean his Conscience and his Will. This subject implies two questions to be answered. First, whether the moral powers themselves are to be considered immortal endowments of man; whether in the life to come he will still be a moral agent, free to choose between good and evil, and responsible for his choice; capable of virtue, and liable to sin; a fit subject of reward and punishment. In the second place, I shall consider the question, whether the moral character which a person actually forms in this life, is likely to pass with him into another state of existence; and whether it will meet there with its natural consequences in a just dispensation of rewards and punishments. Accordingly, the immortality of the moral nature and character of man is the subject of my present inquiry.

Propensities like those with which nature has endowed animals in general to preserve themselves and their species, are implanted also in man. Man is prompted by his animal nature to seek means to support his life, and to avoid or avert whatever seems to endanger it. He is prompted also to impart the means of support he possesses, and to risk even his life, for his offspring.

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But the animal is instigated to provide for itself, to sacrifice itself only for its offspring; while man is prompted, by the in-born revelation of his destiny in his heart, to spend all he has, to lay down even his life for his friends, and to see in every human being a friend and a brother. On the other hand, the animal is impelled to provide only what is necessary for itself and its young. But man is tempted to stretch out his hand after everything that comes within the ever extending grasp of avarice. Still more, while the lioness is constrained, by the law of her nature, to risk her life for her young, the human mother is able to strike dumb the voice of nature within herself, to expose and abandon her offspring.

Thus, every animal, so far as we know its species from observation and history, is irresistibly controlled by the same finite instincts. But man differs from the animal in two respects. First, there are impulses and designs in human nature, the object of which lies beyond the reach of animal instincts. In the second place, those impulses which man has in common with the animal, as well as those which are peculiar to himself, can be resisted and overruled by an uncontrollable power in each individual. The motives of action in man, are not, as in the animal, decisions of nature without appeal. They are mere pleadings of the divers animal and spiritual constituents of his nature. Their success depends on the sanction or veto of an absolute executive in the human soul,—the free will of each individual. This principle of freedom in the soul of man, which breaks, as it were, the mighty tide of instinct that directs all the motions of the animal as a living machine with undivided power, is the first constituent of his moral nature. In order to draw just inferences from this important fact, for the future as well as the present condition of man, it is necessary to attend to the part which is assigned to the Will in the gradual unfolding of his nature.

In the first manifestations of human nature, in the infant, we see no other living principle at work than what we perceive also in the animal; except that there appears in man no evidence of any specific instinct, like that which makes the young duck, as soon as it has burst its shell, launch itself confidently upon an untried element, and which generally assigns to each animal very early, its definite mode of existence. Instead of such a specific instinct, we find in man desires which the most complete gratification of animal appetites cannot satisfy. The

joy with which a child looks forward to a simple gratification of his senses, soon shows, by the partial disappointment which accompanies the actual attainment of his wishes, that the present and tangible was not the real and ultimate object of his soul. The curiosity of the child, also, which is not, like that of the animal, confined to a search after the means of subsistence, is one of the early indications of that power in man, which manifests itself by a tendency to unbounded action, and which we call the mind. This infinite principle in man, however, is so intimately connected with the animal life within him, that at first it appears only as an additional power and inducement to seek after a more complete gratification of the appetites and senses. It leads to the discovery of new means of subsistence, and increases the pleasures to be derived from those already known. Man refines upon the necessities of life, the common articles of food and of dress. He would have the house he lives in at the same time protect him against the discomforts, and secure to him the advantages of living in the open air. There is an infinity, partly real and partly imaginary, in the luxuries of life, because they are the results of the agency of the mind, for the benefit of the senses; and it is this more than the comforts and amusements themselves, which renders them objects of an absorbing interest to man. But in order to preserve him from forfeiting his highest claims to happiness, there arise in his soul desires after more perfect enjoyments than any gratification of the senses and passions can afford or promise. The spirit of truth, love towards all men, and devotion of the soul to God, spring up in the mind; and he perceives that the highest skies to which worldly advantages and honors may raise him, are far below the real heaven, after which the strongest energies of his soul are aspiring.

The desires of the mind, though gradually growing out of the animal propensities, are of a decidedly different character as soon as they are fully unfolded. According to his animal nature, man considers the present life as the whole of his existence, and self-preservation is the chief object of his desires. As a spiritual being, he considers this life only as a part of his existence, subordinate to his immortal interests, which is to be sacrificed, if necessary, for his highest happiness, which is founded on truth and justice, kindness and piety. His affections are not confined to those who have been kind to himself, but are extended to all who deserve his love. His desire of knowledge, when

a selfish principle, is restricted to those objects which are necessary or agreeable to his appetites and senses; but when a spiritual principle, prompts him to the pursuit of all truth. In his intercourse with men, the selfish principle leads him to consider them only as instruments of his own pleasure; but his spirit prompts him to consider himself only as one of them, and to seek his happiness in that of all. Thus, according to the gradual unfolding of his nature, the spiritual principle, by degrees, impels man to seek the springs of happiness beyond the necessities and luxuries of life. Whatever be his condition, his mind is constantly pressing onward after a more extensive sphere of action, a higher state of being, a prospect of true and lasting happiness.

There are some cases in which the highest longings of human nature do not come in collision with meaner interests; and in such cases, all men are eager to avail themselves of all that holy joy which good intentions alone can give. Generally, however, the gold of pure and solid happiness does not lie bare on the surface to surprise the fortunate finder. Truth, justice and love, demand of him who would reap their glories, to deny himself and take up his cross. A crown of righteousness is laid up for him only who is ready to be crowned with thorns. In these cases there arises a conflict in the soul between different principles of action, between spiritual and animal desires or passions. This contest in the human soul is not settled, as it is in the animal, by the irresistible control of instinct. For whenever different animal desires come in collision with each other, instinct regulates them in such a manner that the less important tendency always yields to that which is more essential. The animal quits its play without reluctance in order to satisfy its hunger; and in the same manner it leaves its food to defend its life, and risks its own life for that of its offspring.

But among the various animal and spiritual impulses, which agitate the soul of man daily and hourly, and, like so many pretenders, contend for the sole dominion over the whole, there is not one which nature has invested with the native sovereignty of instinct. The desire to take advantage of a good opportunity for acquiring wealth or power, is checked by the consideration that in making use of it, we should commit an act of injustice or unkindness toward others; and the wish to save another person's life is counteracted by the fear of losing our own.

In these and all similar instances, the person who is thus actuated by two opposing principles, feels that he is not compelled to follow his selfish, any more than his disinterested motives. It is a contest between two powers within him, which can be decided only by the interposition of a third independent power. This power, whose weight in the balance of human motives decides the competition between selfish and disinterested principles, is no other than his free agency, the choice and effort of his own will.

The power of choosing between selfish and disinterested desires, is absolute, in so far as the individual is at liberty to determine which of these two courses, marked out by his inclinations, he shall endeavour to pursue. But his choice is limited to the alternative. He must determine upon following the call of his spirit, otherwise the loud and immediate appeals of passion, drowning the small voice of reason, will carry the day in the wavering mind. Still more, the mere willingness of the spirit, is not sufficient to make up for the weakness of the flesh. The first act of the will, which consists in a mere choice, a wish or a vow to be good, must be followed out by actual exertion, by deep and persevering effort. The ploughshare must be pressed firmly into the ground that is overspread with noxious weeds. Otherwise, we till for the weeds, and not for the good seed, which will not take root on the surface.

Thus we see in man, at first, only the principle of animal life in operation. This, however, is soon aided and enlarged by the infinite essence of life, the mind. At last, the mind, for a time the servant of the body, claims the place which nature has assigned it, asserts its independence of the body, and mastery over it. But this victory of mind over matter in man, can be obtained only by the exertion of his own free will. Man is tempted by the selfish principle in his nature, to give himself up to the pursuit of the greatest happiness that can be obtained by the least exertion. He is prompted, on the other hand, by his own spirit, to strive after the greatest happiness to be obtained by the utmost exertion. The same principle which makes him desire a sphere of action beyond the necessities and the luxuries of life, prompts him, also, to use and exert his own will in resisting and overcoming the attractive power of appetite and sense, so far as it is prejudicial to his greatest happiness, which is founded on perfection; that is, on the free and harmonious exercise of all his powers. If a person obeys this

prompting or desire of his spirit to overcome the opposing appetites, his desire is converted into the greatest joy ; and if he disobeys it, it is changed into the deepest pain of which human nature is susceptible—the joy of an approving, and the pain of a condemning conscience.

Conscience, then, is that principle in man, which is manifested, first, by an impulse or desire to exert all the strength of his will, in preventing his appetites from interfering with the attainment of the greatest perfection and happiness, and then, by feelings of pain and pleasure adapted to the degree in which that impulse has been obeyed or neglected. The appetites, so far as they are opposed to the monitions of conscience, we call temptations. The willing obedience of man to his own conscience, we call virtue ; and the wilful disobedience, we call sin.

Conscience does not inform us whether the views of duty we form, are in themselves right or wrong. Conscience merely prompts us to exert our intellectual faculties to ascertain what is right, and then to use our active powers to do accordingly. Our moral joys or pains are infallible decisions only of this question ;—Whether, and how far we have exerted or neglected our faculties. In the same manner, virtue consists, not in doing what is in itself right, but in striving to perform what the individual conscientiously holds to be his duty. Accordingly the first part of a man's duty is to ascertain the whole of it ; and a right use of his reason for this purpose will teach him to aim, not merely at a conformity with the moral opinions of others, or consistency with his own, or to fashion his conduct according to any factitious principles, but to make human nature his constant study, and to remove every obstruction to the natural unfolding of all his faculties ; to restrict his appetites, that the intellect and the affections may follow their natural tendency to spread over, and to penetrate, like the light and the warmth of the sun, all created beings, and to rise in adoration to the Eternal Source of intelligence and love. Conscience, then, in bidding us to restrict the animal propensities by voluntary effort, does not tend to impair, but to enlarge our real power and freedom. As a wise friend, it advises us to lop off the lower branches of the tree of life, in order to secure its upward growth.

The animal, being governed by instinct, is of course neither liable to temptation, nor capable of virtue. The moral powers,

conscience and will, the power of free agency, constitutes the specific character of the human race, and forms, in every individual, the basis of personal responsibility. The animal is satisfied or dissatisfied with its condition; but man alone can be contented or discontented with himself. The glorious task of endless progress in perfection and happiness, is committed to his own free exertion.

Temptation is frequently considered as in itself an evil; indeed as the greatest of evils except sin. But this opinion seems to arise from an imperfect apprehension of the moral nature of man. Liableness to temptation is not a mark of imperfection in a created being, but the necessary means of the highest, that is, of moral perfection and happiness. For, without any temptation to do wrong, there could be no merit, no virtue, in doing right. Jesus Christ, too, was tempted by the prospect of earthly glory, and earthly suffering, to forsake his spiritual mission. Yet we do not consider this as an imperfection in him, but as a quality, without which he could not have become a pattern of perfection to all men. It is by sin, by yielding to temptation, that we are changed from glory to shame. But God has made us liable to be tempted, that we might be capable of virtue, and of moral happiness. Therefore I would say in the words of the apostle, 'My brethren, count it all joy when ye fall into divers temptations; for the man that endureth temptation shall be blessed in his deed.'

Ask yourself what is the object of your highest esteem in man. Is it what circumstances, parents and friends have done for him? Is it what God himself has bestowed on him, his noble talents and powers? In all these qualities you honor the giver, not the possessor. You do not esteem a man for that which others have done for him, but only for what he has done for himself; his own true merit. You respect him for having made goodness his choice, when he might have chosen and was tempted to choose, the opposite course. It is the free and strenuous effort of his moral nature to overcome all obstacles in the way to endless perfection, it is the glory of virtue, for which we esteem man in ourselves as well as in others; and the deepest and purest happiness of which man is capable, springs from that only sure foundation of self-respect. The man who withstands temptation, lays up in his own soul, treasures more than sufficient to ensure his happiness against the loss of all other means of enjoyment. Satisfied with the consciousness of deserving to be

happy, the christian martyr takes up his cross as a part of the glory that is set before him.

Liableness to Temptation, Conscience, and Free Agency, three principles of whose existence the consciousness of each individual affords incontestible proof, are the foundation of good and ill desert, and a righteous retribution, or dispensation of rewards and punishments. Conscience renders every one happy or unhappy, in proportion to his desert; that is, the degree of faithfulness or unfaithfulness, with which he obeys, or disregards, its promptings. The mode in which conscience dispenses blessing and suffering, is the origin of our ideas of retributive justice. The rewards and punishments of conscience are just, because they are in perfect conformity to the nature and character of man.* They are just, in the first place, because conscience never requires an exertion to which the individual is not equal; secondly, because the joys or pains awarded, are commensurate with his good or ill desert; and thirdly, because its punishments and rewards are motives to strive after a higher state of perfection and happiness. This third characteristic of a truly moral retribution, is particularly important, as, without this, the rewards and punishments distributed by conscience, however correctly proportioned to past merit or guilt, would not be perfectly just, since they would not do justice to the infinite principle in human nature. The rewards and punishments which are the consequences of a satisfied or dissatisfied conscience, have another and a higher purpose than that of affording pain or pleasure for past virtues or sins. The pain by which conscience punishes a bad action, is an incentive to repentance and reform; and the joy by which conscience rewards the virtuous deed, is an impulse to higher moral effort. There is no vice so abject, from which the voice of God within him, does not call back the sinner to virtue; and there is no pain of conscience so great, that is not transformed into joy, if the sinner obeys its call. The kingdom of heaven returns to the heart, as soon as that of the world is excluded; and there is joy in heaven over every sinner that repenteth. On the other hand, the peace by which conscience rewards every conquest of self, however glorious, or however humble, is not a luxurious repose, but a temporary invigorating rest, that calls for new and more valiant effort. The punishments of conscience are corrections; that is, checks upon the

* Chr. Ex. N. S. No. XXXVI. pp. 396, 397.

wrong and promptings to the right course, which consists in striving after perfection ; and the rewards of conscience are encouragements to still greater attainments in excellence. Conscience, therefore, in all its promptings, bears witness to the power and destiny of man to rise, through his own free exertion, from any degree of vice, however low, and from any degree of goodness, however high, to higher attainments in excellence and happiness.

Of all the sources of pleasure and pain, conscience is the only one whose dispensations are always marked with perfect justice, even in the present state of existence ; and for this very reason it affords a standard for men in society, and a preconception of the consummation of divine justice in the life to come. This perfect justice distinguishes our moral from our adventitious pleasures and pains. Adventitious I call all the joys or pains that flow from other sources than a satisfied or dissatisfied conscience. The moral state of man does not depend on what is adventitious in his condition. His conscience chides him for a successful, as well as an unsuccessful falsehood ; and it rewards him equally, whether his honesty be followed by prosperity, or ruin. Nevertheless, there exists a natural connexion between moral and adventitious good or evil. They are parts of the state which Providence has assigned to man, and one generally leads to the other. Moral happiness springs from the highest exertion of the will ; adventitious happiness results from the most perfect use of all the other faculties of body and mind, and a condition in life suited to his wants and his powers. It is in striving after the highest adventitious good, that man is checked by the tempting influences of his appetites, which his conscience bids him to subdue, and thereby attain to moral satisfaction. This moral effort generally aids us in the pursuit of adventitious good, be it wealth, or knowledge, or the confidence of men ; and on the other hand, by yielding to selfish desires, we are more likely to bring upon ourselves adventitious evil. Now those sources of adventitious pleasure or pain, which are the natural result of moral effort or negligence, such as well deserved affluence or want, bear a moral character, which distinguishes them from all other adventitious good or evils, such as inherited wealth or poverty.

There is much adventitious good and evil in this world, that is enjoyed or suffered by men, without any good or ill desert of their own. But his moral nature bears evidence to the design of Providence, that man should make adventitious evils sources

of moral pleasure, by overcoming or enduring them with courage and resignation. For this purpose every good and every evil becomes to us a temptation, that it may be converted into a moral good. The man who has inherited a large property, is tempted to use it for luxurious ease, or to lock it up in his chest, while his spirit prompts him to employ it for supplying his fellow men, who are suffering from ignorance and poverty, with the necessities of animal and intellectual life. There is no situation in life, prosperous or adverse, which man cannot make use of to change pain into pleasure, and pleasure into perfect happiness, through virtue. Thus the spiritual and moral nature of man shows the design of Providence, that all adventitious pain and pleasure should serve the purpose of a moral discipline.

The same design is manifest in the common course of natural events, and in society. It is a fact that virtue is generally rewarded by success, and vice punished by suffering. There are indeed many instances of undeserved joy and trouble. But they are few compared with the evidences of retributive justice in the world; and among them there is none, which, on the supposition that the present life is only the beginning of man's existence, cannot result in higher improvement and happiness. The natural feeling, therefore, which calls every human being to the relief of innocent suffering, and to the generous disdain of ill deserved prosperity, seems, indeed, to be a forerunner of a perfect judgment, that shall 'render to every man according to his deeds.'

In the education of children and in society at large, where men are called upon to determine the condition of their fellow-men, and to dispense rewards and punishments, they are bound in conscience to follow the same standard of retributive justice. Conscience demands such an organization of society, as will put means of support, improvement, and happiness, equally within the reach of all. The power to reward and punish should be exercised only to excite and strengthen, not to counteract, or supersede, the retributive judgment in the mind of each individual. Rewards and punishments, when suited to the moral nature of man, are calculated to awaken, by a natural association of ideas, the self-reproving and self-encouraging principle in the soul, which supersedes, in a moral point of view, all outward retribution. Disheartening censure and excessive praise are equally prejudicial to the harvest of moral excellence,

that prospers in the moderate temperature of a true christian discipline. Rewards and punishments, in order to be just, should be not only impartial, correcting and encouraging each one according to his deserts, without respect of persons; but calculated to do justice to the nature and infinite destiny of man. No reward, however well balanced in the scale of merit, no wreath of laurel or of olive, however well deserved, can truly benefit the receiver, unless it direct him to a higher object of exertion, to a crown laid up for him in heaven. On the other hand, all punishment that is not calculated for the improvement of the transgressor, is not just, in the highest sense of the word. No one, whose heart is full of true family affection, ever gives up a son or a brother, as lost to all hope of moral recovery. And he who stretches forth his hands to the whole human family, and says, Behold my mother and my brethren, the true Christian, never despairs of any child of God, but trusts that the wayward child may still return to Him who has eternal life, though he should thrice deny him.

If there are cases in which society is obliged, in its own defence, to exterminate a dangerous enemy of the rights of all, instead of endeavouring to correct him, such measures may be justified as acts of self-defence, but not as punishments or acts of corrective justice. For this requires that no other pain should be inflicted than what is necessary to overpower the criminal desire, and to remind the transgressor of a corrective principle, a court of justice in his own breast, which alone is qualified to answer the true end of a righteous retribution; that is, to restore the offender to society and himself. Every act of mere self-defence is a declaration that it is not in the power of the earthly judge to do full justice to the moral nature of the offender, without endangering the rights of all; and the spirit of justice looks up to a higher power, that can say to the malefactor on the cross, 'Today shalt thou be with me in paradise.'

Every punishment is an evil that would be a crime, if it were not necessary to check the criminal propensity of one who has wilfully infringed the rights of others. Accordingly any unnecessary evil inflicted for other purposes than that of correction, and any evil that exceeds the amount of what is accounted necessary for this end, is a crime committed by the punisher against the offender. No punishment is just but what

is founded on wilful transgression, and calculated to correct or reform the transgressor.

I shall be told by some, that correction of the offender is not the true, or at least not the only true object of punishment. It is intended as a terrifying or warning example for others. But if punishment be considered as an example for others, and this consideration should be allowed any influence upon the amount of suffering to be inflicted, I would ask, Is it meant to be an example of justice, or injustice? If of justice, then punishment is justified no farther than it is calculated, as a salutary evil, to secure society against the criminal disposition of the offender. If it exceeds this end, it will array all the natural and moral sympathies of men on the side of the punished; or if it operates at all as an example, it will only exemplify the doctrine, that the power of punishing is sufficient to justify its use.

This may suffice to show, that all correct ideas of retributive justice, are derived from the mode in which every one is rewarded and punished by his own conscience; that accordingly all rewards and punishments, in order to be just, must be adapted to the real desert of the individual, and calculated for his improvement.

I have said before, that there is no situation in the life of man which cannot be made subservient to moral improvement, since there is none which is not exposed to temptation. The selfish principle in his nature tempts him to use all that in any way belongs to him, to satisfy his appetites and passions. Love of ease, or money, or honor, or power, contends in the soul of man with philanthropy and piety, for the use of his property, talents, knowledge, and every kind of advantage and excellence. There is no degree of merit so high as to place man beyond the reach of temptation, or to prevent him from rising still higher. And, on the other hand, there is no degree of vice so low, that man cannot, by his own will, degrade himself still more. There is an infinity in vice as well as in virtue, showing forth the exhaustless and incalculable power of the moral nature of man.

There are different degrees of temptation and of virtue. A man whose virtue is proof against a bribe in the shape of money, may be corrupted by flattery, or awed into wrong by authority. Thus there are three degrees of temptation and of virtue implied in this saying of Paul, 'Let him that stole, steal no more; but rather let him labor, that he may have to give to him that

needeth.* He who stole overcomes the lowest degree of temptation, by his virtuous resolution to steal no more. But though he has conquered the desire of dishonest gain, he is still subject to that of indolence, which is to be overcome by a higher effort, the determination to labor. Yet with all this he may be avaricious and a miser, laboring for himself only, not for others; and this third degree of temptation requires a still greater degree of moral effort, in order to add to the virtues of honesty and industry, that of charity. Our moral power grows by constant exercise, and what once required an effort, is rendered easy by habit. But the demands of conscience, and the temptations to disregard them, grow in proportion to our strength. The power and glory which a man has won by his merits, if it does not operate as an incentive to more glorious efforts, will prove a stumbling-block, and betray him either into criminal ambition, or indolent self-content.

I have endeavoured to give a succinct description of the moral powers of man, to show, how, by the cooperation of conscience and free-agency, by self-command and self-obedience, he is able to render himself worthy of existence and happiness, and to look upon every step in his endless progress, as in part his own work. Is it reasonable to suppose that the power of man to act according to his choice, to work out and to merit his own happiness, that his moral nature, which alone distinguishes him from the animal, and constitutes him the fellow worker with God, should be extinguished by death? Take all we have, and all we are, is there anything in human nature, on which we can rest our hope of immortality, unless it be the evergrowing power of virtue—the power to overcome temptation and to press on to the mark of the high calling of God, to godlike derfection? Can it be supposed that that principle in our nature, which enables and prompts us to sacrifice property, health, all the endearments of life, and life itself, should itself be subjected to death?

I shall be told by some, that the consequences of our moral efforts will remain forever, although there will be no more occasion for any farther exertion, in a state in which there is no temptation to be overcome. Those who have attained to a state of heavenly joy, will be conscious that they are still the same beings, and that their present happiness is the result of

* Eph. iv. 28.

their own virtue. They will either immediately be made as perfect and happy as man can be, or they will be carried on, by an irresistible and ever increasing impulse, to higher degrees of excellence and happiness.

Against this opinion I would observe, that the highest moral happiness does not result from the recollection of past virtue, but from actual moral exertion. If, then, in a future state all occasion for virtuous effort ceases, the vital principle, the very root of moral happiness, is cut off. If we are made to enjoy a felicity which we are not continually producing and deserving, if we are carried on to higher states of perfection by an irresistible impulse, we are no longer the same beings; and if we are still conscious of what we have been, we cannot help perceiving that we are not changed from glory to glory, but that we are transformed from moral agents into animals governed by instinct. By these reasons I am led to the conclusion, that there will be in heaven as well as on earth, opportunities to deserve, as well as enjoy happiness. There will be occasions for the exercise of every kind of virtue, of self-denial, of incorrupted justice, and perfect love casting out fear and sacrificing the greatest good we possess for the highest felicity to be obtained by virtue. If we believe in the immortality of our moral nature, we must suppose, that, in every successive stage of our existence, greater moral efforts will be required in overcoming greater temptations, and that thus endless felicity is to be gained by ever growing virtue.

Indeed, if we are right in drawing inferences for the life to come from what the present state has revealed to us of our nature, we may trust that opportunities of deserving what we enjoy, will not only continue to exist, but increase in number and importance. The infant, being born in utter dependence on others for support and comfort, is evidently designed by Providence to be educated to depend on himself, on his own efforts in active life. Accordingly I believe that the whole present state of man, is designed to educate him for a still greater independence on outward circumstances, and for reliance on his own exertions for happiness in the life to come.

If we believe in man's immortality, we must suppose that man in a future state will essentially be the same being, and consequently a moral agent; that is, a being free to choose between the injunctions of conscience and the instigations of opposing appetites. As a moral agent he must still be liable to

be tempted by any advantage he possesses or expects, to neglect exerting himself for a higher but more distant good, and capable of rising above every temptation. He must still be able, by constant virtue, to enjoy, every moment of his existence, the highest happiness of which human nature is susceptible, which consists in moral satisfaction; and on the other hand he must be able to persevere in sin, and consequently in moral misery.

If man is an immortal moral agent, he must be able, at every moment of his existence, to turn from virtue to sin, and return to virtue. This is a principle founded on the moral nature of man, and therefore not confined to this life. This is set forth in scripture frequently and fully. Thus Ezekiel* says, 'The soul that sinneth, it shall die, but the man that doeth what is lawful and right shall save his soul alive.' The same prophet goes on to say, 'If the righteous man turneth away from his righteousness and committeth iniquity, for his iniquity that he hath done, shall he die.' 'Again, when the wicked man turneth away from his wickedness and doeth that which is lawful and right, he shall surely live, he shall not die.' The principle which is here so explicitly taught, belongs to the essence of man's moral nature, and must therefore apply to the future state as well as the present.

The power to choose between good and evil, cannot be destroyed by any act of its own; that is, by any choice and determination that may be formed. The most constant moral exertion does not preclude forever a relapse into sin. It only fits the mind for higher effort. It is, as I have observed, the first part of man's duty to ascertain the whole, and to act according to the result of his faithful inquiry; and no doubt every new sphere upon which man enters in his endless progress, will require on his part adequate moral exertions in directing his intellectual and active powers to know and to perform his ever increasing duty. And surely, He who created man a moral agent, will certainly open to him spheres of action adapted to his growing capacities.

On the other hand, faith in the immortality of the moral nature of man leads us to suppose, that, neither in the future nor the present life, man can sink so low as not to be able to rise again by the same power by which he has degraded himself.

* Chap. xviii.

Though he be dead in sin, he can rise again from his self-made grave, by the undying energy of his moral nature, aided by the active and enlightened sympathy of his fellow-beings, and the redeeming love of God. 'Come now, let us reason together, saith the Lord; though your sins be as scarlet, they shall be as white as snow; though they be red as crimson, they shall be as wool.' Only let it not be supposed that any artificial dye, or even the hot waters of repentance, can restore to the face that is flushed with crime, the native beauty of innocence. Nothing can cleanse the noble metal from its base alloy but fiery trials, a moral regeneration, wrought out by unwearied struggles, and resistance unto blood against the craft and violence of temptation.

The mountain path of virtue that leads to the glory of moral transfiguration, is accessible to the sinner as well as to the righteous. But while the just man ascends in the strength of holy joy, the sinner has to clamber upward under the load of his guilt; and if he delay throwing it off beyond the term of this life, his burthen will become a mountain load. Yet faith, the spirit of virtue, may then, even then, remove mountains. For who would doubt or limit the power and the goodness of Him, who has endowed man with this power to rise and to fall, and by his own choice to rise again from the lowest fall? This very gift of a free moral nature, implies the assurance that the gates of mercy will never, at least not forever, be closed against a penitent child, whenever and wherever the starving soul asks the bread of life of a father, whose mercy is greater than our sins, who is infinite in love as in power and wisdom.

From the previous considerations I do not see how any one, believing in the immortality of man's moral nature, can doubt that man will, throughout the eternity of his existence, retain the power to make himself, by his own choosing, an angel of light or darkness.

Man's conscience, also, will survive death to encourage and warn, to reward and punish, according to the same eternal principles of retributive justice. The state of happiness or suffering, which is the result of a satisfied or dissatisfied conscience, will still be distinct from, and superior to, all adventitious pleasure and pain.

But not only the moral powers of man, the moral character also which he has formed in this life, will enter with him upon the future. When all those external distinctions, great and

small, by which our condition in this world is determined, shall have passed away, our character, with all its lights and shades, will endure, and establish our standing in the future. Of all our possessions in this life, nothing will remain to us except what even now is most truly our own—our virtues and our sins. A record of our whole life will be laid open within us, from which at present our memory is able to quote only separate passages—a faithful record of our moral history, in which not a single event, not the slightest tendency of our will, is omitted. The character of man is never formed, but always forming. It is the natural and gradual working of that moral capacity which man brings with him into this world as an outfit for eternity.

I have spoken of the future state of the moral nature and character of man. My last question regards the external condition of man as a moral agent; I mean such adventitious good and evil, as bears a moral character. We have seen that in this life the condition of man, the state of his health, property, intellectual progress, and standing in society, are frequently, though not always, in conformity to his moral character. When we consider the nature of man and the elements of society, we perceive that it must have been the design of creative Providence that man's external condition should depend on his real worth, even in this life; but that this design was not carried into effect by absolute force, but entrusted to man as a free and responsible being. It is the abuse of this trust which frequently obscures the just design of the Creator. Therefore, when we see so much unfair dealing, deceit, and oppression among men in the life that now is, we look forward to that which is to come, as the great 'jubilee, when liberty shall be proclaimed throughout the world, and to all the inhabitants thereof, and every man shall return to his possession.'

Some are inclined to think, that, in the future state of man, there will be no enjoyments or pains besides those which consist in the approbation or disapprobation of his own conscience; that this alone is to be his heaven or his hell. But the pleasure we derive from improvement in knowledge, and the pain which results from ignorance, independent of our moral efforts or negligence, are not less real though they are inferior to moral happiness or misery. The same is to be said of the pleasure or pain we experience from the virtue and love, or the evil conduct and misery of others. These adventitious pleasures and

pains have a foundation in the nature of man, and belong to his immortal self. Still more, they are necessary to the exercise of his moral powers, and consequently to the attainment of moral happiness. There can be no virtue, or moral effort, without temptation to be overcome. Now there is no temptation in mere disobedience to the voice of conscience, no pleasure in wickedness as such. There must, then, be an intrinsic charm in those things which are contrary to conscience; otherwise there could never be in the soul a conflict of motives and a moral victory. On the other hand, the end of virtue is to obtain moral satisfaction by causing the spiritual desires to prevail over lower interests. But the spiritual, as well as the selfish desires, are not productions of man's own will; they are necessary for the exercise of it, whether for virtue or sin. Accordingly, it is to be presumed that there will be in the future life adventitious good and evil, selfish and spiritual pleasures and motives, distinct from moral capacities and attainments, though constantly cooperating with them in essentially the same manner as in the present state.

In examining the future condition of man as a moral agent, I shall consider, first, those adventitious pleasures and pains which man enjoys or suffers, independently of his own merit or demerit; and then those which he experiences in consequence of virtue or vice,—his future rewards and punishments.

As man is created with the desire of happiness, his own nature leads him to believe that its Author, in order to do justice to his own work, will let him suffer no more pain than what is necessary to his improvement and happiness. All men being created with essentially the same immortal capacities and desires, the same trust in divine justice leads us to suppose, that, in regard to the adventitious good and evil which is distributed among men without reference to their desert, a perfect equality will be observed. There is, however, in this world, much inequality in the natural condition of men, even if we do not consider the artificial distinctions of their own invention. True, we find in every individual the essentials of the same nature, implying the same immortal destiny. But they differ widely in the means to obtain the end for which all seem created—in natural advantages, bodily and mental faculties, and in the success or failure of their various undertakings. But there is an equalizing design apparent even in this diversity of natural gifts.

The different qualities and talents we discover in various individuals, seem to be designed to make up for the peculiar defects of each. Still more, God has implanted in every human soul a thriving branch of his own love for the whole human race, that each may find his own happiness only in the happiness of all; and especially of those who are least able to take care of their own interests. The partiality of a mother for the weakest of her children, is only justice in disguise; and the principle from which this feeling flows, belongs, in fact, to every mind that has not lost its natural tone.

Still there remains much inequality in the condition of men, which can be reconciled with the idea of overruling justice, only by considering the present state as but a part of the moral discipline to which all are necessarily and constantly subjected. In order to bring to light all the powers which are laid up in the nature of man, and to improve upon them by his own exertions, it seems necessary that he should pass through the school of adversity as well as that of prosperity. I have said that every good he possesses becomes to man, on the one hand a temptation to rest satisfied with this possession, and on the other an encouragement to use it as an instrument of greater excellence. Every evil becomes a temptation either to submit to it pusillanimously, or to be impatient under it; whereas misfortune might and should be an incentive to fortitude and pious resignation. Thus all adventitious good and evil is suited for moral improvement; and as this double discipline is necessary for all men, simply as moral agents, it is a natural consequence of our trust in the distributive justice of God, to believe that no individual will experience more pain, or less satisfaction, than any other. Each one, in his time, will receive his equal share of undeserved good and evil; and no one more than is necessary for his improvement.

This view solves all doubts with regard to the distributive justice of God, which arise from the unequal division of good and evil in this world. Whether a person receive his good things or evil things in this life, or in the future, does not affect the justice of the dispensation. Every one enjoys undeserved good, that he may acquire those virtues which can only be gained by the right use of prosperity, and suffers only so much evil as is necessary to acquire that moral strength, which is the fruit of a spirit rising above it. That all are not happy or unhappy at the same time, affords an opportunity for a third

class of virtues to spring up; namely, on the part of the sufferers to see others enjoy without envy, and on that of the happy to deserve their blessings by imparting them to those who are in want. It is evident, moreover, that, by acquiring those virtues for which prosperity is the natural condition, we fortify ourselves beforehand against the temptations connected with want; and the same is true when want comes before prosperity. For all temptations spring from one source, and all virtues are only different forms of moral excellence.

By the manner in which a person uses the good and evil he meets with, according or contrary to the injunctions of his conscience, he becomes a subject of retributive justice. He is rewarded and punished by his own conscience, and this retributive judgment, while it dispenses moral pleasure and pain, applies also to his external condition. He enjoys whatever external advantages he obtains by his moral efforts, more highly, and suffers for the sad consequences of his sins more keenly, because he feels that he deserves what he enjoys or suffers. On the contrary, his pleasures are marred, and his sufferings are soothed by the thought that he does not deserve them. The external condition of men in this world corresponds to the manner in which each one judges himself by his conscience, only so far as to convince us of the design of Providence, that whatever is imperfect in the dispensation of rewards and punishments in this life, is permitted, only that it may give rise to the virtue of bearing even injustice with equanimity, and that absolute justice will be rendered in the end by God's own judgment.

We believe in the retributive justice of God when we trust that God will judge every individual as he is judged by his own conscience, according to his good or ill desert. 'Say ye to the righteous that it shall be well with him; for he shall eat the fruit of his doings. Wo unto the wicked, it shall be ill with him; for the reward of his hands shall be given him.'* This principle, that every one shall be judged according to his deserts, which is so often set forth in scripture, and with indelible characters engraved upon the heart, implies the three above-mentioned qualities of retributive justice.

In the first place, God will reward and punish man only for such actions and omissions as depended on his own free will.

* Isai. iii. 10, 11.

A righteous retribution, or recompense adapted to the real merit or demerit of each individual, is inconceivable, unless he be considered as a free agent. You may as well attach merit and think of reward as due to the fig tree for bearing sweet fruit, or impute malevolence and award punishment to the hemlock for containing poison, as speak of good and ill desert in man, of virtue to be rewarded, and sin to be condemned, if every action and intention of man is predetermined by absolute necessity. A judge who should condemn a man because he is born blind, would be deprived of his office. He who should award the civic crown to him who had inherited the largest property, would be thought distracted. And is it possible to conceive that God should punish man because he has created and predetermined him to be wicked, or that he should reward him for being compelled to do right? It is evident that a belief in universal predestination, is in fact a denial of all that can be called reward or punishment, merit or demerit, virtue or vice, in this life as well as in the future.

But a righteous retribution supposes, not only that man is a free agent, but that the particular act, also, for which he is to be judged, should have depended on his own free will. Thus man is to be judged according to the degree in which he has exerted himself, or neglected opportunities of forming just conceptions of religion. But for the conceptions themselves which are the result of his faithful inquiry, whatever they be—for his creed, he deserves neither reward nor punishment. For it is indeed in our power to open or shut the eye of the mind to the light of truth, and to improve or spoil our vision; but it is not in our power to see things differently from what they appear to our senses or our understanding. That only which depends on our own choice and determination, is a proper subject of retribution; and to say that a person believes a thing because he chooses and is determined to believe it true, is as much as to say, that he does not believe it. Free agency, then, is the first requisite for a just retribution. All the promptings, the promises, and threats of conscience and of scripture, are empty sounds and signs, if man is not a moral agent, free to obey or disregard them. 'If I had not come and spoken unto them,' says Jesus, 'they had not had sin; but now they have no cloak for their sin.'*

* John xv. 22.

The second essential attribute of a just dispensation of rewards and punishments, consists in their being adapted to the good or ill desert of each individual; that is, to the degree in which he has exerted himself, or wilfully neglected, to ascertain and perform his duty. Every one will experience as much good and as much evil, as his good or bad intentions have deserved according to the decision of his own conscience, which not only distributes rewards and punishments of its own, but contains the promise of a state of pleasure or pain adapted to our deserts. Reason and revelation establish the belief that the messenger of God in the soul of man, his own conscience, as it is the judge of his present conduct, is also the prophet of the life to come.

This principle, that rewards and punishments in the life to come, will be commensurate to the good or ill desert of each individual, involves two great truths. It asserts, in the first place, the necessary and eternal connexion between goodness and happiness, wickedness and misery. No doctrine is more clearly taught in scripture, or more powerfully insisted upon by the gospel of justice in our own hearts, than this;—that they that have done good, shall come unto the resurrection of life, that is of happiness, and they that have done evil, unto the resurrection of damnation,* that is, condemnation to punishment. The doctrine that all men shall be saved from future punishment, whether they have done good or evil, contradicts the prophet in our heart. It is opposed to the belief in divine justice and a moral government of the world, and undermines the faith in immortality itself. For if we examine the experience of all ages and our own, we find that the most powerful motive for men to look forward to a life to come, consists in the sad contrast between the moral law and judgment within us, and the present state of the world, in which virtue so often is compelled to beg alms and existence of successful wickedness. The success of vice and oppression of virtue are reproaches against the Ruler of all Events, unless we suppose that God allows virtue to sow in tears, only that it may reap in glory; and that he suffers the tower of pride to be raised so high, only that it may more surely attract the lightnings of divine justice. Vice indeed is allowed to hold out pleasures and to afford them for a time, so that man, by his own free effort, may deserve

* John v. 28, 29.

and anticipate the distant spiritual good ; but the future judgment, as a full revelation of perfect justice, will surely establish the principle, that his choice of the tempting present will as surely lead to greater future ill, as that his timely forbearance will be justified by satisfaction in the end. The artificial gratifications of sense and passion, contrived by men in this world to beguile their own reason with regard to the true state of their being, will then appear what they really are—unsuccessful attempts at a moral suicide. The wicked will in vain endeavour to appropriate to themselves enjoyments due only to the good. ‘The righteousness of the righteous shall be upon him, and the wickedness of the wicked shall be upon him.’

But the prospect of a future retribution implies not merely a decided difference in the end that is set before virtue and that which awaits wickedness. As there are many degrees of merit and of guilt, it is manifest that the same reason which we have for believing that virtue will be followed by happiness, and vice by misery, must lead us to infer that the degree of future enjoyment and suffering will be in exact proportion to the amount of merit and of guilt. ‘He that soweth sparingly shall reap also sparingly ; and he that soweth bountifully shall reap also bountifully.’*

The amount of joy and of suffering to be awarded, must be determined by the true end of rewards and punishments, which implies the third essential characteristic of a righteous retribution. If the above stated views of justice in general are true, they lead to the conclusion that the recompense, in order to be just, must be calculated for the moral improvement of man. The punishments must be corrective, incentives to repentance and reform ; the rewards must be impulses to higher moral effort. The punishments inflicted, and the rewards conferred, cannot be just without doing justice to the nature of man ; and consequently they cannot be calculated to destroy his free agency and capacity of infinite improvement, by depriving him of the possibility to rise, through virtue, from any degree of wickedness and misery to goodness and happiness, or from any degree of excellence to higher attainments in perfection.

Conscience, by its punishments, calls the sinner to repentance. It promises to him who is dead in sin, a moral resurrection ; while its highest rewards lead us humbly to acknowledge

* 2 Cor. ix. 6.

how far our proudest attainments are below the high mark of our calling. The conscientious parent punishes and rewards his child to improve him. Society, in dispensing rewards and punishments in the way of legislation, and by the approving or condemning expression of public sentiment, has or ought to have no other object than to remove all obstacles, and add new incitements, to the free unfolding of the powers, taste, and talents of its members, to rise to higher degrees, and thus to raise the standard of human excellence. Conscience demands and promises a condition that meets and strengthens the feelings of retributive joy and pain which it bestows, in being adapted to the good or ill desert of the individual, and calculated for his moral improvement. And this promise, which parents and society are called upon to realize, is it not the promise of the Author of conscience? We may rest assured, then, that the sentence of the Supreme Judge will not reverse, but confirm the precedent he has himself established in our moral nature, the verdict of our own conscience.

This view of the true end of a righteous retribution leads me to infer, that the duration as well as the degree of future rewards and punishments, will be determined solely by a regard to the true interest of the individual. Every one will receive as much enjoyment or pain, and for such a length of time, as he deserves, and needs for his moral improvement.

The gospel of Christ, in many passages, seems to be opposed to the view of future rewards and punishments, as means of moral improvement. In describing the future condition of the good and the bad, Jesus says, 'These shall go away into everlasting punishment; but the righteous into life eternal;'^{*} that is, eternal happiness. I shall not attempt an explanation of every passage that relates to this subject; nor enter into controversy with those who seem more anxious to embrace the dead letter than the life giving spirit, and are intent upon finding out what is new in theory, rather than what is practical and eternal in the gospel of Christ. The great practical object, which is manifest in all that was revealed by Jesus of the life to come, seems to suggest the true explanation of such passages. The success of vice and the oppression of virtue in this world, seemed to give the lie to the truth that is asserted by conscience in all its promptings and

^{*} Matt. xxv. 46.

judgments, that virtue must always be productive of happiness, and vice of suffering. Jesus came to save this truth and to establish the faith that is founded upon it. His object was to strengthen the commands of conscience, whose promises and threats proved insufficient to sustain the virtuous under oppression, and to restrain the oppressor by the certain prospect of a righteous retribution. Jesus promises everlasting happiness to the good, and everlasting misery to the wicked; but he nowhere says, that those who have been virtuous or vicious once, or for some time, shall continue to be so forever. This, indeed, would imply a contradiction, as present and continued goodness or wickedness does not consist in a mere habit acquired by past virtue or vice, but in actual moral efforts, or disregard of conscience. Now it is evident that the righteous, who are deemed worthy of eternal reward, are not those who have been righteous for some time, but have afterward become vicious; and that the wicked who will be condemned to perpetual suffering, are not those who have afterward repented and reformed. For it is said, 'If the wicked will turn from all his sins, and do that which is lawful and right, in his righteousness he shall live.' And again; 'When the righteous turneth away from his righteousness, and committeth iniquity, in his trespass and in his sin, in them shall he die.' The righteous, therefore, who shall be blessed forever, are those who persevere in well doing; and the wicked who are doomed to suffer forever, are those who persevere in vice. Blessing is here evidently made to depend on virtue, and suffering on vice; and the continuation of bliss or suffering on man's persevering in virtue or in vice. The great practical truth, then, contained in all those passages, is simply this; that perpetual happiness is the certain reward of persevering virtue, and perpetual misery the certain punishment of continued vice. This is true already in this life, with regard to our moral pleasures and pains; and will be true with regard to our condition in general, in the life to come. The perseverance itself, whether in virtue or vice, depends and must always depend, upon our own free will.

Angels may fall through sin; and if angels can fall, they can also rise again through virtue. When the rich man in the parable,* asked for himself only one drop of that abundance

* Luke xvi.

which the beggar Lazarus enjoyed, his request was denied, because he claimed a gratification he had not deserved. But though in his lifetime he had not treated Lazarus as a brother, there was a spark of true affection in his soul, an anxious thought of his five brothers in his father's house; and the torments which had not consumed, but brought to light this precious remnant of humanity in him, were surely intended to aid him in purifying his whole being. The shepherd will go in search of the sheep that has gone astray; and will a father's heart be inaccessible to the prayer of a penitent child, though it rise from the abyss of self-created misery? Nay, the son of perdition, with the undying worm in his heart, if he strive, and strain to the utmost all the immortal energies of his nature, to wrestle with his own fiendish self, and lay hold of the altar of refuge, the seat of unbounded mercy, will surely see the ray of salvation dawn upon the night of his despair, and the psalm of thanksgiving will burst from his heart,—‘If I make my bed in hell, behold, thou art there!’

I would say, then, in the words of scripture, ‘Happy is the man whom the Lord correcteth.’—‘As a man chasteneth his son, so the Lord thy God chasteneth thee.’

The manner in which a person bears the rewards or punishments awarded to him, forms the subject of further retribution; and thus, not only is the present life a state of probation for the future, not only is the future a state of retribution for the present; but every moment is a preparation for the future, as it is the reward of the past. Our whole existence is a state of perpetual probation, and of continual adequate retribution. The perpetuity of the moral state of man, is a necessary consequence of the immortality of his moral being, the loss of which would imply that of his identity, and consequently of his immortality. For if we believe the soul of man eternal, we must suppose that throughout eternity he will be essentially the same being.

In this respect, also, will the divine judgment probably correspond with that of our own conscience;—that every one shall be judged, not only for single actions or omissions, but for the moral character he forms by a continued performance or neglect of his duty. We shall have to render an account for the moral progress we have made, or neglected to make, during certain seasons of probation. The present life is, to those who have experienced most of its vicissitudes, such a season

of moral probation, for which they will be called to an account in the judgments of God. Those who, by an early death, or by other circumstances, are prevented from forming a moral character in this life, will not be left without an opportunity of deserving, as well as enjoying, the happiness for which they were created. Thus, for every season of moral probation, man will have to look forward to a day of judgment.

If the above views of future retribution are correct, they establish a harmony in all the cases in which the power of dispensing rewards and punishments is exercised. All that is sacred and dear to man is secured by this invaluable trust, that God is just, that he will judge the world according to the same principles of retributive justice by which each individual judges himself through his own conscience; the same principles by which parents should be guided in the education of their children, and men in society. Man is to be judged only for such actions or omissions as depend on his own choice. His rewards and punishments are to be in exact proportion to his good or ill desert, and calculated for his moral improvement.

On the contrary, if we suppose that God will judge men in the future, according to different principles from those by which they do, or ought to, judge themselves in the present life, we destroy the natural connexion between our social duties and religion. If there be such a difference between divine and human justice, it is impossible that our various social relations should derive from religion that sanction and strength, which we justly consider as the invisible and eternal security of the life of man in society. How can the just man trust in God, how can the unjust fear him, if justice and morality are not essentially the same in heaven and on earth? It is vain to expect that a view to the life to come, will induce men to conform their present condition to the dictates of justice, if they suppose that God will judge men without regard to the ability of each individual to perform his obligations, and the degree of his merit or guilt; and that he will reward or punish them for any other purpose, or in any other manner, than what is calculated to do justice to the moral nature of his immortal children. The ancient Greeks and Romans, while their public affairs were regulated, in a great measure, by principles of justice, continued to worship a host of gods charged with actions which would have banished them from the sacred home of civil freedom. The gods they worshipped could be no longer to them standards

of conduct, models for imitation; and this want of a rational faith in the existence of sovereign justice, proved a more fatal enemy to the freedom of the ancient world, than all the successful craft and violence of its great tyrants. Such has been, and such must be, the fate of every nation whose ideas of the character of God and the duty and destiny of man are not more exalted than their own actual state of improvement; whose practical and living creed is not founded on the belief that God is just, and will do justice to the free and ever-growing nature, and the moral character of man.

Is it said that the scriptures frequently speak of divine justice in terms which do not agree with the essential requisites of perfect human justice? The scriptures establish and enforce the eternal principles of retributive justice; but they are often clothed in figurative language, calculated to render them plain and impressive, particularly to the primitive hearers and readers of the word. But these figurative illustrations were surely not intended to be taken for the eternal truths themselves, and thus to become instruments of a strange idolatry of scripture words and images.—The race of Greece was run when those noble pioneers of knowledge and freedom, instead of consulting the revelation of truth and of glory in the inexhaustible resources and endless strivings of the soul, worshipped their own greatness and the idol representatives of their passions and fancies. And the doom of Christendom is sealed, if Christians, instead of grounding their faith upon the simple principles of moral and religious truth which are promulgated alike in nature and scripture, insist upon worshipping the imagery of scripture language, and their own creed—thus setting up the temporary result of their own investigation, or indolent assent, as the unalterable, universal, and infallible platform of faith and practice.

These are some of the fundamental provisions of that charter of freedom which God has established in human nature. High in the firmament of the human mind, he has placed the sun of righteousness, to rise and to set at our own bidding. He has entrusted us with the great seal of our own destiny, with the power to establish our own perpetual misery by continuing in wickedness, or to lay hold on eternal life by perseverance in well doing.

In the foregoing observations on the future state of man,

I have endeavoured to consider all the constituent powers and most important manifestations of his nature. It was my intention to enter, and to lead my readers more deeply, into that revelation of the future state of man which every one possesses in his actual being. If our views of the life to come are founded upon what is real and essential in our present being, there is little danger of running into unprofitable dreams of a passive state of rapture or torment, without a moral object, and consequently without a satisfactory influence upon our present conduct. I have spoken separately of the body and of the mind of man, with its chief faculties, the intellect, the affections, and the moral powers. I have spoken first of the future state of each faculty by itself, and then of the attainments we make by exercising it in this life. This separate consideration of the various constituents of human nature, seemed necessary in order to be definite and distinct on each subject. But it is impossible to form a correct view of any part or power of man, without considering it in connexion with all the other faculties and attainments which centre in each human being as one immortal self.

I have not expressed in this article the opinions of any sect or party, but simply my own particular views.* However I may have failed of doing justice to the subject, I am conscious that my only object has been that which was expressed in the great question of Pilate. I now commit this humble effort to that spirit to which Christ committed the solution of that question.

ART. II.—*The Westminster Confession of Faith, with the Larger and Shorter Catechisms.*

WE place this book at the head of an essay upon early religious instruction, not because we mean to have any direct reference to its pages, but because we consider it the parent of most of the errors existing on that most interesting subject.

* The principles contained in this article I first advanced in a treatise 'On the Destiny of Man,' published 1823, in the two first numbers of the *Literary Journal of the University of Bale*.

At least we are not acquainted with any other work, which has had so extensive an influence, and we think it cannot fail to bear us out in any representations of erroneous practice on this subject, which we may feel obliged to notice.

Much has been said of late on the topic of education; and improvements are continually making in the adaptation of elementary instruction particularly to the infant mind. Yet there is one most important branch of instruction, which still seems enveloped in difficulty and darkness. The best mode of imparting religious and moral truth to children in their earliest years, is yet a subject of anxious inquiry. — There must be a way, and there is undoubtedly a way, to bring up our children in the ‘nurture and admonition of the Lord.’ But what that way is, we believe is as yet as unsettled a question in intellectual and moral science as has ever been proposed. There cannot be one more interesting. For that there has been a general failure in giving children such religious impressions as exert a happy influence on their hearts and conduct, we think the experience of almost every one will bear witness. The cause of this failure may be a profitable subject of inquiry; and if it be found to exist in erroneous notions generally prevalent, an exposure of these errors is the first step towards the discovery we are so anxious to attain.

The whole bearing of the religious instruction of children, is, and ever has been, rather to keep them from sinning, than to inspire them with motives to virtue, and to aid them in its acquisition. This has given the subject its sombre and unlovely aspect to them; and the whole system of associations must be changed, before it can become a grateful one to the heart of a child. Most of us can remember, that our earliest religious impressions were the gloomiest we ever knew; utterly repugnant to our nature, ruinous to all our innocent enjoyments; and we have longed to deliver our own children from similar perversions. But how to make them feel religious sanctions without occasioning this distaste, has been a source of anxious, and we might almost say, fruitless experiment; nor have we received much assistance from the sermons, theories, and numberless other attempts to make the matter more easy.

To us it appears, that the grand difficulty lies at the very starting point. As we have intimated, the aim from the beginning should be, not to lay the foundation of religion in its terrors to evil doers, but in its encouragements and rewards to

those who do well. That its efficacy would thus be diminished, no one who has had any acquaintance with children, can suppose. For while all the ardor of their spirits is at once aroused by a motive which strikes them agreeably, it is but a sullen or unwilling, far indeed from a joyous obedience, which they ever give to a threatened punishment. Our meaning may be illustrated by a familiar example.

A child, so young as scarcely to be able to discern between truth and falsehood, speaks them indiscriminately. By way of correction, the parent begins by telling him it is wrong to lie, and he must not do it. But, forgetting the line upon line and precept upon precept which she bestows on his other faults, and looking on this in the child, in the same light that she would regard it in the man, she becomes seriously alarmed by its repetition, and determines to make a final effort to subdue it, not as she would do did she consider the sin against her own commands merely—by a resort to Solomon's advice, but by bringing before his quick imagination the awful tribunal of God, against whom the offence is committed. She takes him on her knee with tender concern, tells him first the story of Ananias and Sapphira, and then teaches him to repeat that hymn of Watts's, which represents God with his 'great book,' in which he 'writes every lie that children tell,' and ends with

'————— every liar
Shall have his portion in the lake
Which burns with brimstone and with fire.'

She has done her work indeed! The child, in deadly terror, never tells another lie. But alas! at what an expense has she laid the foundation of truth in that child's mind. She may labor to make him love his God, but she will labor in vain. He may strive in maturer life for that love which casteth out fear, but never, until the day when God shall wipe all tears from our eyes, shall he see him as he is; never, till that hour, will that mortal heart be free from the fearful impression. Thus a hearty dislike to the thought of God is unwittingly implanted with the earliest religious lesson that childhood receives; and when the parent discovers it, she sets it down as a legitimate inheritance from Adam and Eve. But the truth is, that, if children could love the picture of God which is first given them in this way, it would be the strongest argument we could have of their native depravity. For what must be the original constitution of a mind, which would turn with involuntary af-

fection to a being whose prevailing trait to them is power, whose favorite exercise of that power is the punishment of sinners, and whose image is ever before them, with his great book, where he writes down all their sins, and his dreadful lake of fire and brimstone, where he punishes them?

Is it said this is a partial and unfair statement; that every parent also presents the benevolent exhibitions of divine power? So they may, and so they undoubtedly do present them. But are they felt by their children as this is felt? By no means. The loveliness of all created nature has no power to charm them, while a scene like this is before their imaginations; and joyful would they be to hear, that such a potentate had withdrawn all his care from them, or to be assured that he had retired from his seat of judgment, and changed his lake into a fairer region. And can any one suppose they would be less likely to obey and love him after this relief to their minds?

We know it will be said, But is not this the gospel, and shall we not give our children a knowledge of the truth? To those who consider this language as figurative, we would say, that in giving it to their children, they do not teach them the truth; for they will understand in its most literal sense, what is only figuratively true. To those who consider it literal, we would point to our Saviour's example. He has sufficiently explained to us that young children are not subjects of the denunciations of the gospel; and to apply to them those terrors which he presented to the hardened sinners and accomplished hypocrites of that day, is a monstrous perversion of his example and teaching, and might well be attended by those pernicious consequences which have so abundantly followed from it. Here we receive a powerful condemnation;—‘Of such is the kingdom of heaven;’ and ‘Whosoever shall not receive the kingdom of God as a little child,’ is explicit language, and, if it means anything, implies that a child's heart is not the abode of hellish passions, and no subject for hellish terrors, but that it is prepared by the hand of its Creator for all the happy influences of his religion.

Perhaps we have dwelt too long on this most glaring of all the errors with which this subject is embarrassed. There are others of a milder and less obvious character, which require our consideration. Although there may be some who have escaped this extreme, and many who do not resort to alarms

in the teaching of their children, we suspect that even they have felt, that the impressions they have given of God are far from inspiring filial love. One error of this sort is the confused and indefinite idea of God, which is forced into their minds by what seems to us the mere effect of acting according to popular custom, without a thought of its propriety. In all other departments of instruction, what is to be taught is reduced to its simplest elements, and imparted to the child as he is able to receive it. But with religion, everything is attempted at once. God's power, his omniscience, his omnipresence, his anger, his love, and his hatred, are all presented to him by turns, without a thought of what he is likely to make of all these terms, not one of which conveys to his mind any clear conception. All is done as if in this matter there was to be no progression, as if that science by whose light the human intellect is to be brought to its full developement, was to be opened at once to a child's feeble powers. But is it not manifest that this confused and incomprehensible abstraction, can never be the object of the affections of a child, even though it be attended by some just and affecting delineations of the divine character?

Nearly allied to this is the practice of teaching children 'the doctrines,' as they are called. This error tends to the same confusion as the last, and seems to originate in the same inconsiderate disregard of what a child is able to grasp. In advert- ing to it, we must notice a prevailing practice at the present day, of crowding children's books, of every description, with all the mysteries of the Calvinistic faith. It is not as differing from their writers in regard to these points, that we now speak. As to the doctrines themselves, they may be true or they may be false, their tendency may be salutary or it may be pernicious. This is a separate point, and one on which men differ. But in their relation to the present subject, we think every candid and discriminating parent will agree with us, that their truth or falsehood may be put out of the question. Whether true or false, they are alike injurious. To inculcate them, is to give incomprehensible matter for religion and as food for the infant mind and heart.

We have remarked, that the child's mind is treated as fit for the whole counsel of God, when all other subjects are simplified for it to the last degree, and to prove that it is so, we need but point to one of a thousand instances in the books to which we have alluded. It is a primer of Mrs Sherwood's; and we

choose this lady's writings as an example, because she is one of the most interesting writers for children with whom we are acquainted. Her style is simple and touching, her story well planned, her moral conspicuous, her characters natural, her incidents well chosen. She shows a perception almost miraculous of the motives which are apt to influence children, and has a rare skill in making the good attractive and the evil shunned ; all, in a word, resulting in a powerful moral effect, and all made of no value to those who disapprove her doctrines, or are unwilling to abuse their children's minds by giving them words without knowledge. A technical and obscure theology is so intimately interwoven with the whole, that no reflecting parent, certainly no Unitarian parent, would be willing that his child should read her works. But to return to our subject and the primer. It begins with the A, B, C ; advances as a child must advance, and finishes with a simple story of easy words, well divided to introduce him to the mystery of sentences, but in which the right preparation for heaven is communicated in this very edifying manner ;—' Those who are wash-ed in the blood of Je-sus Christ, will be ta-ken to heav-en when they die ; but those who are not, will be cast into out-er dark-ness.' It would seem like irreverence to set down, in plain terms, what a child's interpretation of this language would be ; not to speak of the uselessness of such teaching for any practical purpose. But in truth, this is nothing, compared with the flood of absurd technicalities which is poured forth from the Sunday School Union press, in thousands of volumes measuring two inches by four, and containing from twelve to fourteen pages, detailing in the simplest language the history of a lamb or a violet, and at the same time artfully presenting the doctrines of original sin, total depravity, salvation by grace, the atonement, trinity, &c., and that, too, in good theological terms. In examining these infant manuals, we have been at a loss which most to admire ; the skill with which all this august matter is incorporated into such a body, or the inconceivable folly of supposing that the mind of a child can thus be impressed with christian feelings, christian motives, or christian hopes.

To illustrate the absurdity of this practice, we need but exalt any other science to the importance of religion, and suppose it subjected to the same process. Let us take grammar, for instance, and imagine it to unfold truths all important to our welfare, and the first to be communicated to our children. What should

we say of the person, who, taking Murray's Abridgement for his manual, should begin with 'orthography, etymology, syntax, and prosody,' and should look for practical results from such explanations as 'common names of substantives stand for kinds containing many sorts, and for sorts containing many individuals under them?' But more than all, should we think it a sign of a corrupt nature, if this teaching were not agreeable to the taste of the child; and if under it his mind and heart should not expand into their full and beautiful proportions? Ah! well do we remember the despair with which we learned by heart this obscure treatise for the twentieth time, without the slightest idea of its application to any earthly purpose, and the grateful joy with which we welcomed the friendly kindness which first took compassion on us, and, by adapting the subject to our capacity, brought light out of darkness, and order from this confusion. And is not the analogy between these two cases perfect?

But the grand inconsistency of the religious teaching we have alluded to, is, that its very first lesson is a 'new heart.' But if this were a matter of easy acquisition—and we do not see how it can be attempted by a child—it might still be a question, whether it would not be easier, more natural and reasonable, if the teaching were adapted to the heart, rather than the heart to the teaching. The day will come, and we wish it might be hastened, when that which has so long been thought a natural barrier to the entrance of religion into the child's mind, will be found the work of man, not of God. The same being made the heart, that made the laws by which that heart should be governed. They are fitted to each other by a master's hand; and distorted indeed is that perception, which fails to see their perfect adaptation to each other. The religion of the gospel is the true element of our moral growth,—the principle by whose energy all the elements of virtue and moral beauty which constitute the human soul, are to be developed and matured. We must see this, and consider religion as something to be used for the accomplishment of an intelligent purpose, before we can know its real value and design. We are not to regard it as something tangible to be given to our children; but as the means in our own hands by which their purposes are to be made habitually virtuous, and their affections secured to such objects as are pure and elevating in their nature;—or, in other words, the means by which they may learn to love God, and obey his commands.

This, then, is the simple result of our religion ;—that love of God which leads to obedience. If, therefore, we can inspire our children with this sentiment, and give them a practical understanding of the christian law of duty, we have a sufficient basis for a christian character. Let us then confine ourselves to these two purposes, and strive to accommodate our instructions to their capacity of understanding, always bearing in mind the natural developement of their faculties, and the principle of improvement on which we depend in teaching them any other subject. Whatever religious impressions we attempt to make on their minds, without reference to these points, either by narratives from the bible or otherwise, tend to confuse them, and are detrimental. If this view be correct, we see that all the ‘distinguishing doctrines,’ as they are called, are alike unfit for our purpose. Even the acknowledged attributes of God must be unfolded to children gradually, and as we see they are needed to promote our ultimate design. By an injudicious use of truth, we may do as much injury as by false representations. By teaching truths really adapted to their age and wants, without a full consideration of the impression which associated circumstances will cause them to make on their minds, we may likewise defeat our own purposes.

For instance, if we first give children a sense of God’s omnipresence, to alarm them, this truth will not aid our endeavours to make them love him ; whereas, by making it their protection in fearful circumstances, or their encouragement in well doing, it will become a welcome and endearing truth. Our first object, as we have said, is to inspire a love of God. Then let our representations of his character be such as shall be captivating to the imagination of childhood. We must watch and improve every opportunity to create a decidedly pleasing idea of God in the child’s mind. It need not be an idea which would bear the test of metaphysical demonstration. It need not be free from associations of human form and person ; for the child will give the human or some other form to God. We must not feel as if we degraded the subject when we suffer it to be thus accommodated to the infancy of life. Is it not by images of sensible objects that the invisible things of God and heaven are communicated to men ? When all the gorgeous imagery of the new Jerusalem—gold, sapphire, and precious stones, is used to describe to us the heavenly country, as better calculated to impress us with a sense of its surpassing beauty

than any delineations of a spiritual nature would be, shall we hesitate to apply the same method to the child's understanding? Will a being who can as yet scarcely perceive the preeminence of truth over falsehood, receive any very captivating impression of God by being told of his moral perfections? But it may be said, Our first teaching is of his care. We would ask if even this may not be premature, so long as the very young child can conceive of no other agency in its supplies, than that of its earthly parents? We do indeed forget, in this matter, that our children are progressive beings; that the knowledge we wish to give them must be communicated by little and little; that its gradual developement must be nicely adjusted to their opening faculties; that their imagination is first to be addressed, their affections next; and that the conscience and understanding are objects of later culture.

One of the first opportunities that a parent has, to communicate the idea of God to her child, is suggested by the child itself. Among its earliest delights are flowers. It reaches with avidity towards a blossom, and when possessed, tears it in pieces with what seems to us senseless folly; and we wonder, that, desiring it so much, it values it so little. But the child is wiser in his generation than we, and takes his enjoyment of the flower in the only way it can yield him pleasure. By and by he holds it in his hand for a long time, or sticks it in his shoes, or frolics about, wearing it as an enviable decoration. But soon a new capacity begins to dawn, and he says, Who made this flower? It is well if in our answer we can confine ourselves to the suggestion of wisdom intimated by the question, and when again he demands, Who is God? refrain from such a description of his works as shall overawe the little mind of the being that is now to receive its first impression. How natural to say—He made the sun and moon and the sky, the earth and everything you can see! And yet how injudicious! since at no age is the idea of inconceivable power unattended by dread. No; let the rose content us; it is enough. You may satisfy his curiosity to know how he made it, without being able to satisfy your own. Tell him that God made him; and he made the rose to give him pleasure. That he made it grow out of the ground; for God can do such things, though men and women cannot. Show him the beautiful color of the blossom, and tell him that no man could paint it so; but that God puts all these colors in the air, and that there he makes them shine on

the leaves and flowers, just as he thinks it best for their beauty, giving to some flowers one color and to others another. Tell him, too, that he gives the flowers their different odors, just as he gives them their colors, and does it all to please us. The material world furnishes the child with his first wonders, and furnishes you with ample materials for giving him pleasing impressions of its Maker. Aim at nothing further until this is done. It will prove the best foundation of filial love. And though it seem to you but a glimpse of his least magnificent attribute, and conveyed in language all unworthy of the subject, yet you may recollect that it is all the child can comprehend, and that it is a ray of that light, however feeble, which shall shine more and more unto the perfect day.

Then the duties of Christianity, how are they to be inculcated? This field in early life is very narrow. One or two precepts are all we can profitably apply to young children; and perhaps we need state no other as an example, than that they 'should do to others as they would that others should do to them.'—This, and others like it, they can be taught to understand and practise as soon as they begin to associate with other children. But this and other principles of action should be given them, not as matters of propriety, or of choice, but with authority, as admitting of no appeal. As they emerge from childhood, they will become fit subjects of that 'perfect law' under whose influence their character is to acquire its true value. And here occurs the grand mistake, which has always prevailed, of making this law spiritless and uninspiring, and thus unattractive to the youthful disposition. And is the genius of the christian law such as of necessity makes it unwelcome to the natural ardor of the youthful spirit? Is the character of its great teacher really destitute of those inspiring traits, which always recommend themselves to their quick and soaring imaginations? We think in both these cases we shall find that the fault lies neither in the subject nor in the being to be affected by it, but that they naturally possess a much happier adaptation to each other, than is generally imagined. We think the subject capable of assuming a very inspiring character to the apprehensions of youth.

The rules of christian duty should be imparted to children in strict connexion with the character of Jesus Christ. But nothing has suffered more than this very character, from mean and unworthy representations. Children are told that he was meek and lowly, and this is about the extent of

their notion concerning him. That it should not be very captivating, is not strange; for if they have any definite idea of these qualities, it is probably derived from some good old woman of their acquaintance, who suffers uncomplainingly, and who, though justly entitled to the praise of emulating her Saviour's spirit, is not the illustration best calculated to recommend him to their imitation or their respect. Let them but see him standing forth among men, his brow clothed with the mild majesty of the Prince of Peace, awfully unapproachable to the proud and hypocritical Pharisee from the open manliness and conscious purity which made him feel how awful goodness is,—yet saying to the sincere and timid, 'Come unto me, for I am meek and lowly in heart,' and we venture to say that the picture and sentiment together, will awaken a chord of pure and ardent feeling, if struck before the heart has become unstrung by perverted teaching. Let them see him invested with all power from God, and left to use it at his own pleasure. He can take the sovereignty of the world to himself. He can sway a universal sceptre over the nations. He can make kings bow, and princes yield him service, 'and exalt himself above the stars of God.' But behold! all the forms of human suffering are before him; the sick—and he can say to disease, Depart! the blind—to the sightless ball he can unveil the visible world; the afflicted—his word can raise the dead, and cause the widow's heart to sing for joy; the deaf—his voice can reach the ear which never heard a sound; the lame—he can bid him walk; the lunatic—he can say to the distracted elements of his brain, Peace, be still! He sees the bondage of cruel despotism blinding men's minds, and immortal souls brought under the slavery of degrading error;—he can open to them the light of heavenly truth. He sees the poor without a beam of mercy to cheer their adversity, with no hope but the grave;—he can tell them of a better country, even a heavenly. He can prove to them, and to all, that the grave shall give up the dead; for he has power to lay down his own life, and he has power to take it again. His choice is made. He enters on his work. He faints not, neither is weary. He scorns to waste an effort to provide for his own comfort. Though he has not where to lay his head, it matters not—he can make thousands of pillows happy, which have been long wet with unavailing tears, and this is rest to him!

Who will say that this representation is not for the spirit of

youth? It will waken an enthusiasm equal at least to any glow which ever followed the actions of the heroes of this world; and it will no longer seem to them a spiritless employment 'to go about doing good.' And then, where will you point them to a picture of the moral sublime, which shall kindle a warmer admiration than his example—the living letter of his instruction? 'Resist not evil.' No rule of his has been thought more abject than this. But let them see him at the close of his labors, when the crisis of his fate approached, contemplating that fate with mortal agony, as combining the most dreadful bodily torture with every wound to the spirit which an ignominious death ever inflicted,—yet, because he saw in it the consummation of his usefulness to mankind, going forth to meet it with a calm self-possession, unshaken by the prophetic view of all that awaited him; standing before an iniquitous judgment seat with the noble bearing which on another occasion had cast the rough soldiers at his feet, and in the face of mockery and insult thinking of no injury but that which those deluded and miserable beings were bringing on themselves;—and will an uncorrupted youth blush to be found imitating such an example as this? No—the principle thus carried out by him, will seem to him as it is—exalted, ennobling! But it must be taught before he has learned a different lesson from the world. And with such a view of the real greatness of our Saviour's character, how will he be likely to study the thousand incidents of his life, every one of which goes to aid this glorious impression! His last interview with his disciples before he suffered, what sort of feeling will it be likely to awaken in the heart of a generous youth? Not that sickly sensibility which overflows at the detail of disappointed love or ambition. It will be a deep-toned and healthful sympathy, so full of admiration of the disinterested fortitude displayed, that, were it not for the touching tenderness of his manner to his friends, the starting tear would be of high and gratified emotion, rather than of sorrow. And are these indeed the emotions of which the opening heart of youth shall be ashamed?—We shall search the world in vain for a subject half so inspiring. Let the young come to the contemplation of this sublime character free from unworthy prepossessions and mean prejudices, and it will be their delight.

It is manifest that the religious teaching of our children needs only to be subjected to a rational consideration, to become easy

and efficient. And it is time to give it a chance to act on the human character, and accomplish the work whereunto it was sent. Must it be the very last subject to be delivered from the errors of former ages? Certain it is, that, until it is rightly inculcated in childhood and youth, it will never have its true influence on individuals or society. Alas! where is the heart that is subject to the pervading light of Christianity? It does but touch the mountain tops, and glance an occasional doubtful beam upon the vallies. Many are the deep ravines which never felt its cheering warmth, many the deep forests which lift an impervious barrier to its rays, and great the extent of fallow ground not yet laid open to its quickening influence.

ART. III.—*A Memoir of the Rev. Edward Payson, D. D. late Pastor of the Second Church in Portland. Portland, Shirley & Hyde, 1830. 12mo. pp. 444.*

MANY of our readers must have seen, and all probably have heard of a little book, very popular among our Calvinistic brethren, entitled *Scott's Force of Truth*. It professes to record the workings of the author's mind on the subject of christian theology, and the motives which induced him to renounce the speculative notions of his early life, which he calls Socinian, for the rigorous tenets of another stamp, distinguished, by a curious misnomer, as the *Doctrines of Grace*. The work is plausibly drawn up; and the writer's impressions are cited as proofs of the truth and excellence of Calvinism.

From the confessions of Scott, nevertheless, it is apparent that, prior to his asserted conversion, he was careless of all religion. He saw the power of religious principle manifested in the life and conversation of his friend, Mr Newton; and, struck with the guilt of his own unfaithfulness in the contrast, both as a Christian and a minister, he opened his heart to the solemn counsels of so impressive a teacher, and received implicitly, along with his practical charges, his scheme of doctrinal divinity. Enthusiastic by temperament, his mind was a fit soil to nourish the growth of prejudice. He espoused with zeal the views of the 'evangelic' party of the church; and his studies and efforts were subsequently applied both to fortify in his own bosom the faith he had chosen, and to recommend and press it on the souls

of others. His *Force of Truth* was designed to promote the latter object; and, published in a cheap and convenient form, it has been extensively circulated.

But much about the time that Thomas Scott became a convert to Calvinism, there was a change quite as marvellous, though in the opposite direction, which another mind was undergoing,—a mind at least equally conscientious, but of superior powers, cooler judgment, and far deeper erudition;—we allude to the case of Theophilus Lindsey. He was vicar of Catterick in Yorkshire, and on entering the church had subscribed without question the established statutes of faith. But he did not afterwards shut up his convictions in the creed which he had acknowledged. He used his right as a Protestant, to examine scriptural truth for himself. The doctrines of the church he carefully collated with the statements of the Bible. For the better interpretation of the latter, he put in requisition the abounding stores of judicious criticism; and, after diligent investigation, continued, not for a few weeks or months, but years, he was convinced that Unitarianism was the doctrine of the scriptures.

With these sentiments Mr Lindsey felt that he could no longer retain his connexion with the established church. Yet to relinquish his living, to be turned adrift upon a wide and heartless world, to encounter the expostulations of some, the contempt of others, the wonder of all,—these were severe trials. If disposed to follow examples too common among men, he might have administered a liturgy construed with mental reservations, and remained in the bosom of the church. But his conscience rose superior to all subterfuges, and, tearing himself from a beloved and affectionate flock, he committed his cause and the keeping of his temporal interests to the one adorable Being, in whom he reposed a believer's hope. Under the title of an *Apology*, he published the reasons which produced his change of sentiment, and an account of the sacrifices which it involved. This was followed by another work of equal merit, called the *Sequel*. The two books offer a masterly vindication of the great principles of Unitarianism; yet while Scott's *Force of Truth* has passed through scores of impressions, Lindsey's *Apology* and *Sequel* have barely reached a second edition.

Let any one, however, compare the works and the circumstances which occasioned them, and say whether, if the authority of names can recommend a party, the advantage is not preem-

inently with that which enrols the name of Lindsey. We rejoice as we admit, that this excellent man rose afterwards to honor and preferment in the ranks of Liberal Dissenters. But when with a bleeding heart he left his humble charge at Catterick, he could not have anticipated the distinction he reached in later life. The congregation with which he subsequently became connected, did not then exist. Unitarianism was as yet in an humble condition. But Lindsey lived to behold a signal measure of success crowning his personal exertions. He saw the victorious march begun of those Liberal principles which have since been pressing with tremendous vigor on the old time-bowed theology of the Genevan school, and which are commissioned, we trust in God, to extirpate its influence from the entire Protestant world.

But it is not on the authority of names that we would rest the merits of any sect. We protest against the servile deference which is paid to them by too many in the religious community. And we have cited the case of Lindsey only to show, that the countenance, which the numerous memoirs put forth by the Calvinistic fraternity, may be thought to offer to the truth of their system, can be easily countervailed by the personal history of individuals of very opposite minds.

It was with pain we perceived, on inspecting the Memoir whose title we have placed at the head of this article, that the late Dr Payson must be added to the list of those, who, throughout an active ministerial life, have opposed Liberal Christianity, and asserted the exclusive excellence of Calvinism, with no competent knowledge of the weightier points at issue. His soul, from the dawn of its perceptions, was preoccupied with the tenets of the theology, which in the season of manhood he strenuously advocated; and he seems to have recoiled from adverse scrutiny, lest his faith therein might by any means be shaken or disturbed. In a biography compiled by a professed friend and admirer, the admissions of such a state of mind might be expected to be few; yet enough is offered to make good our remark.

In a letter written by this gentleman near the close of his preparatory studies for the pulpit, we find him saying,—‘One thing I wish not to be thought, and that is what is commonly called a *rational* Christian, an epithet which is almost synonymous with no Christian. Liberal divines are pretty much of the same character.’*

* Memoir, p. 64. The emphatic words are printed as they were originally underscored. Of course, there can be no mistake as respects their intended application.

From this it might be inferred, first, that Christianity, in the writer's estimation, is an irrational scheme of doctrine, and though communicated from the Father of Lights, and addressed to creatures inspired with understanding, it is a mystery which falls not within the compass of their intelligence; and secondly, that free inquiry in matters of religion, expressed by the word *Liberality*, is no prerogative of mortals, although guarantied, we had supposed, both by Protestant and evangelical sanction. The writer of such a sentiment was in little danger of suffering from either of the imputations which he deprecated; and as for those who bear the reproach, they may console themselves with remembering that it was a greater than Calvin who came to preach deliverance to the captive, by unchaining the bondage of the mind, and whose apostle has said, 'That where the spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty.'

The effect of a rooted repugnance to investigation, in the bosom of the young theologian, as intimated in the foregoing extract, we have exhibited to us in a precious confession which occurs in his *Diary* of a later date. We wonder that it should have been made public.—'Sat up till 2 o'clock at night, talking with Mr — on religious subjects. Found that he had more to say in defence of Unitarianism than I could have *supposed*.' (p. 75.) This, coupled with other declarations which we forbear in this place to quote, sufficiently discloses the cloudy medium through which he was wont to look on a scheme of religion which he zealously combated through life, as though he had demonstrated its arrant falsity. But it is time that we introduce the subject of the *Memoir* more formally to the notice of our readers.

Edward Payson was born in Rindge, New Hampshire, in July, 1783. His father was pastor of the Congregational church in that village,—a worthy man of respectable endowments, and a staunch Calvinist. The mother was a rigid religionist of the same class. She took this son under her special tutelage, and 'though,' affirms his biographer, 'she was solicitous that he might be liberally educated, yet the supreme, the all-absorbing concern of her soul, was, that he might become a child of God.' Of course, she believed that this character could be formed only on Calvinistic rules.

The boy was tractable and affectionate, and, as he grew in years, displayed considerable quickness of penetration, though his turn of mind was more imaginative than exact. He was sus-

ceptible of strong and hasty impulses, and was rather the creature of feeling than of judgment. Both constitutionally and as the effect of training in domestic seclusion, he was reserved in his general intercourse. His affections wanted expansiveness from his youth up. They were driven in and exerted with great force, indeed, on his nearest natural kindred; but abroad, he seemed to walk as it were alone, holding little communion or sympathy with the mass of society. His manners were accordingly marked by an embarrassing shyness, which never left him, but which by no means implied a distrust of his own personal merits. On the contrary, we think it to be regretted that Mr Payson, when a young man, was not brought into more immediate contact with his fellows in years, that, measuring himself by them, he might have formed a truer estimate of reciprocal claims to consideration. The stripling, bashful and timid in the company of strangers, is not always the most self-diffident. If his habits be the result of a retired education, he is apt to overvalue himself with respect to qualifications and attainments in which others on comparison might be found materially to excel him.

In 1800, having completed his seventeenth year, Mr Payson entered Harvard College at an advanced standing, being passed as Sophomore. His tastes and habits having previously acquired a strong bias, no sensible change in his manners or deportment was wrought by his residence at the University. He lived for the most part aloof from his classmates; and from the testimony of his biographer, he does not appear to have signalized himself in the branches of study prescribed by the Faculty.—‘He was regarded,’ we are told, ‘as no more than a decent scholar by his associates and teachers at College.’—‘Nor is it remembered that there was any public recognition of distinguished merit in him at the time he commenced bachelor of arts.’ However, he was reputed at the University to be ‘a great reader,’—a distinction which the Memoir judiciously qualifies by observing, that he bore it in common with thousands who are not the wiser for their reading.

Shortly after leaving Cambridge, he took charge of an academy established in Portland, in which he continued for three years. We have understood that he owed this appointment mainly to the kind offices of the clergyman with whom he was subsequently associated as junior pastor, and of whose pulpit he became at length the exclusive proprietor. That friend little imagined that this act of benevolence was the first

step in a series of occurrences, which was to result in a personal calamity which has never since ceased to follow him with its disastrous visitations.

During the early part of his residence in Portland, Mr Payson displayed himself in a novel character. He entered with a zest 'as exquisite as the most hearty devotee,' into such 'amusements' as were fashionable or were deemed 'reputable.' What these amusements were, we do not learn. If they fell under the class of dissipations, then surely they were reprehensible. But these, we believe, would hardly be deemed 'reputable' among a people of such high moral sense as the inhabitants of Portland, and by no means would they have been tolerated in a preceptor of youth. If therefore by 'amusements' we are to understand the innocent pleasures of social and lively meetings, we think that an occasional indulgence in them continued through life, would have exercised a salutary influence on a temperament like that of Mr Payson.

We are no friends to religious austerity, and as for a monkish distaste to the social pleasures, we find no countenance for it, either in the precepts or the example of our Saviour. Jesus himself mixed daily and habitually in the world, chose unto himself a few bosom companions with whom he might open his soul in the freedom of intimacy, and at other times, whether as at the marriage festival in Cana, or seated as a guest at the table of an opulent publican, or as an occasional visitant in the well-loved abode of a friend in Bethany,—he indulged in the flow of generous sympathies, and honored and blessed the exercise of the social charities.

It was not long before Mr Payson relapsed into his former habits. He came at last 'to dread an invitation to a social party, though he had reason to expect there nothing directly offensive to his religious feelings.' And thus his mind, naturally somewhat morbid, was placed in circumstances not only unfriendly to the culture of inward cheerfulness, but conducive to dispositions at variance with the principles of enlightened philanthropy. His judgment of men and things was proportionately narrowed; and whatever other attainments may be conceded to Mr Payson, we certainly cannot assert for him the merit either of a candid survey, or even correct knowledge of the world.

Leaving his charge as teacher at Portland, Mr Payson, in August, 1806, returned to his father's residence in New Hampshire. He there devoted himself, in strict retirement, to the

initiatory studies for the christian ministry. In the spring of the following year he was deemed qualified for the responsible duties of his profession. Being presented as a candidate in form for the sanction of a pastoral association in his neighbourhood, he received from them a license to preach.

That he entered on the ministerial office with fervor of heart and purpose, is abundantly evident. That he had been diligent in appropriating the little time which he had allotted for preparatory work, is equally clear. But whether his studies were comprehensive or thorough, we have some reason to doubt. Among the notices of his life, our judgment is left to be formed from two passages,—one from the pen of the editor, the other from that of Mr Payson himself. The first, besides the valuable Tracts of Watson, names distinctly only the works of Witsius, Stackhouse, and Jonathan Edwards;—the second, writing to a friend, fifteen years after his entrance on the ministry, says, that the books which he had found most useful to him were, ‘Edwards’s Works, Brainerd’s Life, Newton’s Letters, Owen’s Treatise on Indwelling Sin, and Thomas à Kempis’s Imitation of Christ. Perhaps,’ he adds, ‘I ought to include in the list, Baxter’s Reformed Pastor and Saint’s Rest.’ He doubtless read other works, though we have no mention of them; but they were all, probably, of the same character.

Now with such preparatives we may well question whether any one could be pronounced a scribe duly instructed for the kingdom of God. We have it on the highest authority, namely, of Jesus himself, that a steward of the mysteries should ‘bring out of his treasury things new as well as old.’ In our reverence, therefore, for the teachers of elder days, we are not to discredit more modern aids for the judicious interpretation and exposition of the holy scriptures. Biblical criticism has risen to the rank of a science, the principles of which, to be well understood and applied, should be profoundly explored. Discoveries in this department of theology, have rendered obsolete and valueless a no inconsiderable portion of the divinity of the last and some former generations. Much learned rubbish has thus been thrown out, and new avenues opened up to the temple of Truth. And for the purpose of unfolding the gospel in its native simplicity, purity and grace, other lights must be sought and eyed than ever broke upon the minds of Edwards, Brainerd, or even Thomas à Kempis.

Mr Payson’s first effort as a preacher was made in Marl-

borough. We extract from his Journal the following account of his feelings and performances on that occasion.

'*Sabbath, May 24.* Felt thankful it was rainy. There were very few people at meeting, and I just got through without stopping. Spoke too fast and too low. Was a good deal depressed after meeting. In the afternoon did a little better, but still bad enough.' p. 110.

Three months after we find him at North Andover, in a pulpit then vacant by the death of the truly venerable Dr Symmes. His success at this time is thus briefly recorded;—

'I had little assistance in preaching, and pleased neither the people nor myself.' p. 127.

These notices are interesting. Mr Payson, it is well known, acquired celebrity afterwards as a preacher. His style of oratory, indeed, was rather of the declamatory cast; but it was for the most part awakening, and sometimes powerfully impressive. He possessed, it should be observed, several natural requisites for producing effect, both as a writer and speaker;—namely, a vivid and discursive imagination, which was apt and frequently felicitous in its combinations; great earnestness of soul and manner, and a voice of singular power in respect to clearness, strength and inflection. But from the foregoing intimations it is obvious that the accessory of skilful management, was wanting, at first, to give these advantages due effect. But, by dint of care and assiduity, he succeeded in so working upon the useful materials which he possessed, as to obtain a deserved reputation for pulpit power. But there was no paltry trick, no studied *finesse*, for the purpose of either setting off himself, or gaining a vulgar applause. Everything was natural and unaffected. There was a straight-forward energy of heart and purpose. Mr Payson was always himself.

The success of Mr Payson in this line of excellence at a later period, contrasted with his unpropitious beginnings, should be remembered by juvenile aspirants in quest of similar distinction. Let them not be discouraged by their early failures, but remember the value of the object to be gained. In their action and enunciation, let them correct the bad, and improve upon the good. Especially, let them throw the elevation and grandeur belonging to their themes into their public professional exercises, and display an ardor of solicitude that souls may be touched and roused and won; and even with less capabilities

than in the instance before us, they will enjoy proportionate success.

From Andover Mr Payson went to Portland. He was invited to preach there at the instance of the Rev. Mr Kellogg, the gentleman who had befriended him in his vocation as preceptor, and whose people were contemplating the settlement of a suitable colleague pastor. His services on trial proved generally acceptable to the parish; and as Mr Kellogg was anxious to secure the fellowship of his labors, and lent all his aid to effect the object, even at considerable personal sacrifices, the plan of settlement succeeded, and before the close of the year 1807, Mr Payson was ordained junior pastor of the Second Church in Portland.

His father officiated at the ordination, and preached the sermon. He bade the son beware of infection from 'the infidel sentiments of the day,' and never to employ his powers as presbyter 'in raising the enemies of God and his truth to the pernicious eminence of teachers in the christian church.' A casual reader might consider such charges to be quite irrelative to the person and place. For what temptation could prevail on a minister of Jesus Christ, or where was the likelihood of opportunity, to set apart and ordain professed Deists and Atheists to the ministerial office? If such characters exist in our community, we apprehend that they would hardly covet the priestly robe, or the grace of clerical consecration. There was another meaning in the parent's admonition, to which the biographer makes significant allusion. The men of *infidel sentiments*, and who are *enemies to God and his truth*, we learn, *ex cathedrâ*, are Unitarians. Theirs, said the preacher, is another gospel in the shape of 'a lax theology which degrades the Saviour and flatters man.'

Now we have been taught to reverence filial piety quite as highly, perhaps, as the generality of our brethren; and it is because we reverence it, that we undertake to say, that there is another obligation at least equally imperative on the child of mature age with that of implicit submission to 'fathers after the flesh;'—we mean the duty of absolute subjection to the Father of Spirits, the duty of impartial interrogation, and solemn heed, of His most holy oracles. The youth, we admit, is required to observe and to ponder upon the counsels of an earthly parent. And why? Because of the weakness of the reasoning faculty, and the indiscretion incident to his age. But he re-

mains not always a youth; and if, when a child, he thought and understood as a child, on becoming a man he must put away childish things, and not servilely acquiesce in the lessons of faith derived from a parent equally fallible as himself,—lessons which that parent perchance inherited in the gross from an ancestor not a whit wiser or more considerate than either.

How faithfully Mr Payson acted in consonance with the instructions received on the day of his ordination, is recorded in the pages of his memoirs. Two years had not elapsed when an occasion arose, which illustrated the strength of the filial principle within him. A candidate of Liberal sentiments was invited to settle over the First Church in Portland. The two societies had been mutually estranged, chiefly on the ground of political differences, not independently, however, of some transient causes of local dissension. The leading members of each came at length to see and lament the unreasonableness of such alienation; and the settlement of a promising pastor over the old parish, was judged a favorable opportunity for the adoption of measures conducive to future harmony. Mr Payson's conduct and views on the occasion are detailed by himself.

Referring to a request that he would give, in the name of the churches, the Right Hand of Fellowship to the pastor elect, he observed,—

‘It was made, no doubt, hoping either to stop my mouth, as Æneas did that of old Cerberus with this honey-cake, or at least to discover from my answer how I meant to conduct [myself].’ p. 187.

And what were the grounds of either of these conclusions? Why,—

‘One of the Deacons,’ he adds, ‘came to me, representing it as the wish, not only of Mr ———, but of the church, that *there might be harmony between the churches*, and that [therefore] I would give him the Right Hand.’ *Ib.*

Of course, then, Mr Payson must have uncharitably imagined that the deacon came to him with a tongue of falsehood. But this is not all. Later still he thus commented on the affair:—

‘The ordination is just at hand, and engrosses universal attention in town. The candidate is a fine scholar, has an amiable disposition, and has treated me in that *frank*, *open* and *friendly* manner’—no ‘honey-cake’ in this, we should suppose,—‘which is just calculated to win me over to his side. Add to

this, that both his society and mine are anxious that the old enmity between the two parishes may now be done away, since two young men are placed over them.' p. 188.

The path of christian duty would seem sufficiently plain even from this partial statement. The simplest wayfarer need hardly have erred therein. But the foolishness of men would fain be wiser than God. And thus, on the final trial, Mr Payson not only stood out against the earnest wishes of the combined flocks, in refusing to cooperate with the Council in the ordination, but raised his hand against the proceeding altogether. Not only did he evade all share in a small responsibility at most, of one sort, but he assumed to himself another of heavy and fearful burden. The account which we annex, and which strikes us as something too lightly penned, considering the seriousness of the subject, he subsequently transmitted to his approving parent.

'The ordination is over. I shall not trouble you with an account of the good-natured speeches which are made respecting my conduct. You can easily conceive of them.—It will only be a nine days' wonder to the good folks and gossips, who will lament in very pathetic strains that Mr Payson should have such bigoted, narrow, party views, and that there cannot be harmony and peace between the two churches.' p. 189.

We are sorry that his worthy biographer should have spoken with complacency of such deportment, and have sought to justify it on the narrow plea already exposed. To us it appears highly reprehensible. The devotion of the son to the 'solemn cautions' of a sire, however respectable, can only in this case be defended at the expense of his claim to the charity which, in the balance of the sanctuary, outweighs the knowledge of mysteries, and even the faith which can remove mountains. Mr Payson forgot one clause in his commission as a christian teacher; viz. to follow peace with all men. And while our hearts respond to the touching exclamation of the evangelic prophet,—How beautiful are the feet of those who preach glad tidings and publish *peace*!—we must lament that this minister of a gospel of reconciliation, went forth on his errand unshod with the preparation of an errand of grace and love. From a mind of this mould little of charity could be expected towards the great mass of mankind. In his pulpit he was wont to ply the rhetoric of unsparing denunciation. The soul

which quaked with the terrors of the law, he seldom soothed with the grace of the gospel. His dispensation of the word reminds us, not of the vernal shower and wholesome dew, refreshing as they distil, but rather of the descending hail, or sweeping tempest, which scatters and destroys.

In illustration of our remarks, we select the subject of a discourse, of which Mr Payson himself has given this brief synopsis ;—

‘I preached last sabbath on man’s depravity, and attempted to show that by nature man was, in stupidity and insensibility, a block ; in sensuality and sottishness, a beast ; and in pride, malice, cruelty and treachery, a devil. This set the whole town in an uproar.’ p. 164.

We have heard something of this sermon, and have been informed that in the following week, the salutation of ‘brother devil,’ was frequent between man and man in the streets of Portland. It gave just offence to some of Mr Payson’s best friends, and threatened awhile the permanence of his settlement. Remotely, it was one of the causes of a serious schism in his parish,—a portion of the congregation withdrawing with the senior pastor, and becoming incorporated into a third society, called the Tabernacle Church. But he set to work with characteristic ardor to repair the breach ; and by a complicated machinery soon put on foot, and which he busily moved for the purpose of stirring a ‘revival,’ he succeeded in fashioning abundance of converts to his mind. Even from the unpromising materials of ‘blocks and beasts and devils,’ he ‘turned them out’ with surprising celerity,—insomuch that certain of his brethren admonished him by message, ‘that he was making Christians somewhat too fast.’ But he heeded not the suggestion, and still toiled on, till his church was stocked with professors, and he saw his communion table thronged with guests.

In using this language, we would by no means be understood to discredit the sincerity of Mr Payson’s convictions, either of the fitness or rectitude of the measures which he employed. But we are struck with the palpable inconsistency between his doctrine and his doings. He uniformly taught, and doubtless believed, that all souls are totally depraved from the very birth. Of course, their conversion implied the acquisition of entire new natures. As well might an Æthiop

change his hue, or a wolf be transformed into a lamb, as a sinner, on the Calvinistic theory, by any human means be regenerated and come forth a saint. It must solely be the result of Almighty agency; and this Mr Payson was earnest in asserting. Yet he diligently planned and wrought out an instrumental process, supremely efficacious, as he conceived, for the recovery of lost souls. It is somewhat curious to find, notwithstanding, that the first experiment which he made of it, was unfortunate in its issue.

After due preparation, he met a portion of his flock one evening in the conference-room, assured of gathering in a goodly number of converts that very hour. But the Spirit moved not in answer to his invocations. Having waited awhile in vain, he abruptly left the meeting, and hastened back to the solitude of his study, to vent his indignant lamentations over the failure of his pious devices, and in view of the yet unconquered stubbornness of his people's hearts. We have in the Memoir a recital of the circumstances at large; and under the gloss which is there thrown over them, our readers may detect, with us, enough to authorise a parallel, more close than flattering, between the Portland Revivalist bewailing so natural a miscarriage and entering into a controversy with God respecting it, and the prophet who saw with anger the luxuriant gourd which rose in a night with promising shadow, suddenly struck and withered ere the noontide heat.

We are unable to follow the detail of Mr Payson's personal or pastoral history; nor is it needful. His biographer has traced it *in extenso*,—too much, indeed, in an untempered strain of eulogy,* but, qualified with the strictures which it is our aim to mete in the spirit of justice, an estimate may be formed from the whole of the merits of Mr Payson, as a minister and a man.—He lived, as he truly acknowledged, *ex tempore*, and yet accomplished much of professional labor. His zeal, worthy of a better cause, was unquenchable in his vocation. He showed a willingness to spend and be spent in concern for his flock, and for the diffusion of the faith wherein he had been bred. His varied and accumulated toils made

* Are there any who will think the following passage an exception?—'He [Mr Payson] was a man—a sinner; and it is well for survivors that he had faults, lest, in looking at him, they should lose sight of his and their Saviour.' p. 125.

large drafts on a constitution naturally none of the strongest. He overdid himself in the outset, and running with footmen was wearied,—much more so, when encountering the swelling of Jordan. As his cares multiplied, and he was brought forward a frequent champion of a cause which was beginning to be powerfully assailed, his health prematurely declined. His spirits suffered proportionate depression.

Prevailingly, the views of religion cherished by Mr Payson, were far from administering to him light and comfort. He walked for the most part in darkness, and his steps, like those of the Jewish fathers, led under the cloud and through the sea. At times, indeed, the feelings of his soul were strained to a preternatural pitch of excitation, but he seems even at such moments to have rejoiced with trembling. Soon the fair vision was eclipsed or gone, and his spirit again shut up in distressing gloom. One while, he would doubt of his salvation; at another, of the truth of his favorite doctrines, and occasionally, of the genuineness of all religion. As respects Calvinism, he confesses, in portions of his *Diary and Correspondence*, that it is a hard featured system; that it presented ‘difficulties, strong difficulties, both from reason and Scripture in the way’ of its admission; that ‘he wondered not that the unregenerate are so bitterly opposed to its doctrines and their professors;’ that at times he was ‘pulled about’ by the force of objections, and whilst he ‘felt’ that his tenets must be true, he ‘seemed to know it is impossible they should be so.’ He acknowledged, moreover, that he was often obliged to preach and write sermons when ‘doubting of everything and scarcely believing that there is a God.’ These conflicts he referred to the suggestions of Satan, without seeking a more rational cause for them in the intrinsic absurdities of a faith which continued to cloud his perceptions, but to which, nevertheless, he pertinaciously clung.

Mr Payson enjoyed a growing reputation with his party, to the period of his days. So strenuous and unshrinking an advocate of their cause, was tasked on various emergencies, and his power as a preacher became extensively known. In the year 1825, he was invited to remove from his Parish in Portland to the pastoral charge of the new church in Hanover Street, Boston; and in the winter following he received a call of settlement from the congregation in Cedar Street, New York. He refused both these applications, in a spirit of disinterestedness which advantageously displayed his attachment to his flock.

From Bowdoin College he was presented with a doctor's diploma in divinity ; but in a letter to his mother, shortly after, he says of it,—‘ I beg you not to address me by that title, for I shall never make use of it.’

Mr Payson was not exempt from some severe trials by bereavements and the pressure of other outward troubles ; but these he appears to have borne with becoming magnanimity. His personal sufferings, during a long and painful decline, were sustained with a meekness and resignation truly exemplary. His labors were kept up till almost the close of his mortal career. He learned at length, like Cecil, to trust God rather than his own impulses, and in the events of Providence to await patiently the developement of the divine will. The final scene took place October 22, 1827, when he sunk to rest after a ministry of twenty years, and in the fortyfifth year of his age.

Dr Payson—for we may honor his name with the title which in life he professed to abjure—expressed himself once as ‘ longing for death to reconcile apparent contradictions ’ in theology. We have seen that his acute mind saw difficulties in his religious scheme. We grieve that the biases of his education and the prejudices of his riper years, prevented his resolving those difficulties by a fair examination of the claims of another system, which, once comprehended and embraced, would have shed in his bosom, we doubt not, ‘ a peace and joy in believing.’ Could his faith have escaped from its perplexing trammels, could he have contemplated the gospel in the mighty scope of its liberal and beneficent aims towards the human family, could he have seen the same paternal wisdom and mercy in its provisions as met his gaze when he looked abroad on the book of nature and of providence, had the golden thread of consistency been perceived and followed up, which combines reason with revelation, disposing their testimony in one harmonious whole, and directing the eye to a common Almighty Parent, alike one in person as in the plan of his dispensations,—his soul would have been cheered, sustained, and elevated, and his ministry would have proved a signal blessing to the church and the world.

As it was, with a capacity strong, but cramped in its operations ; with faculties all respectable, yet wanting the appliance of a well regulated balance ; with an education inju-

diciously planned and prosecuted to disadvantage; with a faith entailed and soul-subduing; with affections ardent, though straitened in their objects, and with views of duty mistaken in direction, and united to keen and stirring sensibilities,—Dr Payson spent his strength in a cause which can only prosper on the wreck of much that is precious, ennobling, and satisfying in religion. As a scholar, he was ingenious, not profound; as a preacher, more eloquent than instructive; as a Christian, sincere though uncharitable, and as a pastor, worthy of all praise for self-devotion and assiduity. The inflexible dogmatist, he fell in a hopeless effort,—a victim to his zeal in propping the weakness of a Gothic theology, which is crumbling in presage of a final overthrow. Should any of his personal admirers suppose, that, in thus undertaking to animadvert upon his life and ministry, we have been influenced by unfriendly feelings towards his memory, or that our minds have labored under a cloud of prejudice in respect to his religious opinions, which has prevented our duly appreciating his merits, we assure them that nothing can be further from the fact. We profess, and we cherish, unfeigned charity towards all men; but ours is a ‘charity which rejoiceth in the *truth*.’ To have suffered to pass uncensured some traits in his character and some acts of his ministry, which struck us as deserving particular reprehension, would be a forfeiture of our obligations as impartial critics.

Dr Payson himself had little respect and candor for his opponents, and his scorn of Unitarians was unqualified and undisguised. But in no vindictive spirit have we sought to retaliate on his memory, the wrongs which he inflicted on the Liberal cause and its supporters. The tone of rebuke has been softened by sympathy in contemplating the partial derangement of his mental organization, which was manifestly produced by the fanatical and gloomy tendencies of the doctrines he had imbibed, and which he betrayed on other occasions than that mournful night spent under the roof of his friend Mr Whelpley. We have said nothing of his ambition and love of supremacy, which made him to be regarded, by many of his professional brethren, as a Diotrefes among them. We are willing, in short, to drop a veil over the harsh and repulsive features of his character, remembering that if he was a Christian, still the christian is but a man.

For the errors of an honest heart, Dr Payson was entitled to indulgence. For the good which he thought and essayed, despite of imperfections, he will live in honorable remembrance. And in recompense for the trials which he underwent, and the virtues which they brightened, we trust he has entered on the heritage of the blessed.

With a faith inspired by the revelations of love, we follow his emancipated spirit into the world of light, and contemplate it joined to the host which none can number, composed of the wise and good of every sect, and age, and clime, where, no more with the films and through the mists of mortality, he discerns the lineaments of celestial Truth, but beholds, in their unclouded beauty, the radiant emanations of the infinite and All-perfect mind.

ART. IV.—*Catalogue of the Library of Harvard University, in Cambridge, Massachusetts.* Cambridge. E. W. Metcalf. 1830. 3 vols. 8vo.

2. *Bibliotheca Parriana. A Catalogue of the Library of the late Reverend and Learned Samuel Parr, LL. D. Curate of Hatton, &c. &c.* London, John Bohn. 8vo. pp. 725.

3. *The Library Companion; or, the Young Man's Guide, and the Old Man's Comfort in the Choice of a Library.* By the Rev. T. F. DIBDIN, F. R. S., &c. 2 vols. 8vo. London, 1824.

THE catalogue of a library, even with all the recommendations of such fair volumes as these, and the strong interest we may feel in the accumulating treasures of our college, or the curiosity, which some may have, to know what sort of books were collected by such a man as Parr—might seem but an unpromising topic for a review. And lest any of our readers should be alarmed at the first mention of such a project, we freely announce, that it is no part of our intention to take a survey of the pages before us; for this, we are aware, would be giving for a review a catalogue itself. We shall scarcely refer to the countless worthies, living and dead, whose names,

amidst endless degrees of fame and honor, are here set in order. Among them are divines, philosophers, historians, orators, and poets of Grecian and Roman and of modern name, whose deathless works are, and ever will be, read. And here, also, are fathers, commentators, lexicographers, grammarians, critics; nay, some too, who in their day might have passed among poets and even novelists, whose names have quietly gone down to oblivion, and the precious dust of whose volumes might never be disturbed, but for the diligence of a librarian like Mr Peirce, or the faithful search, from which nothing is hidden, of an 'Examining Committee.'

Of this class of books, which seem to take in a library the place which 'sleepers' hold among animals, except that they have within them no inherent principle of reanimation, every large collection must contain its proportion. Nor let them be counted worthless. They are, if ancient, the venerable, if modern, the decent monuments of their time. They record, if not the learning, at least the notions of their day. Many of them may have honorably fulfilled their destiny, by serving as hints and helps, pioneers and precursors of better books; and in some even of our public libraries, they are of signal use, by making a goodly show upon shelves that would otherwise stand empty.

Of such a show, however, the Library of Harvard College happily stands in no need. The catalogue before us exhibits a list of more than thirty thousand bound volumes, and of several thousand tracts. And we hasten to congratulate the friends of the University on the publication, just now completed, of this copious, well-arranged, and beautiful work, so long desired and so much needed. It is now forty years since the last catalogue was formed; and from that period, in 1790, when there were only twelve thousand volumes, additions have been continually making, which rendered indispensable a new and full arrangement. To the indefatigable industry, to the fidelity and learning of the present librarian, Mr Peirce, are we indebted for the very satisfactory execution of this arduous undertaking.* He has comprised it in three volumes, which, both for the treasures they exhibit, and the excellence of their arrangement,

* To the faithful and accurate inspection of the press,—a work of more delicacy and toil than by the uninitiated can easily be imagined—and to the intelligent cares of the former librarian, Mr Folsom, it is just to ascribe part of the value and correctness of these volumes.

to say nothing of the typographical beauty of the books themselves, do honor to him and to the University. To those, also, who, as members of the College, or connected in any manner with its interests, who by their duties or privileges, the offices they may hold, or the advantage of neighbourhood, can avail themselves of the benefits of its library, it will be an invaluable publication.

The two first volumes contain the catalogue of the whole library in alphabetical order, consisting, as we have said, of more than thirty thousand volumes. And notwithstanding its deficiencies and wants, it is pleasant to compare this fair and choice collection with what it must have been in its day of small things and of Cotton Mather, who, in a letter to a friend of the College in England, congratulates him, that they had at length 'got a library with some books to it.'

In the third volume, Mr Peirce has furnished us with a systematic index, or a classed catalogue of the whole. This laborious part of the work, he prefaces with this appropriate motto. '*Scire ubi aliquid possis invenire, magna pars eruditionis est.*'

The value of such an index must at once be apparent; and the faithful execution of it, as here accomplished, demanded nothing less than the indefatigable industry as well as extensive bibliographical skill of the librarian. With respect to the arrangement which has been adopted, there will probably be, as the editor himself remarks, 'a diversity of opinion; since every system of classification must be more or less arbitrary; and with all possible accuracy in the execution, works, in some respects of the same nature, will frequently be found under different heads.'

Notwithstanding this obvious difficulty, the work appears, as far as we have had opportunity to examine it, to have been managed with such exactness, that under the six great classes, within which the whole collection is arranged, and the numerous sections into which these, again, are broken, almost every inquirer may find the book of which he is in search.

Of the actual toil and labor of such a work, any reader, least conversant with such subjects, may form some notion from the fact, that under one division of the theological department, viz. that of parænetic, or exhortatory divinity, there are more than twentyone hundred distinct books or pamphlets, under the names of sermons, charges, &c. &c.

In the general preface to the whole work, the history of the present college library, from the period of the destruction of the original collection by fire, in 1764, is briefly given. And, as the library itself is almost wholly the fruit of individual munificence, an honorable notice is taken of its most prominent benefactors, of whom were the Hollises, and Hancocks, Shapleigh, Palmer, Boylston, and Gore, with other generous donors, yet living.* This preface, therefore, may be read with satisfaction by many, who have no occasion to consult the catalogue itself. That part of it, which relates to the present condition and immediate wants of the library, we commend to the attention of our readers.

‘Many of the books, however, which have been added to the Library for several years past, have been excluded from their appropriate places by the want of room. This want is now very sensibly experienced; and in a short time another apartment will be indispensably requisite. It is most ardently hoped, that means will at no distant period be furnished by the public-spirited friends of the University and of literature, to erect a new building for the exclusive use of this department, in some respects more eligibly situated than the present, and ample enough to accommodate a library, that shall rival the great repositories of learning in Europe, and correspond more nearly to what may be reasonably expected of the first Library in our country.’ *Preface to Catalogue*, p. xiii.

In adverting, also, to the deficiencies in the library itself, and at the same time to the extent and liberality with which its privileges are granted, in other words, to the large number of those who enjoy them, Mr Peirce thus remarks;—

‘In looking over the Catalogue, authors and others will discover many deficiencies, which they may often have it in their power to supply; and by doing this they will render a service, which will be gratefully acknowledged. All publications relating to this country are naturally expected to find a place in our library. It has already a greater number of works upon America, than are to be found in any other; still the collection is far from being complete; many works are wanting, especially of a recent date, all of which it is exceedingly desirable to obtain. A public library like this, is a particularly suitable repository for state papers, political, religious, and other tracts, reports and proceedings of

* Of the living benefactors, the names of the Hon. Israel Thorndike, and of Samuel A. Eliot, Esq., claim, as they have here received, a special mention.

ecclesiastical bodies and of societies instituted for various purposes, for local publications, occasional pamphlets, and public documents of every description; it being a place, where they will not only have the best chance of being preserved, but will be accessible to all persons, who may at any time wish to consult them.

‘The benefits conferred by the library are rendered as extensive as possible by the liberality of its regulations. A ready admittance, and the requisite information and facilities for examining and consulting the works, are afforded to all visitors. Books are loaned to all the Undergraduates, to the Members of the Theological and Law Schools, to all persons residing in Cambridge for purposes of study, to the Members of the Faculty, Corporation, and Board of Overseers, and to all regularly ordained Clergymen living within ten miles of the College; and persons, not coming within the provisions of the law, may, by application to the Corporation, obtain the use of any books, which are proper to be taken from the Library. The privileges, granted to individuals, are not exceeded by those enjoyed at any other institution of a similar kind, and are believed to be in all respects as great as a due regard to general accommodation and to the preservation of the books would permit. These facts will, of course, be all taken into consideration in estimating the importance of augmenting the Library. A fund, from which so many minds are constantly drawing their chief supplies, to pour them again, with incalculable effect, over the whole community, should be as rich, as munificence and zeal for the promotion of learning can render it.’ *Preface to Catalogue*, p. xv.

From this brief notice of the catalogue of the most extensive of our own libraries, which its value and importance seemed to demand, we will now turn to one of the best private Libraries in England; viz. that of the celebrated Dr Parr. His collection was indeed a very remarkable one, whether we consider the character of the owner, one of the most learned scholars and singular personages of his time, or the narrowness of the means with which so extensive a library was purchased. The catalogue itself is a royal octavo of more than seven hundred pages, adorned with one of the best engravings we have seen, of the Doctor; and it numbers, as we think has been stated in other publications, about ten thousand volumes. Many of them were undoubtedly the gifts of his numerous correspondents and friends, of whom no man could boast of more. But the greater proportion were unquestionably of his own procuring; and some of

them, for their extreme rarity, would seem to have required for their purchase an income far more abundant than Dr Parr, except at the very close of his life, was able to command. Indeed, for a very considerable term of it, he was no stranger to the perplexities of a straitened condition; but his biographer relates, that even at that time, he always contrived means to buy the books he wanted, and finally left a collection, which, not indeed for beauty, or splendor of outward appearance,—for many of the volumes, as we are told also of the books of Dr Johnson, were worn and moth-eaten—but for scarceness, curiosity, and, what is much more to the purpose, for their intrinsic worth, excelled some of the magnificent collections of dukes and princes.

This library, like all his other acquisitions, and in truth, everything that belonged to him, was a matter of great pride and delight to Dr Parr. ‘For many years before his death,’ says the editor of his catalogue, ‘it was his anxious wish, that it should remain entire, and that it should, in consequence, be purchased by some opulent and liberal nobleman, or, preferably, by some public body. “The world,” he was used to say, “would then see what sort of a collection of books had been made by a country parson.”’ He considered his books, as did the mother of the Gracchi her children, as his jewels; and was ostentatious both in his praises and exhibition of them. ‘He was also in the habit of marking on the fly-leaf of any particular book something relative to the work or the author, which suddenly occurred to his mind. These remarks,’ continues his editor, ‘it must be acknowledged, were sometimes committed to paper without sufficient reflection, and sometimes, perhaps, in a fit of spleen.’

All this was unquestionably true. For, notwithstanding the intention and the vigilance of Dr Parr’s executors to prevent it, some specimens of these notes were fraudulently taken from the catalogue while it was yet in manuscript, and without any sanction on their part, nay, even against their remonstrances, actually made their appearance in a periodical publication. It was their design that the printed catalogue itself should be purged of such objectionable comments; for they wished to suppress what by its severity or bitterness might give pain to living witnesses or their friends; but they lament that some unguarded and hasty expressions still remain,—expressions, we may add, which, with the egotism and pomposity they discover, are altogether characteristic of their author. Some of the notes, how-

ever, are only amusing, while they show at the same time his learning and bibliographic ardor. We shall transcribe a few specimens, some to mark the rareness of the books, some the vanity and wit of their owner, freely leaving to our readers their judgment of each.

“Porson's (Richard) Letters to archdeacon Travis, in answer to his Defence of the Heavenly Witnesses, 1 John v. 7.

“The gift of the fearless author.—Inimitable and invincible.” S. P.' pp. 87, 688.

‘Priestley's (Dr Joseph) Theological Repository, consisting of Original Essays, Hints, Queries, &c. calculated to promote Religious Knowledge, 6 vol. 8vo.

“These six volumes were given by Dr Priestley to my late *sagacious* and *serious* Wife, Jane Parr.” S. P.' p. 87.

‘Justiniani Institutionum, seu Elementorum, Libri quatuor, a J. Baptista Pisacane in Carmina heroica redacti, folio, *Ncapoli*, 1694.

“Dr Parr thinks this the scarcest book in his library. He saw it about forty years ago in White's Catalogue, and eagerly secured it. He never saw it in any other Catalogue; he never found a scholar who knew its existence; he has in vain inquired for it in the University Libraries, and the Libraries of collectors. The learned Mr Hamley, of New College, Lady Oxford, and at her request Mr Windham, the English Minister at Florence, and the Russian Minister, who was a collector, could not find it in Milan, Florence, Venice, and other parts of Italy. Mr Blunt, the ingenious son of a Birmingham surgeon, was for several years busy in inquiring at the libraries and booksellers' shops in Paris, but could not hear of it. At length, Mr Hobbs Scott, in 1819, rummaging some old neglected books in the back room of a bookseller at Rome, met with it. The bookseller knew not its value. Mr Scott paid a few shillings, and brought the book to Hatton. Dr Parr then gave his other copy, as a rarity, to adorn the library of his honored friend and patron, Mr Coke, of Holkham.” p. 489.

‘Cowper's (Wm.) Poems, 2 vol. 8vo. 1795.

‘This copy is rendered highly interesting by the following autographs. On a fly-leaf in the first volume is written:

“Given by me to the Flower of the Church, Dr Parr. JANE ELIZABETH OXFORD.

“I stole this book from Lady Oxford. S. PARR. June 15, 1798. Signé *Jekyll*, et plus bas FRANCIS BURDETT.

“I hereby certify the aforesaid felony of the aforesaid Dr Parr, for which he has been allowed his charges. THOMAS (Lord) ERSKINE ✕ his mark; WILLIAM SCOTT (Lord Stowell.)” p. 516.

‘Short Account of Emmanuel Swedenborg and his Writings, 1787.

“Very entertaining. Swedenborg was an amiable fanatic.” p. 609.

' Dr Snape's Sermon preached at the Parish Church of St Mary at Hill.

To this sermon is appended the following singular note in Dr Parr's hand-writing, from which it would appear, that he had preached the sermon to his own parishioners, as indeed he often did the sermons of others.

"If there had been any real, or even seeming necessity, I could with ease have composed a sermon upon this present occasion. But I believe that you will be sufficiently instructed and edified by the discourse, which I am going to deliver to you. It is written with great clearness in the diction, great judgment in the matter, great seriousness in the spirit, and is in all respects worthy of the learned and pious author, Dr Andrew Snape, Provost of King's College, who preached it." p. 622.

' Dodd and Locke's Common-place Book to the Bible.

"The unfortunate Dr Dodd was executed by the barbarous interposition of Lord Mansfield." S. P.' p. 684.

' Fellowes's (Rev. Robert) Religion without Cant, or a Preservative against Lukewarmness and Intolerance, Fanaticism, Superstition and Impiety. 8vo. 1801.

"The Gift of the Author.—Dr Parr justly, and therefore greatly, values the various learning, the deep reflection, the elegant diction, and the rational, unfeigned, and sublime piety of his friend, Robert Fellowes." pp. 48, 685.

' Henry's Exposition of the Old and New Testament.'

"A book much esteemed by half-Methodists." S. P.' p. 685.

' Trinity—a Collection of curious Tracts on the, 5 vol. small 4to.

"My most learned friend, the President of Magdalen College, possesses the same rare work; but what work, fit for a Scholar and a Theologian, does he not possess and understand?" S. P.' p. 689.

' Thucydides Hudsoni, folio. Oxon, 1696.'

"There is in my library scarcely any book I prize so highly as this. My reasons are, it is the very book in which I first read Thucydides, at Emmanuel College; it contains a few marginal notes of mine, which are of no value; I gave it to my learned pupil John Wright; it was sold after his death. I was anxious to recover it, and for many years I made many fruitless inquiries. June 27, 1816, I attended a Visitation of Bishop Parsons, at Northampton. I there met Mr Rose, a clergyman quite unknown to me. After dinner, he said he had a book of mine. 'What?' said I. He answered, 'Thucydides by Hudson, and it has some MS. notes of yours.' I told him my piteous tale. He most politely and kindly gave me the book." S. P.' p. 694.

' Jones's Greek and English Lexicon.

"I have examined this Lexicon again and again; and I have no hesitation in pronouncing it the work of a man of sense and a man of learning. The usefulness is indisputable; and my hope is, that it will be extensively known and highly valued." S. P.' p. 698.

' Rivarol—Discours préliminaire du nouveau Dictionnaire de la Langue Française.

"This book was given to Dr Parr by his beautiful, witty, sagacious, truth-speaking, warm-hearted, and unfortunate friend, Mrs A. Green, of Lan-Saint-Frede, Monmouthshire. The eloquence is brilliant, but the principles are most pernicious." p. 699.

' Salmasii (Cl.) de Hellenistica Commentarius, 12mo. Lugg. Bat. 1643.

"In point of curious learning, I assign to this book the next place to Bentley upon Phalaris." S. P.' p. 699.

' Vossii Aristarchus. Accedunt de Vitiis Sermonis et Glossematis Latino-barbaris Libri Novem. Amst. 1685.

"This book Dr Parr read at College; and there is no book to which he is more indebted for his knowledge of the Latin language." p. 701.

' Garmanni (L. C. F.) de Miraculis Mortuorum Libri tres; quibus præmissa Dissertatio de Cadavere et Miraculis in Genere, Opus physico-medicum, 4to. Dresd. et Lips. 1709.

"A scarce and curious book, very fit to be consulted on the Controversy which is now going on in Germany about the reality of Christ's resurrection." S. P.' p. 705.

' Junius's Letters, 2 vol. 12mo. 1772.

"The writer of Junius was Mr Lloyd, Secretary to George Grenville, and brother to Philip Lloyd, Dean of Norwich. This will one day or other be generally acknowledged." S. P.' p. 407.

' White (J.) Diatessaron, sive integra Historia J. C. Græce.

"The gift of the learned Dr White, who ingenuously reminded me of what I had forgotten, that the dedication was written by me. Every candidate for orders should be well versed in this Diatessaron; and every reader of the New Testament will derive from it the greatest advantage; for it collects the facts of the gospel into a clear historical form." S. P.' p. 690.

' Serveti (Michaëlis) de Trinitatis Erroribus Libri. VII.

"*Liber rasissimus*. I gave two guineas for this book." p. 97.

And again;—

"Servetus was burnt for this book. He might be a Heretic, but he was not an Infidel. I have his Life in Latin, written by Allwörden, which should be read by all Scholars and true Christians." S. P.' p. 688.

The following pompous note, affixed to a Latin work, sounds exceedingly like our Doctor.

'Conringii (Hermanni) de Civili Prudentia Liber unus.

"Dr Parr has been instructed by this work of Conringius." p. 705.

And again of another (*Orthographia Romana*) it is set down,

"Dr Parr highly values this book."

'*Histoire du Sociniaisme, divisée en deux Parties, ou l'on voit son Origine et les Progrés que les Sociniens ont faits dans differens Royaumes de la Chrétienté; avec les Caractères, les Aventures, les Erreurs, et les Livres de ceux qui se sont distinguez dans la Secte des Sociniens*, 4to. Par. 1726.

"A most scarce work, for which Dr Priestley, when writing the *History of Christianity*, advertised two years without success. It was given to me by the learned Dr Johnstone of Worcester." S.P. pp. 55, 56.

'*Casauboniana*, a J. C. Wolfio, cum Ejusd. Notis, 12mo. *Hamb.* 1710.

"This very scarce book belonged to the learned Dr Matthew Raine, Master of the Charter House School, and upon April 10, 1812, was given by his accomplished brother, Jonathan Raine, to Dr Parr, who at the request of that brother, and of Mr Russell, now Master of the Charter House School, had written a Latin Epitaph for his much respected friend, Dr M. R. the predecessor of Mr Russell. The very learned Dr Routh has a copy of the book, and was told by the celebrated collector Mr Heber, that he believed the copies in England not to exceed five or six." S. P. p. 292.

'*Rapin's History of England*, translated by Tindal, 2 vol. folio. 1732.

"This book formerly belonged to my father. It is imperfect; for it does not contain the *Dissertation on Whigs and Tories*. As a child I read through these volumes several times; it was the first book of English History I ever read." S. P. p. 416.

'*Ars Sciendi sive Logica*, studio J. G. 12mo. *Lond.* 1781.

"Dr Parr and Sir William Jones first learned Logic from this book." p. 424.

'*Grant's (Mrs) Sketches of Life and Manners*, 2 vol. 12mo. 1810.

'Presented to Dr Parr by the Duchess of Gordon, who has thus written in the fly leaf.

"Dr Parr did not steal this book, though he may steal whatever Jane Gordon has, except *Jane Montague*. Leamington, 1820." p. 520.

'*Toulmin's Memoirs of Bourn of Birmingham*.

"Bourn's son, Samuel, was a masterly writer, profound thinker, and the intimate friend of Dr Parr at Norwich." p. 704.

'Hollis's Free Thoughts, consisting of Remarks occasioned by Dr Paley's Reply to Hume; Hypercritical Strictures on certain Passages in the Critical Review; a Letter to a Friend; the Reflections of a Solitary; and Thoughts on a Future State, 1812.

"Mr Hollis gave Dr Parr his 'Apology' in the year 1809, and in the summer of 1812, he sent him his other works. Mr Hollis leads a studious and blameless life at High Wycombe, Bucks, where Dr Parr sometimes visits him. He is confessedly an unbeliever, but he never writes prophanely; he is charitable and respectful in his judgment upon the character of Christians; he devotes his time and his fortune to doing good; and, be his errors what they may, Dr P. is bound by the principles and spirit of Christianity, to love and to honour such a moral agent as Mr Hollis."

'In another note is:

"Dr Parr knew Mr Hollis personally, and considered him one of the most serious, upright, and benevolent of human beings. They often conversed upon the most important subjects; and whatsoever be the errors of Hollis, he supported them with much ability, and without any taint of acrimony or profaneness." pp. 572, 3.

'Letters to Gibbon, by G. Travis, with an Appendix, 1784.

"Travis was a superficial and arrogant declaimer, and his Letters to Gibbon brought down upon him the just and heavy displeasure of an assailant equally irresistible from his wit, his reasoning, and his erudition: I mean the immortal Richard Porson." p. 601.

Among these books is also a set of more than two hundred volumes of modern Latin, which in the manuscript are headed "*Books of Pleasantry*, most of them very rare, and very expensive." And again, "All expensive except one, and that not a very cheap one." And of this class is one book, entitled '*Prolusiones Poeticæ, or Poetical Exercises*,' by Bancroft, of whom Dr Parr writes;—

"An honest man, but a furious bigot, and from the violence of his prejudices, became a maniac." p. 497.

And of another work,—

'Joci G. du. V. Senatus Aquensis Principi Avenioni, 18mo. 1600,

"This book bears the name of the unfortunate Dr Thistlethwayte, once Master of Wadham College, whom God forgive." p. 504.

'Hervey's Meditations and Contemplations: 25th edition, with the Latin Verses translated. 12mo. Edinb. 1772.

"This book was the delight of Dr Parr when he was a boy, and for some time was the model on which he endeavoured to form a style." p. 438.

'Sancroft's (Archbp.) *Predestined Thief; or a Dialogue between a Calvinistic Preacher and a Thief condemned to the Gallows*, translated from the Latin, 1814.

"The *Fur Prædestinatus* was republished and translated in 1813, in consequence of the execution of a Calvinist at Northampton. He denied the fact at the gallows. He had been encouraged in presumption and self-delusion by a Calvinist teacher. The Calvinists in Northamptonshire took up his cause, and attacked the judge and the jury. Their attack was repelled by the testimony of the offender's attorney, who lived at Wellingborough, and who, in justice to the laws of his country, published the criminal's private confession made to him in Northampton gaol. One Hufley White, a notorious offender, was hanged at the same time, *but did not deny his own guilt.*" S. P.' p. 604.

'Letters of William Wilberforce on the Doctrine of Hereditary Depravity, by Cogan, 1806.

"Excellent.—Cogan's Arguments are unanswerable, and Wilberforce very discreetly made no attempt to answer." p. 552.

'Codex Theodori Beza Cantabrigiensis, Evangelia et Apostolorum Acta complectens. Quadratis litteris Græco-Latinis edidit, Codicis Historiam præfixit, Notasque adjecit F. Kipling. 2 vol. royal folio. Cantab. 1793.

"This beautiful edition of Beza's Testament was given to me, spontaneously and politely, by order of the Vestry of the Unitarians in Birmingham, soon after I had written an English inscription for Dr Priestley, for the monument erected in the Unitarian Chapel." S. P.' p. 4.

"In a variation of the same note, Dr Priestley is called "an eminently great and truly good man;" and Dr Parr's most "respected, injured, calumniated friend." p. 681.

Bagshaw (Ed.) *Dissertationes Anti-Socinianæ*, in quibus probatur, 1. Socinianos non debere dici Christianos; 2. Solam rationem, quo fundamento nituntur Sociniani, ad percipienda Fidei Mysteria non sufficere, 12mo. Lond. 1657.

"Et gens quæ infausti placitis addicta Socini

"Christianos inter vix meritura locum est."

"Dr Parr directed these verses to be transcribed from the Poems of Adrian Reland. But in defiance of the Poet, who was ingenious, and of Bagshaw, who was dull, Dr Parr will not erase the Socinians out of his Catalogue of Christians." S. P.' p. 17.

'Belsham's Epistles of Paul the Apostle translated, with an Exposition and Notes, 2 vol. 4to. 1822.

"This excellent work of Belsham was given to me by the writer. I do not entirely agree with him upon some doctrinal points; but I ought to commend the matter, style, and spirit of the preface; and in my opinion the translation does great credit to the diligence, judgment, erudition, and piety of my much respected friend." S. P.' p. 21.

Of a collection of Modern Greek books also, he says,—

‘“I assign a particular place to the following works: for I never saw them in the possession of any scholar.” S. P.’ p. 59.

But it was not only of printed books, that Dr Parr’s library was composed. Of manuscripts also, usually, from their scarceness and value, to be found only in public depositories, he had collected not a few. Among these we find ‘a manuscript of St Chrysostom, never yet used by any editor, in four volumes folio;’ and another on the Immortality of the Soul, respecting which there is the following notice;—

‘This is the work of the immortal Sir Matthew Hale, and was never published. It was given to Dr P. by his sagacious and most highly respected friend, F. Hargrave, Esq. Dr Parr hopes, that after his death, both the foregoing manuscripts will be purchased for some College Library, in Cambridge.’

Dr Parr himself, we are informed, presented them, some time before his death, to Emanuel College, Cambridge.

On the whole, this catalogue exhibits as remarkable a collection, as was perhaps ever formed by a private individual for his own use, and without fortune. We may agree with his biographer, that his library was of itself a monument of the intellectual courage and capacity of Parr. ‘It was begun,’ he tells us, ‘when he was a boy at college, and when the price of a book deprived him of some other need, or comfort. It continued to accumulate, when he was bowed down by penury and opposition. Whatever else he wanted, he always found money to buy books; and the sums, which he expended in the year 1824, when his life was waning, show, that his ardor in the cause of letters was inextinguishable.’

Among the literary projects of Dr Parr, it was long a favorite one to write, upon a large scale, the life of his celebrated cotemporary, Dr Johnson. He was not satisfied, it would seem, with the various and copious memoirs that had been already published of him, and had read and laid by, in a particular part of his library, a great number of scarce and learned books, of which it was his intention to make use in this work. Though, as he laments, ‘amidst his cares, his sorrows, and his wants,’ he failed of accomplishing his purpose, he lets us see something of the preparation he had made for it, in all which he betrays, as was certainly not unusual with him, his

vanity of learning. We forbear giving the catalogue, which is by no means inconsiderable; for the names of many of the works, we fear, might be strange to some of our readers. But it surely is no difficult task to string together the names of uncommon books; and we cannot but suspect, that, in the great science and mystery of bibliography, many a bulky volume has been commended by title, whose pages have never been read. From this folly of pedantry, Dr Parr, notwithstanding his solid and various attainments, was by no means free. He was much addicted to that annoying practice, scarcely less offensive to good manners than to social comfort, of quoting, and that pompously, from books. Indeed, it might be literally said of him, that he 'lisp'd' in Greek—this probably being the infirmity of his classic, as it was of his native tongue; so that, to a plain English gentleman, like Sir Roger de Coverly, who loved a fair share in conversation at home, and begged of his friend to provide him a chaplain that would not insult him at his own table with his Latin and Greek,—the Curate of Hatton, with all his learning, must have proved a most troublesome inmate.

It will be readily admitted, however, that pedantry is not the besetting sin of scholars at the present day. Education is now too generally diffused, to make learning, or at least a good reputation for it, a very prominent distinction. And though of these days of journals and periodicals, it may be more than suspected, that reviews are read in a measure vastly exceeding the books reviewed, yet so generally are the means of knowledge diffused, that scarce any one may now with impunity make a show of more than his neighbour. The laws of good breeding, moreover, are so well understood, that, as Miss Edgeworth has somewhere remarked, it is deemed decorous rather to allude, than to quote; in other words, to take for granted, what some perchance might unwillingly find proved, that those with whom they converse, have read as much as themselves.

To this general diffusion of literature, the multiplication of bibliographical works, such as that of Dibdin before us,* serv-

* One of the most remarkable works mentioned by Dibdin as a treasure to be prized by any possessor, is the very first book named in Dr Parr's Catalogue. It must have been the same copy described by Dibdin, being purchased by Dr Parr of the same bookseller, only a few months before his death. It is the Polyglott Bible of Elias Hutter—'It ranks,' says the bookseller, 'among the very rarest books in bibliography. There does not appear to exist a single complete copy in

ing as faithful guides to the initiated and inexperienced, or, as he says, to the old and to the young, in the choice of a library; the copious and well arranged catalogues, which it has become customary, with foreign booksellers, annually to put forth, in which we sometimes see, not the titles only, but accurate notices of many thousands of volumes; together with the establishment of literary associations, Lyceums, scientific lectures and journals, adapted to practical purposes and to the mass of readers,—have essentially contributed. To this may be added, the vast multiplication, and thence, combined with other causes, the greater cheapness of books themselves. This has been more and more observable for the ten years past, till now, with the reductions that have followed with the general depression of trade, the acquisition of even an extensive library, is brought within the ability of scholars of moderate means.

We rejoice in the multiplication among us of good libraries, private and public. Of our dwellings, they are among the choicest and most becoming,—though if, perchance, the housewife be curious, or, yet worse, if the abode is to be changed, they may prove the troublesome, decorations. Of our colleges, they are the appropriate treasure and glory.

Of many of the universities of Europe, the libraries are very extensive. That of Cambridge, in England, is numbered at one hundred thousand volumes. The celebrated Bodleian Library, in Oxford, said to be the largest in the world, if we except the Vatican at Rome, and the Royal Library in Paris, is usually stated at four hundred thousand volumes, besides its rich treasures in manuscripts. Its outward appearance, however, indicates no such extent, and might tempt us to the suspicion, that there is somewhat of fallacy in these estimates of large collections. In Germany, it is true, books are multiplied to great numbers; and from the cheapness in the style of printing, and a wise preference, by those who hold the direction of their academic affairs, of utility to show, it is not uncommon to find immense libraries in that country. By a recent intelligent traveller it has been stated, that within thirty-one public institutions, either of their universities or of their

any of the foreign public libraries. In England, the one now submitted, is decidedly unique. "Such is its amazing rarity," says Clement, "that to obtain the work complete would be an acquisition requiring the lives of two or three men; owing to its having been printed at the private expense of Hutter, at different periods, and but very few copies struck off." p. 1.

capital cities, are to be found no less than three millions three hundred thousand volumes, or an average to each of about one hundred and nine thousand; the largest of which, as he remarks, contains more literary resources of this kind, than all the collegiate and university libraries of the United States.*

We shall not indulge in any unprofitable or discouraging contrasts between our own and foreign institutions, sometimes made with a show of wisdom, but not with a sufficient discrimination of the differences in the condition of our people. Neither will we intimate, what might seem a gratuitous distrust upon the matter, that it is much easier to count up, than to find, three or four hundred thousand volumes; nor that, of this vast collection, seldom, we believe, found upon earth, no small proportion may be only fit food for moths and dust, needing much space, but yielding little profit. Neither will we detain our readers to observe what has been well observed by another, 'that it is not by means of huge libraries, that discoveries will be made for the benefit of mankind;' or that 'a taste for literature is not necessarily promoted by an accumulation of books, however excellent.' But we presume no one will doubt, that in good public libraries, we of this country are yet lamentably deficient. In truth, some of our colleges and literary institutions exhibit in this respect a spectacle of deplorable poverty, which, were it only for appearance sake, we should hope might be improved.

To return to the library of Harvard College, the welcome publication of whose catalogue has invited these remarks, we here repeat our wishes for its growth and prosperity. Though in comparison with most others of our libraries, and especially with the libraries of other colleges in the country, it holds a preeminent rank, it must be remembered, that of itself, it is small, and wants much to constitute it the complete library of a university. We rejoice in what has been recently done by its government in liberal appropriations towards this object, and to learn that large additions to its stores may shortly be

* Dwight's Travels in Germany; from whom also we learn, that of the numerous libraries of their universities or large cities, that of Göttingen, consisting of three hundred thousand; of Dresden, the capital of Saxony, of two hundred and forty thousand; of Berlin, of one hundred and eighty thousand; and above all, of Munich in Bavaria, containing four hundred thousand,—are the most celebrated. But it is to be remembered, that to make these extraordinary numbers, pamphlets, duplicates, and everything printed, however small, is counted.

expected. Still, it has many and great deficiencies. It wants a large fund for its regular annual increase, even in those branches, as of theology and of ancient classical literature, in which it is most abundant. In oriental and in modern literature, very much remains to be supplied. But its most pressing want is, now, that of a suitable edifice for the accommodation and security of the whole. As is intimated in the preface to the catalogue, and in the full report upon this subject, made at a recent meeting of the Overseers, the present building, though, in its interior, yielding to few of the kind in appropriateness, and even venerableness of aspect, is yet in constant exposure to destruction by its neighbourhood to the inhabited colleges, with their multitude of fires. The bare possibility of such a calamity is sufficient to awaken attention, and even to justify alarm. We hope, that with the aid which is needed, measures may be adopted to secure so desirable an object.

Nor may we, in passing, omit the mention of the library of the Theological School in Cambridge, if indeed it may be called a library; for we almost fear, that the number of its shelves will not be found much inferior to the number of its books. From the privileges, which the members of this School share, in common with other students, in the library of the University, the deficiencies of their own institution in this respect are not so severely felt. But separated as the Theological School is from the College, and inconvenient as must be a daily resort to the public library, we earnestly wish to see this great want supplied. We commend it to the attention of those, who regard with favor this ancient school of the prophets, and who hope from it the fulfilment of those great and holy purposes which our fathers contemplated, when, in founding Harvard College itself, they consecrated it to 'Christ and the Church.'

We look upon the libraries of Cambridge and the Athenæum in Boston, as among the very choicest of our public treasures. Their prosperity is equally an object of public interest; for they furnish the means of light and knowledge, and thence of valuable improvements too, not to students and professional men only, in theoretic science, or learning properly so called, but for the most valuable practical purposes, to the whole community. The facilities of access and of use, granted at Cam-

bridge to as great an extent 'as a due regard to general accommodation and the preservation of the books will permit,' by extending the numbers of those who want, show the necessity, also, of increasing the supply. The library should be such, that every person, pursuing an important subject, writing a book, or consulting only personal gratification, may be able to find within it the very thing he is seeking. Multitudes of books, which to the unlettered eye might seem but so much learned or unlearned lumber, are continually needed for reference; and many a valuable project may be defeated, or many an excellent work lost to the world, for want of such assistance. It will not be doubted, in these days, that the interests of these institutions are worthy of the patronage of the liberal and wise; or, to use the words of the preface which we have before quoted—'that a fund, from which so many minds are continually drawing their chief supplies, to pour them out again, with incalculable effect, over the whole community, should be as rich as munificence and zeal for the promotion of learning can render it.'

ART. V.—*A Treatise on Crimes and Indictable Misdemeanors. Second Edition, with considerable Additions.* By WILLIAM OLDNALL RUSSELL, Esq., of Lincoln's Inn, Sergeant at Law. London, 1828. 2 vols. 8vo. pp. 683, 828.

THE design of this valuable work is to dispose, in appropriate arrangement, 'the principles of the common law, the statutes and the decided cases relating to every offence which may be made the subject of prosecution by indictment, except high treason.' The first edition appeared in London in 1819, and was reprinted in this country, with additional notes of American decisions, in 1824. The first volume of a second English edition was printed in London in 1826, and contained, in an appendix, the act for improving the administration of criminal

justice in England [7 Geo. 4. ch. 64.], passed on the 26th of May of that year; but the publication of the second volume was delayed, with the professed design that when it was published it should contain, 'in proper arrangement, the important statute consolidating the law relative to theft,' which was then before parliament. This act passed on the 21st of June, 1827 [7 and 8 Geo. 4. ch. 29.], and the second volume of the work before us was issued from the press, we believe, not until the last year, although it bears the imprint of 1828.

It is not our intention to speak of the value of this work to the profession for whose libraries it is chiefly designed, nor to discuss its merits as a standard authority; for this is well settled by the respect it has received from courts of law. Nor shall we be led away from our present design, by the more agreeable task of examining the great improvement of the criminal code, both in its principles and practice, by the recent statutes prepared by Mr Peel; * nor even stop to pay the tribute of merited respect and admiration to that eminent statesman, whose enlightened humanity and sound practical good sense, combined with uncommon industry and unconquerable perseverance, gathered from the wastes and deserts of the law, over which genius and learning are not always willing to travel, this proud memorial of his usefulness and worth. Our object is to offer some general remarks on the subject of criminal law, principally in connexion with its agency in preserving the morals of a people, and maintaining public character.

No one doubts that the good order and security of society depend materially on the efficacy of its criminal code. Other causes have their operation, and higher motives of action are drawn from the precepts of religion and the obligations of morality. To do right because it is right, to regulate the conduct in obedience to the dictates of conscience and the will of God, is certainly the noblest, as it is the purest spring of human actions; and in the eye of Heaven, nothing has the character of virtue, which proceeds from a less elevated origin. But the security of man in civil society depends on motives, only so far as they influence actions. In reference to the moral character of an individual, we ask *why* he has performed an action that is submitted to our notice, but in reference to society, the question is rather *what* has he done. Bad passions and bad feelings, con-

* 7 and 8 Geo. 4. ch. 27, 28, 29, 30, 31. 9 Geo. 4. ch. 15-23.

finer within the breast of any one, are causes of his own unhappiness. It is only when they burst the restraints of human laws, that the community becomes affected, and feels itself bound to exert its control.

The motive, which fairly considered is the lightest, too often has practically the greatest effect; and the reason of it is well expressed by an eminent divine. 'One principal cause of the feeble hold, which subjects of religion have upon the mind, is the fancied remoteness of their objects, and the spiritual nature of the subjects of religious contemplation. What is immediately perceptible, tangible, pleasurable, or profitable, excites more emotion than any of those spiritual truths, which a man must study his own heart in order to understand.'*

Education is a restraint on the commission of crime. It raises its objects above the temptation that might seduce them, or furnishes motives and means to resist its operation. But education is necessarily limited. There are those in every community who have neither time, nor means, nor capacity to enjoy its advantages. An intellectual darkness, thicker and grosser than ever gathered upon Egypt, has settled on their minds; and while the age in which they live is an enlightened one, and the community of which they form a part is polished and refined and cultivated and improved, they are in coverts where the light of learning cannot reach them. Education is also limited in its influence. It sometimes sharpens the intellect and blunts the moral faculties, in a manner altogether unaccountable; and seems, in raising a man above the influence of one class of temptations, to expose him with more danger to another. Education is not virtue.

Public opinion does much to preserve the public tranquillity. Many who do not fear the guilt of crime, tremble at its disgrace, and are honest from a sense of shame, rather than a principle of integrity. Public opinion is, indeed, a powerful protector, wherever its influence is rightly directed. As far as its authority extends, its sanctions can be enforced. But not only are there many members of every community wholly beyond its influence,—many who have no respect for, and hardly any knowledge of any other sentiment than what is generated by profligate companions; but in society at large

* Buckminster's Sermons, the new volume, p. 118.

public opinion is in a good degree to be purified and made salutary by the operation of the laws. The enlightened members of the state entertain a respect for the laws, which itself influences the public opinion, on the subject matter of the law, as well as on whatever is analogous in principle or tendency. But public opinion sometimes tolerates what the laws denounce, and becomes the most formidable enemy to the morals of society, or is so unsettled as to do them but little good. We have lately discussed its operation in our communities, and should now repeat rather than retract anything we have advanced regarding its importance, and the resistless weight with which it moves. But with all its consequence everywhere, and its vast power in such a state of society as ours, it would be a most dangerous substitute for the authority of the laws. We the more insist on this, because though no one, that we know, would go so far as to abrogate the entire criminal code, and rely on the protection of public opinion, there are many who would confide this or that part of it, to so insecure a protection. There are some of our most esteemed and respected fellow citizens, of sound learning and generally of good judgment, who, in particular instances of vital importance to society, would abrogate the penalty of the law, and trust to the good sense and integrity of the public mind.

For example, the preservation of the christian sabbath as a day of rest and relaxation from labor, as an appropriate day for the discharge of those religious duties which other vocations interfere with on other days of the week, and for a recognition of those obligations, which, if indeed they ought to be always present to the mind, would soon be effaced unless brought periodically under review—the observance of the sabbath is in all christian countries, to some extent, secured by positive enactment and the penalties of a criminal law. We do not mean to touch the question about holy time. We admit, for the present, that all time is equally holy. We do not meddle with the inquiry, to us indeed a very plain proposition in the affirmative, whether the Supreme Being commands, or the christian religion requires, any appropriation of time for religious communion and the public worship of God. We suppose that no Christian of any creed, that no statesman of any party, that no philanthropist of any school, would deny that the separation of one day in seven from the ordinary business and

cares of the world, is as important to the well-being of society, as its revenue, its magistracy, or its military force.

But what would be the condition of things, if the rights of the public in this respect were not enjoined by positive law? We answer, that in our opinion the result would be an increased disregard to any essential distinction in the general employments of society, between one day and another. Labor would, more than now, be carried on by those who had not means or inclination to enter into any calculations of profit beyond their immediate and pressing wants. The profligacy of a low class would more eagerly seek places of wasteful dissipation; and the ministers of vice, who feed high their love of gain, by taking advantage of the base passions of base men, would riot in a license, which no law existed to control. Over such men principle has no power. They laugh at it. Opinion has no influence. The opinion they regard is that of their own class. This it upholds, and praises those most, that most daringly set at defiance the obligations of morality. While the world lasts, we suppose the christian sabbath will be religiously observed by the pious and well disposed, whether there be law of man's making, or whether there be not. But in the absence of law, it would only afford something worse than idle time to those who feel no obligation of conscience to observe it. On such must be laid the enforcement of law. As the case now stands, it is with infinite difficulty that any restraint is imposed on many classes of people. Violations of the positive law which enjoins what religion and morality enjoin, are not unfrequent. Sometimes they are punished, sometimes they escape; and the chance of escape leads to repeated attempts to infringe its provisions, while the higher sanctions, derived from duty to God and man, are treated with levity and contempt.

We have taken this subject for an illustration, not that it is the most forcible or apt, but because upon this, in particular, intelligent and high-minded men have at times expressed a different opinion. We have heard it doubted if the law should have anything to do with the observance of the sabbath. We have heard men, who feel most sensibly the necessity of a due regard to the day, and are aware of its immense importance to all the interests of society, advocate a reliance solely on the good sense and good feelings of the community. We have heard from the pulpit, in language of impas-

sioned eloquence which left no doubt of the preacher's sincerity and conviction,—from the pulpit even we have heard it urged, that the civil arm should not exert itself to enforce, by prosecutions and penalties, the cessation of secular employment on the first day of the week ; and we accounted for the fact, by reflecting that the preacher was not a practical man. Had he visited the poor and ignorant and depraved and abject population of our great cities, had he known the indulgences which a less needy and more worthless class allow themselves on the return of the day, how eagerly the haunts of dissipation are visited, how daringly inroads are made on the decencies of life ; had he seen the disposition which prevails, to take every possible chance for gain, and the restiveness which is manifested under the slightest control, he would not doubt that it is the positive prohibition and penalties of the law, alone, which, in many cases, shut up shops and places of idle resort, and keep down the example of riotous amusements ; or that, were these restraints removed, the devotions of the serious, and the solemnities of the thoughtful, would be disturbed by obstreperous mirth and profligate carousal.

With the faith of men we do not desire to meddle in the way of coercion. Far be it from us to maintain, that human law should control the dictates of conscience. With religious tenets we deprecate all interference by civil authority ; but for the good order and peace of society, legal provision should most certainly be made. For the civil interests of the state, its magistrates are bound to be watchful and active. How far the cessation of labor and amusement should be required, is a question of expediency ; but when that is settled, the right and duty of the magistrate is perfect and plain ; and if he will not lend his own efforts to the influence of higher motives, he may be assured that those motives alone will not be found universally to answer the purpose he proposes.

But our main position may be established without resort to controverted ground. The criminal code is one of the defences of society against vice. Now it is manifest that with all the guards which religion and education and public opinion and the laws of the land have provided, crimes are perpetrated and the peace of society is invaded. If all these means combined cannot, as certainly they have not eradicated the vices of mankind, no one of them can be spared ; for each, we suppose it is uni-

versally admitted, does something towards so desirable an end.

It is our object, then, not so much to speak of the importance of the criminal code, as of its condition, the character it has and ought to have, the difficulties which obstruct its execution, and to suggest whatever occurs to us as an improvement in its general features.

The criminal code prohibits such actions as, in the judgment of the sovereign power, are injurious to the state; provides for the arrest and trial of any who are suspected of violating its provisions, and punishes with appropriate penalties whoever is convicted of offending against the laws. Its object is to preserve the peace of society; and its means of accomplishing this object, is to punish, and thereby, if possible, reform the guilty; to strike a salutary terror into the minds of those who might be endangered by the impunity of vice, and to prevent the commission of offences by a practical illustration of the truth, that the way of transgressors is hard. It necessarily varies in its details in the different States of our confederacy, and in the statutes of the United States; but its general character throughout our country is in all essential respects the same. With two exceptions, it has grown up by successive, but not very methodical arrangements, as time and opportunity allowed, or more probably as some immediate exigency seemed to demand. The learned and profound investigations of Mr Livingston, have given to Louisiana, and the laborious industry and wisdom of the Legislature of New York, have secured to that State more judicious and regular systems, and brought a high order of intellect to the consideration of a subject, which directly concerns the happiness of multitudes, and oftentimes the character of society.

The first remark we have to make on the condition of the criminal code, is, that it is an error to take its operations as an index to the moral character of a nation. Yet this is almost the only standard to which writers on this branch of statistics, are in the habit of referring. We find it invariably the case that the record of convictions is adduced as evidence of the quantity of crime. But it hardly furnishes an approximation to the fact. Crimes are perpetrated, and no prosecutions ensue; the offenders are unknown, or elude pursuit. Again, prosecutions are instituted, and the accused party is discharged, not because a crime has not been committed by

some one, but because the person charged is not proved guilty according to the rules of law. Nor are these defects uniform or nearly so. Detection depends on the degree of vigilance exerted by the police, which is greater or less at different times; on the skill, ingenuity, and perseverance, which hunts through the coverts of iniquity, and seizes on fugitive offenders. It depends on the rapidity of pursuit, on the thoroughness and extent of it, and of course on the pecuniary means which are supplied for the purpose.

We secondly remark, that institutions for the execution of the criminal code, are too frequently considered of importance in proportion to the number of convictions which occur, as the nets of the fowler are valued by the game he is enabled to capture. In pursuance of this most erroneous notion, courts and their appendages for the prosecution of criminals, are sometimes thought to be less necessary, as the number of cases within their jurisdiction is diminished. It is forgotten that they are of the nature of citadels for defence, and that their most important object is attained, when they prevent aggression by the display of a force that would certainly overwhelm it.

Men who live in the habitual commission of crime, if they do not bring the intellectual powers into proper exercise, and so are not to be considered wise men, are yet, as a class, not to be treated as fools. It is not politic to regard them as destitute of a fair proportion of intelligence. There are many miserable dolts among them, but the *class* is not deficient in natural talents or acquired information. Indeed, it is frequently ingenuity misapplied, which has led them from the path of honesty. Good citizens make an unfortunate mistake, when, in forming the laws, or preparing the mode of administering them, they consider depraved and lawless men as beings of inferior capacity. It is not so. The public prisons are tenanted by at least an average portion of human intellect, and often by men of a character of mind eminently fitted to exert a commanding influence in any society of which they are permitted to be members. Such men calculate with accuracy the general chances of detection. They have as regular an estimate of the hazards of their mode of life, as a merchant has of the winds and storms of the ocean, or the risks of commerce. When the history of their lives is disclosed, we turn with disgust from the repetition of crimes and the depth of

iniquity, which are unfolded ; but we ought to learn the more practical truth which these felons' speeches never fail to disclose to us, how feeble, namely, they have found the barriers of the law ; how often they have committed atrocious crimes without being suspected ; how often they have been suspected and not taken ; or taken and tried, but have contrived artfully to escape through the meshes of the net which enclosed them. The competency of the judicial tribunals, the vigilance that is to bring them to the bar, the care and accuracy with which the forms of proceedings against them will be arranged, the possibility of buying off witnesses, or the means they may have of deceiving a jury by false evidence or purchased sophistry, are as regular items in the account current of their chances, as any that are entered in the ledger of honest employment.

The object most desirable is to obtain the means of detecting the guilty person,—a branch of our inquiry which we shall presently consider. But we remark in this connexion, that the careful organization of the criminal courts, with the proper means of immediate pursuit known to be at their command, is quite as useful, to say the least, in preventing crimes, as it ever could be in punishing them. But in regard to the punishment which is to be inflicted, the mildest that is not so trifling as to be laughed at, is more likely to be efficacious, than that severer discipline which is threatened without being applied.

Our community is averse to capital punishments. These are adopted by the criminal code, and in certain cases we have no doubt are warranted by the laws of God, and required by the stern necessity of public preservation. But whenever they are decreed, a strong sentiment of commiseration is excited. The executive is beset for a pardon, be the guilt of the party what it may, and in case of an execution, we are sometimes left in doubt which receives the greater share of public condemnation, the magistrate or the criminal. Something of the kind is found in all cases of conviction. Popular feeling is adverse to severity, and where a discretion is allowed, judges have found it wise not to go to the extent of their power. The reaction of the public mind, in cases of any excitement, is extraordinary, and much more powerful than one not accustomed to watch its movements, would suppose. The first account of crime excites indignation. People are on the

alert, and a detestation of the offence rouses them to a general pursuit, or whatever other effort is required to detect the suspected party. He is taken and put on trial, and there begins to be an inclination to doubt his guilt. He is convicted, and he excites sympathy. He is punished, and his sufferings create commiseration. Humanity laments over his misfortunes. Generosity is awakened. His humbleness and helplessness disarm resentment. What good can be done by the exercise of power on a wretch already rendered incapable of doing further injury to society? He has connexions, a family, a wife, children, and perhaps other dependants, and his disgrace throws its darkness upon them. Their misery, great enough by the fact of his guilt, is aggravated by the disgrace of its penalty. Every blow inflicted on him, draws blood from the hearts of his innocent offspring. Every day's confinement to which he is subjected, deprives them of the means of subsistence. While he is in prison, they are in poverty; while the state punishes him, food must be provided for his family, or they must starve in the streets. This with a vast number is the language both of feeling and of fact. It is difficult to find an answer to it. The common law of Providence involves the innocent in the punishment of the guilty, but the extent of this communion is oftentimes man's work. We say guilt must be punished, and innocence protected; but we have not the means of accomplishing both. If we discharge the convicted felon, we encourage a herd of prowling wolves to drink the blood of our children, or riot on the plunder of our property. If we punish him, we draw tears of anguish from hearts pure, perhaps, as our own, and seem to be exerting the whole weight of society on a being, bound, fettered, and helpless, too insignificant for resentment, or too dull for reproach. In this dilemma is the judge of a criminal court often placed, when to be just is to appear cruel to one class, and to be merciful is to be unjust to another.

Undoubtedly, that law would best answer its purpose, which should take early measures for preventing the opportunity of crime, and extend its cordon of observation round the deluded and unprincipled part of the community. But when this may not be done, such punishment as may not bring odium on the law itself, and of course a mild and moderate system of penalties, is most to be commended as a sanction for the criminal code. Not only must cruelty be avoided, but nothing en-

couraged that looks like vengeance, or even severity. The terror of the law is inspired by a different principle. Its certainty is more efficacious than its weight. When there is a great probability that the punishment that is threatened will be awarded, and that what is awarded will be inflicted, although this may be small, and wholly inadequate as a retaliation for the wrong done to society, there is a better hope that the object will be secured.

The power of pardon has a direct connexion with the criminal code, and it is not to be inferred from what we have said, that we join with those who think it should be never, or very sparingly exercised. It may seem singular, after what we have already remarked with regard to the difficulty of executing the sentence of the law, that any should be found to resist its remission. Such contradictions, however, are not unfrequent on a subject which is of daily recurrence, and appears so plain to common apprehension, that most men speak about it in a manner somewhat dogmatical. But so it is. While a constant clamor is raised against the common course of proceedings in relation to the punishment of criminals, an outcry not less perplexing is made as to the exercise of pardon. The executive is importuned by applicants for clemency, while abroad there are those of some influence and weight, who are not satisfied with any relaxation of the sentences which from time to time are pronounced by courts of law.

The power of pardon has in some parts of our country been greatly abused. In Pennsylvania, one chief magistrate is said to have released eleven hundred criminals. In New York, it was customary to pardon the old convicts, to make room for new ones, in a prison not large enough to contain all. This was little less than a repeal of the criminal code. In Massachusetts more discrimination has been made, and we think with good effect. The pardoning power has its appropriate limits, beyond which it cannot be carried without injury; but the power is an indispensable part of the system of criminal law, which, without its liberal exercise, would be a cold, and dreary, and stern infliction of severity and suffering, at which all feelings of humanity would revolt, and even the rigid principles of justice turn aside in disgust. To repentant guilt let the hand of mercy be readily extended. Let it remove from the oppressed heart the punishment which has already had its perfect work. Let it restore the child of error to the path of

duty, chastened by the perils he has passed, and bound to virtue by gratitude for that kindness which visited him in prison, and restored him to liberty. Let it alleviate a severe sentence and remit an unjust one. Courts are obliged to act by general laws, by circumstantial evidence and established forms. These may in particular cases bear severely, and perhaps oppressively; but the judge cannot always exert his power for their alleviation, or according to the peculiarities of different offenders. The force of temptation, the seductions of bad company, the pressure of misfortune, the wrong direction of the mind by want of early education, or parental discipline, or kind friends, cannot always enter into the consideration of a judge, even if, as rarely happens, they are made known to him. The different character and condition of offenders of apparently the same class, the state of mind which renders the same penalty so different in its effects on different individuals, must be beyond the cognisance of a judicial officer; but the intelligent and careful dispenser of clemency regulates these inequalities. Each case is before him with its palliatives and its aggravations, and in those in which the operation of general principles have been too stern, or where peculiar circumstances present a claim for mercy, it is wise and just, as well as humane, that he should have the power of forgiveness.

Upon the criminal, too, this power of pardon is the influence that draws him back to society, and connects him with the virtuous and the worthy. It is the little light that throws a cheering ray upon the darkness of his solitude, and sheds a kindly warmth on the coldness of his cell. Without it he could hope nothing. 'The world is not his friend, nor the world's law.' All that chance of amendment which springs from good feeling and a softened mind, would be lost forever. The only hold society has upon a culprit, is in his feeling that there is yet a living sympathy in his misfortunes,—a belief with which he is impressed, that the power which punishes is just, but not vindictive, and however rigorous, is never cruel; that there is yet in operation a benevolence that would delight to bring him back to the path of virtue. There are no other means of amendment. If these fail, if they cannot soften the heart, and melt the obduracy of hardened guilt, it will be in vain to expect reformation by any human exertion. We believe they do, and much more frequently than is generally supposed; but good resolutions are overcome by new temptations, and the de-

sire to do well vanishes before the allurements and necessities of the world.

None probably think of abridging the constitutional power of pardon, which everywhere in our country is lodged in some department of government. But the desire to curtail its free and liberal exercise amounts to the same thing. With some opportunity of observation, we are satisfied that the power of pardon judiciously exerted, is, not less than the power of punishment, indispensable for the good of society, and vastly more beneficial in its tendency to reclaim the deluded and misjudging violaters of the law. And it does not lessen this conviction to be told that this power cannot be exerted, and therefore does not operate, on every transgressor. It is enough that it exists, and can be exerted in any case, and will be in many. Some, therefore, must, and all may be its objects. The chance is open to every one. The self-exertion, which controls chance and begets favor, is practicable, and there is a good motive to practise it. The mind, thrown back upon itself by the sufferings it experiences, has a double inducement to reform; it is impressed at once by the penalty of guilt and the reward of amendment.

Nor are our views changed by the fact, that the records of our prisons frequently show that they are tenanted by many, who have once been pardoned. It proves only that the discretion of the chief magistrate was in such instances wrongly exerted; and this is not wonderful. He is obliged to depend on the information that is given him, and is too often guided by extraneous influence, interested solicitation, and resistless importunity. Society, also, must take something of the reproach to itself; for the convict is pardoned indeed, but his pardon merely gives him liberty to go from the solitude of his cell into the more dreary solitude of a crowd that avoids him. The curse of the felon hangs upon him, and because he can get no employment, and can neither beg nor borrow, he is compelled again to steal.

With all the objections, which have been made to a liberal exercise of the pardoning power, we hope to see it freely, but judiciously exerted. In the whole subject of the treatment of criminals there is nothing that is entirely what we could wish; but this branch of it is certainly not the most revolting, with whatever difficulties it is supposed to be connected. If mercy be sometimes poorly repaid by the gross ingratitude

of its objects, it is oftener encouraged by its rewards. It is the regenerating spark which brings to new life the erring and deluded offender, warms in his bosom the better sentiments of virtue, and excites him to repentance and reformation.

In our remarks on the criminal code, we ought before to have mentioned that we have reference to that of Massachusetts, which, like most of the States, is built on the English common law. In most of its principles, its forms of proceedings and rules of evidence, it remains unchanged. The amendments it has received chiefly relate to the punishments, which have been, with as much wisdom as humanity, made less rigorous and severe. The most important change in this respect was adopted in the year 1805, when confinement in the State Prison was substituted for those corporal scourgings, brands, and exposures in the pillory, formerly awarded.

Trial by jury is everywhere secured by provisions of constitutional law, but is not in all cases practically enjoyed. In Massachusetts, for instance, a man may be deprived of his wife, his children, his fortune, and his character, by the judgment of a single judge, acting without a jury, and often when his opinion cannot be revised by the other members of the Supreme Court.* The case we refer to is under the law of divorce; a law most unwisely contrived to multiply cases for its own operation.

On application for divorce, the investigation of the crime on which the libellant's right depends, is conducted before a single judge, who decides without a jury on the question of fact; and this he is authorised to do, not only on testimony given by witnesses in open court, but by depositions of persons whose character and appearance he cannot by possibility know. When, in his opinion, the libel is sustained, he decides who shall have which, and how many of the children. He determines the ability of the convicted party to pay alimony, and fixes its amount. When the character of the condemned party is thus decided to be infamous, and his children are removed from him, and his property is forfeited, and his wife is divorced, he has not even the poor satisfaction of knowing that it was by verdict of his peers, or even by the deliberate judgment of all his constitutional judges.

It is no answer to say this power has never been abused. The actual administrators of this law are entitled to, and pos-

* Mass. Laws, 1820. Ch. 56.

sess, our highest respect ; and while the greatness of the trust confided to them makes them wisely cautious, it should have had a similar effect on the makers of the law. Whenever its operation is brought to bear on some member of the more influential class of society, it will be a subject of very serious complaint. We have known hard cases, where the solicitude of the bench to do right, could not always accomplish it. Our dissatisfaction is not diminished by the consideration that a law, so important and anomalous, was made for the exigency of a single case, and that a whole system was imposed on the community for the benefit of a single family ; a mode of legislation that can never escape reprobation. But our motive especially in noticing it here may be found in its tendency to encourage divorces. The ease and rapidity with which a dissolution of the marriage contract can be obtained, and the collusions, which, under the existing laws, can be practised to obtain it, are not light matters of consideration, either to the moralist who regards the manners, or to the civilian who is concerned for the general interests, of society.

The right of trial by jury is also taken away in such cases as fall within the enlarged jurisdiction of justices of the peace.* It is true, that a right of appeal is reserved to the party convicted, and on the trial of such appeal the case passes under the revision of a jury. But this is the most tantalizing of all judicial mockeries. It indeed keeps the word of promise to the ear, but breaks it to the hope. On the statute book all looks fair and constitutional. There appears to be no oppression, no injustice, no usurpation. But how is the fact? The appeal is given on conditions that can hardly ever be complied with. The poor man has not the means, the ignorant has not the knowledge, and the innocent has not the time, which the statute requires. The process is too summary, the judgment too speedy, the sentence too sudden, to allow the benefit of provisions, which the Bill of Rights declares shall be 'granted freely, completely, and without denial.' And the result proves this. Of more than one thousand cases decided under this statute in the city of Boston, not five have been carried before a jury by process of appeal.† We do not doubt that all these cases were

* Mass. Laws, Ch. 82, of 1822.

† During seven years and a half there were received in the Police Court of the city of Boston, 15,449 complaints of offences under the laws. We have not the means of ascertaining how they were disposed of. Probably they terminated in some of the following ways, viz.

decided correctly on the evidence before the court. Possibly a jury might have come to the same results ; and had the same magistrates pronounced a final judgment in all cases of homicide or felony that occurred during the same period, it is not supposable that they would in any one instance have been designedly wrong. But this is not a proper foundation for criminal law. It does not comply with the direction of the Bill of Rights, which provides, that 'the legislature shall not make any law that shall subject any person to a capital or infamous punishment, except for the government of the army or navy, without trial by jury.'

To take away a trial by jury, except on impossible conditions, and from persons whom it is known beforehand cannot comply with the conditions, is an evasion of public duty. It is a deception which can satisfy the conscience of no honest man, and must have been introduced by mistake, and is suffered to remain through mere inattention.

We have supposed the magistrates who execute this law, to be intelligent and upright ; and we do not mean to retract that testimony of our respect, when we suggest our apprehensions that they may be sometimes led into error. For who are the persons on whose testimony complaints are often made and judgments awarded? They are the retainers of the police, constables, and constables' deputies, and the deputies of deputies, and so down. And who are the objects of the law, but exactly that unfortunate and miserable class, upon whom oppression could be most easily exerted? The theatre of a justice's court is too small, the spectators are too few, the actors are too humble for the performance of so serious a tragedy. There is wanted a wider field of observation. What is done, should be done before the community. It should be

1. The complaint was dismissed without further process.
2. The defendant could not be found ;
3. Or was discharged, not being proved guilty ;
4. Or was ordered to appear before some higher tribunal, the case being beyond the final jurisdiction of the examining magistrates.
5. Judgment was pronounced against the party accused.

From some other sources we learn that about twelve hundred of the above cases were remitted to a higher tribunal. Sixty appeals were claimed from judgments ; but, after some inquiry, we can find but one of this number, in cases under the enlarged jurisdiction of justices, where punishment by imprisonment was imposed ; which proves, we think, a most extraordinary satisfaction on the part of the accused persons, or what in our opinion is much more probable, an entire inability to obtain a trial by jury.

subjected to the salutary influence of public opinion ; and that influence is well kept up by a jury, who are the representatives of all the people in courts of law. Without their agency no very considerable jurisdiction should ever be exercised.

This subject is of vastly more importance than it may seem to be, to superficial observers. The right of trial by jury is justly esteemed invaluable ; but in the worst times there were comparatively few men, who suffered for the want of it. The moral benefit is of equal moment, and operates extensively on all that class of the community most to be affected by criminal law. The higher penalties are rarely called for. It is the recurrence of little crimes and little punishments, which constitutes the mass of business for a court ; and the great body of those, whose minds and manners are to be influenced by the operation of the laws, are consigned for good or for evil to the humblest departments in the administration of justice.

The criminal code is wanting in that completeness and symmetry of parts, which are the marks of a regular system. It resembles those ancient fabrics of Gothic architecture improved by modern taste without regard to their original construction. It would extend this article too far, to notice in detail the proofs of this position, but we may rest it on the general fact, that the code has never been systematically arranged with a view to any definite results. Something has been done at one time, and something at another ; but alterations have been made for temporary purposes by permanent provisions, projected without regard to the existing law, and often in language singularly inartificial, untechnical, and hard to be understood. It would not escape the animadversion of a legal critic, that the forms of indictment, the subject of evidence, the admissibility of confessions, or the manner and circumstances of receiving them, are left to the regulations of ancient common law.

But we pass from this branch of our subject, which would carry us beyond the bounds we are desirous of prescribing to ourselves, to say something of the difficulties in the *execution* of the criminal laws.

We first remark, that the ambiguity of their language, is one cause of insuperable difficulty. Every one has heard of a law for lighting the public streets, in a neighbouring State, which first provided for lanterns, and then for candles to be put in them, and yet failed of its purpose, until it was enacted that the candle should be lighted. A mistake of an opposite nature was

made by one of our own eminent jurists, who drafted a law to prevent the sale of any lighted fireworks, an article, which, in such a condition, nobody ever wanted to buy. The meaning of the plain phrases 'sailing to a foreign port,' and 'from any harbor in the United States,' gave rise to endless discussions under the embargo laws, and furnished excuses for conniving at evasions of the statutes.

Something of this ambiguity is doubtless unavoidable. But there is an unpardonable negligence in the phraseology of laws, which ought not to be tolerated. And it would be easy to remedy it. The expense of prosecutions on an ill-worded law, is vastly greater than would be incurred by paying competent persons for a careful revision of it. At such a suggestion the pride of the legislature takes immediate alarm. What! are not we, the representatives of the people, capable of doing the public business? Are not the lawyers of the General Court as competent to frame a law, as any other members of their profession? Undoubtedly they are. But they have neither the time, nor the inclination, nor do they feel the responsibility, which such a work requires. At any rate, after the experience of more than half a century, it is certain the evil exists, and we speak to practical men when we say, that it is unwise and unthrifty to proceed on theoretical principles which have always deceived us. Every government has certain law officers whose time might be commanded for this purpose. The criminal code, if it has any pretence to the character of a system, is to be modified with a knowledge, not only of the effect of proposed alterations on the part under consideration, but of the entire system with which they are to be incorporated. Of the general design and tendency of rules and principles, the people by their representatives, are not only the best, but unquestionably the only judges; as they are what fortresses or ships of war should be constructed for national defence, or what edifices should be erected at public expense, for the ornament or convenience of the country. But, as in these latter cases, artists and architects would be employed under their direction, to carry any general plan into execution, we do not see why the same aid may not be useful in the technical construction of the laws, unless, indeed, to erect a market-house or build a revenue-boat, be harder than to frame a body of public law. If the law has acquired the complexity of a science, either reduce it to plain and elementary principles, or use its

technical language with precision. The system ought to be made practicable, either by a simplicity which requires no skill, or by the use of such skill as its want of simplicity demands.*

A more serious difficulty in the way of executing the laws than the ambiguity of their language, and one for which no remedy has ever been suggested that in itself is free from objection, meets us at the threshold. We allude to the commencement of a prosecution. The law never moves of its own accord. Its precepts, its officers, its authority, its penalties, all remain quiet, by something more than a mere *vis inertiae*, until set in operation by some extraneous power. The arrest of a delinquent, which is its first efficient movement, is to be preceded by a charge under oath, which anybody may make, who has knowledge of the facts, but which nobody is obliged to make. The exceptions to this position need not now detain us. The necessary security, which is here provided for innocent parties, has a serious operation in screening the guilty, and retards, and frequently defeats, the whole design of the law. The oath and complaint are not certainly to be dispensed with; but the inquiry is a very important one, when and by whom it ought to be made.

In cases in which public opinion, or individual interest is strongly excited, all is found to answer very well. If a murder is perpetrated, or violence is inflicted on the person of a citizen, or property is stolen, there is generally an alacrity of pursuit after the offender, and somebody stands ready to seek the aid of the laws. But that multitude of cases, which regard the peace, comfort, and good morals of society, without being particularly injurious to any one more than another, and those acts which become criminal only by positive prohibitions, remain notorious, but unpunishable, till some private inconvenience, greater than the trouble and vexation of undertaking to prosecute, induces somebody to volunteer in moving the majestic silence of the laws. Hence it is, that while the community is known to abound in places of abandoned profligacy, where mind, manners, morals, health, and property are daily and hourly sacrificed, the proprietors of the establishments are en-

* The distinctions between prosecutions and *qui tam* actions are singularly confounded in the Massachusetts laws. The statute, ch. 143, of 1804, has several omissions and a great want of accurate distribution of prohibitions and penalties. The statute, ch. 134, of 1828, seems intended to expend its power in threats which there is no means of enforcing.

abled to fatten on the heart's blood of their victims, and maintain themselves, with very little hazard, in a shameless and disgraceful impunity. Liquors are sold without licence, to the great encouragement of intemperance and its host of calamities; gaming houses are maintained; places of ill fame congregate their nightly assemblies of depraved and dissolute inmates; lottery offices are kept open; personal, obscene, and blasphemous libels are published; minor offences are permitted; the laws of the market, of the road, of police—of vast consequence as a whole, though seemingly insignificant in detail—are violated; little frauds and small felonies are committed upon suffering citizens little able to bear them, and the seeds of iniquity thickly scattered in the community, because it is not the particular duty of any one to take care of the public soil.*

We have alluded to certain cases, in which that which is the business of anybody, and therefore never done, becomes in some degree the duty of a particular officer. Thus the chief magistrate of large cities has generally some agent to enforce the execution of the laws, 'not only before complaint, but without complaint.' But the duty of such officer is always limited to police regulations, and is moreover controlled by such higher motives for indulgence, that his office is in a great degree useless. Consequently, police regulations are the most frequently, openly, and daringly violated; and while, now and then, what relates to health and personal convenience, is rigidly enforced, the more dangerous contaminations of the moral atmosphere, seem to be reckoned as among the necessary impurities of the city air.

To excite a vigilance that may be effectual, the legislature

* Impunity is not confined to these smaller acts. The law against challenging to a duel, has been repeatedly violated in a manner as notorious as any incident of public history, with no movement on the part of the law. Indeed, a duel was actually fought within the limits of the city of Boston, in view of divers good citizens of the Commonwealth, and one of the parties shot through the body; but the civil authorities were as silent as the grave. Sundry others, less public, but quite as well known, have occurred with the same death-like stillness on the part of the public authorities. At the moment we are writing, the legislature have received the report of a committee detailing gross fraud, and something that looks rather worse than mere fraud, without intimating the least disposition to turn over the offending parties to the judicial tribunals. This negligence is not found only among us. It is not uncommon in other parts of the country, nor rare in the history of the nation from which we have borrowed our law; though, where political questions are not concerned, it is but justice to say, endeavours are made, in flagrant instances, to insure the more certain march of justice.

has in some cases rewarded the obnoxious task of an informer, by dividing with him the penalty inflicted on a convicted party ; and though this does not impose a duty, it furnishes a motive to prosecute. In some cases it has had a good effect, but as a general principle is liable to very serious objections. It diverts the object of a prosecution from public good to personal emolument, generally draws a very inferior class of agents into the public service, and brings on the law itself the stigma of a mercenary spirit, discreditable to its character, and, in a free state, unfriendly to its influence. It further most commonly raises a question in the public mind, whether it be not better that an offender escape, than that an informer make money by telling of his crime. Men, who, as legislators, have proposed this reward, or as citizens have approved of it in the abstract, as being a salutary provision of the law, are often found very hostile to its practical operation, in the very cases in which it was intended to operate. The legislature itself constantly vacillates, now offering and now retracting its bounty, as the impunity of flagrant guilt, or the profits of a busy informer, seem from time to time to be most deserving of rebuke. Interested men find it very easy to direct something like public indignation against the agents who are invited by the public promises of the statute book, to perform an ungracious, though very often a necessary task. Take, for example, the case of licensed houses under the laws of Massachusetts. To place these establishments under legal control, was the early and constant policy of the State ; and, to insure an impossibility of evading the law, a heavy penalty was imposed on offenders, and one half of it given to the informer. When the desolating calamity of intemperance began to excite an increased degree of solicitude, attention was directed to places where its means were illegally obtained ; and the law, set in motion by the inducements provided in its terms, had an immediate and salutary vigor. But the consequences of its activity were no sooner perceived to be, that, besides closing the unlicensed shops, it was made profitable to those who had become obnoxious by giving information, than the provision for dividing the penalty was repealed. The effect, of course, is, that this most desirable law is left to take care of itself ; and, against the common sense of the community—hostile to all encouragements for intemperance, in open ridicule of the labor of societies formed for the promotion of good morals in this regard,

and against all those reasons of a public and important character, which demand the rigid enforcement of its penalties, it is constantly, extensively, and notoriously violated with impunity. Men of respectability, engaged in an honest calling, conform to its provisions ; but that worthless class it was intended to restrain, treat its denunciations with impudent contempt.

In one or two cases, the law officers of the Commonwealth, are directed to prosecute offences against certain laws ; a provision which either means nothing, or, being introduced with great ignorance of the established mode of proceeding in criminal cases, can come to nothing. It is the duty of these officers to prosecute all crimes, when a prosecution is practicable, and there needed no direction to them to do this as to any particular class. The only prosecutions they can conduct, are those, the means of which shall be furnished them by witnesses knowing to the facts, and ready to testify to these facts before a jury. It would argue great folly to suppose that the attorney-general could draw an indictment on his own knowledge, and be at the same time witness and counsel for the Commonwealth. The statute which directs him and his colleagues to prosecute, gives no means of procuring the information on which the very first measure of a prosecution must be founded. It certainly does not expect him to go himself into the purlieus of crime, nor does it empower him to employ or pay others for such domiciliary visitation. Its only use is to keep up an expectation of activity, which must necessarily be fallacious ; and it holds its place in the statute book only by a strange mistake, both as to the object to be obtained, and the legal means of obtaining it.

A more effectual mode of enforcing the laws, is through the intervention of a grand jury. They are under oath 'diligently to inquire, and true presentment make, of all such matters and things as shall be given them in charge ;' and the practice here is, invariably to give them in charge the whole criminal code. Their numbers prevent any personal odium, and their obligation to keep the Commonwealth's counsel, their fellows', and their own, if observed, shuts out the means of directing it. They are the people's representatives, and are entrusted with the people's rights in the administration of justice. From this body, therefore, might be expected to come a complaint against every open violation of law, with directions where to find the precise evidence to maintain their charge in the form required

by the provision of the Bill of Rights. In practice it is not so. Either the successive members of this body do not possess the requisite information, or do not feel bound to communicate it. The case of an indictment at the voluntary suggestion of a grand jurymen, is exceedingly rare. The law is left to its course, and deeds of evil, which the interest or feelings of an aggrieved party do not bring to light, are permitted to sleep in the tranquillity of oblivion.

If the community were better informed of the defects of the criminal law, many of their complaints would cease, or be directed only against themselves. Strictness and clemency are equally the causes of dissatisfaction, and often with different classes at the same time. Sometimes there are too few prosecutions, and sometimes too many. Sometimes the expense of proceedings, or the insignificance of the culprit, it is said, should stay the arm of the law, although the power to restrain, is as little the subject of discretion, as that of commencing a prosecution. Again, the clamor is equally obstreperous, that a more comprehensive operation does not include every possible culprit. Some would have the lightning of the law wither on the instant, this or that class of offenders, while over the heads of these very victims there are others quite willing to have its innoxious thunders roll safely at a distance. In all these cases it is forgotten that the public will has seen fit to fix the whole penal code, like the bucket of a public well, which at one time swings idly in the air, and at another cannot be moved with sufficient rapidity to satisfy the thirst.

We add another remark, which we trust will be candidly received. If the community feel any interest in the due execution of the criminal law, they should give their countenance to those officers by whom it must be executed. The efficacy of its operation depends in a good degree on the exertions of the representative of the State. He is called upon to strip off the disguise of artful imposture, to lay bare the fraudulent deceptions of knavery, to expose the pretences that would conceal crime, or detect the sophistry that would defend it; and in doing this he surrounds himself with enemies who find in his interference their liability to punishment. He may truly say, *Quonam meo fato fieri dicam, ut nemo his annis viginti, reipublicæ fuerit hostis, qui non bellum, eodem tempore, mihi quoque indixerit? Nec vero necesse est quenquam nominari, vobiscum ipsi recordamini.*

The men who live in violation of the laws, have a common sympathy with each other. Sharpers, gamblers, panders to the unlawful appetites of the young, the dissolute and the prodigal, lottery dealers, *et id genus omne*, see only one obstacle to their security. Men whom the humanity of a jury discharges from conviction, which everybody but a technical jury knows to be merited, or on whom the lenity of a judge inflicts a fine instead of sending them to prison, affect an appearance of innocence, by blustering about the oppression of the laws, and show their gratitude for an escape through the instrumentality of a legal doubt, by pretended indignation that their innocence was suspected. Such men are more powerful than is generally supposed. Under various pretences, they consort with better citizens. They are voters, and throw their weight into the scales of an election; or are writers, and move the power of the press.

A series of public prosecutions were recently conducted in the city of New York, tending to disclose a complicated system of chicanery and fraud, and involving men of influence and property. After immense difficulties, verdicts were obtained and judgments pronounced, which were reversed by the high Court of Errors and Appeals. The discharge of his duty in these cases, brought on the law officer all that hostility in a notorious manner, which, in a less observable form, is the constant consequence of similar exertions. But the public sentiment threw over him its impenetrable shield, and the merchants of that opulent city recorded the estimation of his services by a donation of plate. Such great occasions rarely occur, and the reward can as rarely be deserved. But the spirit which dictated it, is always in request. The same protection is necessary against a malignant and revengeful temper, which, failing of success upon the laws, turns its rage upon their ministers, in the hope that if it can beat down the sentinel, it may carry the citadel.

ART. VI.—*Lectures on the Inspiration of the Scriptures.* By LEONARD WOODS, D. D., Abbot Professor of Christian Theology in the Theological Seminary, Andover. pp. 152. Andover, M. Newman. 1829.

THE Professor of Theology in the Andover Seminary will excuse us, we trust, if we postpone his claims, for a while, to the less agreeable task of dealing with adversaries who are assailing us with weapons far different from those which he uses. With this remark to guard against even a momentary misapprehension, we shall take up the matter of our thoughts *ab origine*.

One of the evils of controversy, is, that men are driven by it into extremes of opinion. The sound and sober conclusions at which they arrive in calmer times, are made to give way to extravagant positions, injurious to the minds of those who hold them, injurious to the cause of Christianity, and favorable only to the attacks of its enemies. Inquiry is pursued under many undue biases indeed, but especially under the bias of a wish to put opponents and adversaries in the wrong. New tests, not only of practical religion, but of Christianity itself, are set up, in order to exclude unwelcome opinions from the ground of our common faith, and the maintenance of such opinions from the credit of cherishing its virtues.

It is of some importance, at such times, to look to the foundation of our faith, and to call to mind its most judicious and able defenders, to point to the old and firm landmarks and standards, in order to show that these periodical freshets of theological zeal, which bear away 'the wood and the hay and the stubble,' are not powerful enough to remove those landmarks and standards;—to show that they will spend their force and pass away, and leave all that is weighty and strong in our religion, just where it was before. We say it is of some importance. It is not of such importance as if we were defending the very ground of our faith and hope. It is only pointing with our finger, and showing where the foundations are. He who feels his house to be strong and firm, cannot be disturbed if his neighbour, with misplaced zeal or benevolence, should tell him that it is all decaying and sinking beneath him. He may listen to him with an incredulous smile, and may good naturedly go around with him from pillar to pillar, and show him that

what he apprehends to be fatal defect, is the mere rubbish that surrounds them.

It might awaken a stronger feeling, if that neighbour should evidently take pleasure in the alleged unsoundness, if he should exult in the downfall he predicted, and if he should pertinaciously insist upon the point manifestly with the design to injure the property in the great market of public opinion. But still the feeling would be a calm one, and would be only strengthened into a firmer and more fearless confidence. He would perhaps put his hand upon the foundation or upon the pillar, and shake it, with the most careless exertion of his strength, that he might show it to be safe.

It is for all these reasons, that we shall task ourselves for a few moments to examine the totally unauthorised and groundless character of the charge now pressed against us, of being, notwithstanding our christian profession, ourselves Infidels. But for the same reasons, we cannot anticipate that we shall awaken in ourselves much zeal on the subject. We cannot, as we have said on a former occasion, fairly descend into the arena of argument; we cannot seriously put ourselves in contest at this point of recent attack; for, with our professions, it would seem to us a moral indecorum so to do. We must take our stand aloof from this, and simply point out to our prying opponents, whether friendly or unfriendly, their mistake.

We lay our hand strongly, then, upon the foundation—the Bible. We say, *THERE is a communication from Heaven.* *There* is light supernaturally communicated, and attested, to those Heaven-commissioned prophets and apostles, who, in their turn, have simply, naturally, each after the manner of his own age, his own style, his own peculiar habits of thought and feeling, imparted it to us. *There* are truths recorded, beyond the human reach of the men who delivered them, and they are truths dearer to us than life.

Right or wrong in our conviction, this is what we believe. We are not reasoning now with infidels; if we were, we should undertake to show them that we are right. But we are expostulating, we cannot reason, with those who deny us the credit of the faith we profess; and we say to them, again, Right or wrong, this is what we believe. Our opponents must pardon us, if we seem to them to speak loftily in a case like this. We put it to them, whether they could do less in similar circumstances. If the Catholics, or if we ourselves, were seriously

and perseveringly to lay the charge against them, of being infidels in disguise, we ask them if they could consent gravely to argue upon it? We put the case to their own feelings, and we say to them, as they would say to us or to others, in a change of circumstances—with all our solemn professions before them, with all our preaching and our prayers in the name of Christ, with all our labors to illustrate the holy scriptures, with all our publications, our books, our commentaries—with all these things before them, we say that the charge they bring is not *decent*; and in common decency, we cannot descend to argue the point with them.

The only decent allegation which they could bring, is, that our views tend to produce infidelity. On this point we should be at issue with them, and should be willing to reason. We are at issue with them, indeed; for we say that their own views much more tend to produce infidelity. Nay, we seriously believe that it is our system, with thinking minds, that will prove to be the only sufficient defence and barrier against utter unbelief; and this is one great reason why we are anxious for its prevalence. We are perfectly willing to admit, at the same time, that no speculative views are, with all persons and in all circumstances, an effectual preservative. We admit that some Unitarians in foreign countries have become infidels. But do not our opponents know, that many Calvinists, many Orthodox persons, not in other countries alone, but in this also, have become infidels; and that multitudes of Catholics abroad, believers in the trinity, and the atonement, and many kindred points of doctrine, have fallen into utter disbelief of the christian revelation? Doubtless there is a medium somewhere, which is perfect truth and secure faith; and we believe,—without arrogance we hope, since it is a matter of simple sincerity and consistency so to believe—that we are nearest to that medium.

It seems to us not a little extraordinary, and it illustrates indeed the observation with which we commenced these remarks, that while our Orthodox brethren are charging us with these disguised and subtle errors, they do so completely wrap themselves up, as to all the difficult points of this controversy concerning inspiration, in general implications with regard to their own faith in the scriptures, and that they push those implications to an extent so utterly indefensible—so utterly unauthorised, at any rate, by many of the highest standards of their own churches.

And we must add that it seems to us a fact still more irreconcilable with candor and good faith, that while, with a view to show what our faith, or as they will have it, what our unbelief is—while, we say, for this professed purpose, they take brief sentences and disjointed members of sentences here and there from our writings, they altogether suppress the strong and full declarations we make of our belief in a supernatural communication to the inspired teachers of our religion; that they never tell their readers or hearers, that we ‘earnestly contend for this faith’ against unbelievers, and profess to find in it the highest joy and hope of our being. This, we must remind them, is an utter violation of all the received courtesies of religious controversy. For a reasoner to charge upon opponents his inferences as their faith, has long been branded as one of the most inadmissible practices in controversy. But pertinaciously to do this, in the face of the most deliberate protestations to the contrary, and without noticing such protestations; and this, too, before communities that either have not the means, or will not use them, of learning the truth, is a conduct for which we would gladly see any tolerable apology. For if he who ‘robs us of our good name,’ does an inexcusable action, what shall we say of him, who, without affording us any remedy, robs us of the name we most honor and value? We will not say what; we regret the necessity of saying thus much.

But we would invite those from whose lips the charge of infidelity so easily falls, to forsake the convenient covert of general implication, and to tell us, in good truth, what they themselves believe, on some of the matters of accusation that seem to them so weighty.

In laboring to fix upon us the charge of infidelity, they quote from us as proof, the statement, that ‘the inspired penmen wrote in conformity with the philosophy of their respective ages—in conformity therefore with some portions of natural and metaphysical philosophy, that are false.’ We ask if they themselves believe any otherwise? Do they believe that the sacred writers foresaw the discoveries of modern science? If they had this foresight, these matters would not have been left for discovery.

Again, we have said, ‘it cannot be denied that there are some slight discrepancies in the evangelical narratives;’ and this, too, has been quoted as evidence of our unbelief. But can it be denied? Does any intelligent student of the scriptures—do

our accusers deny it? We confess that we are surprised to read a citation like this, because we considered it as a conceded point, in some of our best and best authorised books of evidences, that there are such discrepancies, and because it is argued by our christian apologists, as it was by ourselves, that these discrepancies give additional credit to the evangelical witnesses, by showing that there could have been 'no collusion among them.'

One further extract. We remarked that 'unbelievers have derived more plausible and just objections from the prevailing theological assumptions with regard to our sacred books, than from any other quarter;' and then went on to say, that 'the attacks which are usually made upon the philosophy of Moses, the imprecations of David, the differences among the apostles, the obscurities of Paul, and upon instances of puerility, coarseness, and indelicacy in style, and inappositeness in illustration, are all of this nature.' These expressions, again, are quoted as confirmation strong of our infidelity. On each of these points we should like to put those who arraign us to the question, and to see where *they* stand. Do *they* believe in the philosophy of Moses? Do they reject the Copernican system in astronomy, and maintain with Moses, who wrote in conformity with Jewish astronomy, that the heavens are a solid concave, in which the sun, the planets and stars, like splendid balls of light, perform a daily revolution around the earth? The answer of the rational defender of a revelation to the infidel objection arising from this quarter, is easy. He says that Moses was not commissioned to teach philosophy, but religion. But of this answer our opponents deprive themselves, since to question the philosophy of Moses is with them a sign of infidelity.

Next, 'the imprecations of David'—do they undertake to defend them? Speaking of his enemy, David uses the following tremendous supplications;—'Set thou a wicked man over him, and let Satan stand at his right hand. When he shall be judged, let him be condemned, and let his prayer become sin. Let his days be few, and let another take his office. Let his children be fatherless, and his wife a widow. Let his children be continually vagabonds, and beg. Let the extortioner also catch all that he hath, and let the strangers spoil his labor. Let there be none to extend mercy unto him; neither let there be any to favor his fatherless children. Let his posterity be cut off; and in the generation following let their name be cut off. Let the

iniquity of his fathers be remembered with the Lord, and let not the sin of his mother be blotted out.' It is impossible not to say with Le Clerc, these are the words of a man 'full of excessive choler, and an extreme desire to be revenged. And yet,' says he, 'some famous divines have put in the title to this Psalm, that David, as a type of Jesus Christ, being driven on by a singular zeal, prays that vengeance may be executed on his enemies! But where,' he says, 'do they find that Jesus Christ does curse his enemies at that rate?' Another caption reads that 'David, complaining of his slanderous enemies, under the person of Judas, devoteth them.' But the truth is, all these explanations are perfectly gratuitous. They are worse than gratuitous; they sanction a wrong principle. Can it be right to curse any being, and so to curse him—to curse not only him, but his father, his mother, his children, and his whole posterity, for his sin? Indeed, there is no defence to be made of this passage. This *could* not have proceeded from the good and merciful spirit of God. It was the imperfection of David, thus to feel. It was the imperfection of a rude and barbarous age. It belonged to a period of early and erring piety to use such a prayer. And it does not disannul the evidence furnished by other portions of his writings, that the Psalmist derived an inspiration from heaven. Those lofty conceptions of the spirituality and glory of God, and those sacred and transcendent affections which he entertained, considering the period in which he wrote, seem to us, in their intrinsic character, to warrant the claim to more than human teaching. The Book of Psalms, as a whole, appears to us, the more we study it and the age in which it was composed, to bear marks of an elevation and purity that are supernatural. There is nothing more wonderful to us in its character, than that in an age when the universal reliance was on things material, when all the ideas of what is good, and happy, with the world at large, stopped at this point,—that the mind of David should have found its rest, its portion, its all-sufficiency, as it did, in God; that he should, in this noblest respect, have gone so far beyond the prevailing piety of every subsequent age. But we must not dwell upon this subject. Our reverence for the Psalmist is great; but we cannot be blind to the imperfection of such a passage as that which we have cited. When the imprecations of David are next alluded to, we hope there will be some attempt at an explanation of them into accordance with the received ideas of in-

spiration, or an honest confession of the hopelessness of the task.

We insist upon these instances, more than we should do with any reference that is personal to ourselves or others. They present difficulties, in truth, to the advocates of literal and plenary inspiration which we could wish them fairly to meet.

Our reference to 'the differences among the apostles,' it is said, is another argument to prove that we are infidels. But do they, we ask again, deny that there *were* differences and disputes among the apostles—differences and disputes in regard to their apostolic conduct and work? Did not Paul upbraid Peter at Antioch, for 'not walking uprightly according to the truth of the Gospel;'—for making in fact a false impression in his apostolic character? Did he not 'withstand him to the face, because he was to be blamed?' Did not Paul and Barnabas dispute at the same place, and was not 'the contention so sharp, that they departed asunder one from the other?'

Then as to 'the obscurities of Paul'—on what age of biblical criticism have we fallen, when it is denied, even by implication, that there are obscurities in Paul—'things hard to be understood'? On what age of common sense, when the mention of these obscurities is set down as confirmatory evidence to sustain the charge of infidelity? And further, if the style he has adopted *is* obscure and hard to be understood, is that style, as mere style, to be commended as anything more than a human composition? Are the words that compose it, either 'grammatically or rhetorically the best words?'—Still further as to the scriptural style, the allegation that there are instances of puerility, coarseness and indelicacy, has been referred to as bearing a skeptical aspect. But has any man ever read the Old Testament without finding such instances? To us, they have no more weight, and they furnish no more difficulty, as affecting the question of a divine communication, than the costume of that ancient age. We should as soon think of requiring good breeding or politeness in the writers. Such phraseology belongs to the period, and its absence would take away one mark of truth from the record. But what the advocates of a literal and suggesting inspiration are to do with such instances, it passes our comprehension to devise. We beseech them to consider those instances,—it would be improper to quote them, we dare not refer to the texts—and to tell us whether they are ready to pledge the sense and delicacy of christian men for the propriety of such passages in

sacred books or any other books. We warn them, if they do confound the claims of revelation with the defence of such passages, if they dare to present themselves before the searching and free spirit of this age with such a defence, that they will have something to do with infidelity, besides conjuring up a phantom of it in the faith of their fellow Christians.

Lastly, 'inappositeness in illustration.' We would ask any man learned in the scriptures, whether he does not believe that the New Testament exhibits frequent instances of Jewish allegorizing?—and whether these instances do not conform to the principles of that mode of illustration?—and whether he accounts those principles to have been very strict, or exact, or logical? We will refer our hasty accusers to some of their own authorities. Dr Woods says, 'It is no objection to the inspiration of the scriptures, that they exhibit all the varieties in the mode of writing that are common in other works.' Other works, we suppose he means, of the same period, and indeed he instances under this observation the 'allegory.' Were the allegories of Jewish 'works' always exactly apposite? He maintains, we know, that there is a relevance; but does this amount to an exact appositeness? Bishop Atterbury says, 'The language of the East'—and he applies this observation to the scriptures—'speaks of nothing simply, but in the boldest and most lofty figures and in the longest and most *strained* allegories.' Dr Powell, Master of St John's College, Cambridge, says, in speaking of the writings of Paul, —'Lastly, he abounds with broken sentences, bold figures, and hard, *far-fetched* metaphors.' *

We introduce two or three criticisms of Dr Jahn, on some of the prophets, which we presume no one will call in question. Of Ezekiel, Dr Jahn, says, 'His tropes and images do not always exactly correspond with nature;'—of Zachariah, 'Many novel and elegant tropes and allegories occur, but they are not always quite in character with the nature of the things from which they are drawn.'† Can any critic maintain that there is in the scriptures an invariable 'appositeness of illustration?' If there is, then the language is not, as Dr Woods admits it is, 'completely human,' but perfectly divine.

But all this proves, say our reviewers, that 'in regard to some

* Dr Powell's Sermon on Inspiration.

† Jahn's Introduction to the Old Testament.

portions of the Bible, Unitarians no more believe the *ideas* inspired, than they do the words.' Once more, we ask, do *they* believe in the inspiration of every idea that is contained in the Bible? That is the implication conveyed by their words; but do they believe it? Do they believe that the Psalmist was inspired to say, 'O daughter of Babylon, that art to be destroyed. Happy shall he be, that rewardeth thee, as thou hast served us. Happy shall he be that taketh and dasheth thy little ones against the stones.' Or when Solomon says, 'Be not thou one of them that strike hands, or of them that are sureties for debts,' do they believe that this injunction was inspired? Or when Paul uses this opprobrious language to the officer that struck him,—'God shall smite thee, thou whited wall!' do they account this to be the fruit of inspiration? 'Where,' says Jerome, speaking of this angry retort,—'where is that patience of our Saviour, who, as a lamb led to the slaughter, opened not his mouth, but answered mildly to him that struck him—"If I have spoken ill, convince me of the ill; but if well, why do you strike me?"'

Let us take an instance of a different character. Paul says to Timothy,—'Demas hath forsaken me, having loved this present world, and is departed unto Thessalonica, Crescens to Galatia, Titus unto Dalmatia. Only Luke is with me. And Tychicus have I sent to Ephesus. The cloak that I left at Troas with Carpus, when thou comest, bring, and the books, especially the parchments.' Now can any sensible man believe that these ideas were inspired? We presume not. Well, can any man believe—for this is the only tolerable supposition for our opponents—that Paul was *specially directed* to say these things to Timothy? They may believe so, but to us it seems a most unnecessary exaction upon our faith. We can believe that they were specially directed to state many things, which were derived, not from divine suggestion, but from memory—to state many things that were important as matters of fact and testimony—and that in this, the only possible sense, such things were inspired. But to suppose that Paul was divinely prompted to request that his cloak and books might be brought from Troas, and especially the parchments, looks to us more like an attempt to cast contempt on the doctrine of inspiration than seriously to defend it. We have opened at this moment on a passage of Dr Woods's Lectures, where he comments on this text. He says to the objector, 'I would ask him, what reason he has to think that the direction was unimportant either to the

comfort and usefulness of Paul, or to the interests of the churches.' To the interests of the churches, we suppose he means, *inasmuch* as it promoted Paul's comfort; and we answer, No reason. But is it to be thought that every request or direction of Paul's that concerned his own comfort, and, through that, his usefulness, was a matter of inspiration? We might as well say that when he asked for food at the daily board, he was inspired, as when he asked for clothing on the approach of winter; for the promise of divine guidance extended, it will not be denied, to what the apostles spoke, as much as to what they wrote. But to presume that this guidance was given in the minutest affairs of every day convenience and prudence, is not only an extension of the promise wholly unwarranted by the terms of it, as we think, but it is a stretch of inference which shows that the common theory of inspiration presses hard.

For ourselves, we feel no such pressure. Our minds are so much at ease in this argument, that we are ready to throw the little ball we have just been winding up, to our neighbours, for their further amusement. We cannot help referring those—we mean not the author we have just quoted—but those who are so fond of running out parallels between Unitarians and Infidels,—who have lately studied so hard upon 'Bolingbroke, Hobbes, Tindal, Morgan, Dodwell and Gibbon,'—referring them, we say, for it must cost a good deal of labor to hunt up so many references on both sides, to the new instances we have just given them, to be added to their useful catalogue. We warrant that Bolingbroke, Hobbes, Tindal, Morgan, Dodwell or Gibbon, or, perhaps, Paine, have quoted the same passages in objecting to Christianity, that we have quoted in objecting to the Orthodox views of inspiration. What a notable argument is it, and what notable minds must it be expected to operate upon! Unitarians believe some things that Infidels believe, and use some of the same methods of reasoning; therefore Unitarians are Infidels! But let us try a different application of this favorite argument, and see how it will stand. Orthodox persons believe in a providence; so do many Infidels, therefore the Orthodox are Infidels. The Trinitarians have departed from the simple unity of God, and conceive of three distinct principles, each of which is God; so did Plato; therefore Trinitarians are Platonists; they have forsaken Christianity, and, shocking to relate! have gone back to Heathenism. Calvinists decry human nature; so did the French philos-

ophers; therefore Calvinists are infidel philosophers. They are Necessitarians too; so were some of the ancient philosophers; and therefore, their system is a strange mixture of ancient and modern skepticism. The parallel might proceed, and thus it would be. 'Nay, but we make distinctions,' these several sects would say. We cannot help it; we do not see them; these meshes of sophistry are all broken and crushed before the step of this 'mighty and grinding dispensation' under which we are fighting the battle for truth. 'Well, but we profess to be Christians.' Ay, profess; no doubt you profess. That furthers your purposes for a while; you are 'Infidels in disguise;' you are on the way to a disclosure; and 'the sooner you come out,' the better.—'Ah,' our opponents will say, with a serious face after all, 'but can you shut your eyes to the great, historical fact, that some of the German theologians, a few years ago, speculated on some points as you do; and that they have now become Infidels?' The Catholic shall answer for us. 'Can you, Calvinistic Protestants, shut your eyes to the great, historical fact, that, but fifty years ago, the German theologians speculated in all respects as you do, unless that they speculated less freely, and that now, some of them are Infidels, and many of them Unitarians, and that almost all deny the scriptural obligation of the sabbath, the eternity of future punishments, and hold the Old Testament to be of authority inferior to that of the New?*' This is what we told Luther and his coadjutors long ago—told them so at the time. We told them, that they were plunging themselves, or their successors, at any rate, into infidelity. Nay, Holy Church deems but little better of you now, than that you are Infidels! It holds you outcasts from faith and hope,—and it ill becomes you to protest against this exclusion, so long as you are dealing out the whole measure of its severity against those who

* We wish, indeed, that those whose imaginations are so possessed with the resemblance which we bear to the Liberal Party in Germany—who have rung all the changes of argument, warning, and sarcasm, upon it, till we should think it could scarcely yield another note—we wish that they would look at the state of the *Orthodox* Party in that country. How easy would it be for us, if we were disposed to practise this lately perfected art of *seizing occasions*—to wage this petty war of comparisons, and allusions, and insinuations—to address ourselves, not to the reflections, but to the imagination of the people—how easy to retort, and to spread a vague horror against half of the Orthodox clergy of New England! But do we live at a period when there is no discrimination? Is the learning of Germany, with its hasty, though monstrous growth, to deter all the world from inquiry?

differ from you.' We commend the argument of the Catholic to those whom it may concern, and return to our discussion—only saying, as we pass, that the Catholic Doctors have more ground than they think for, to support the sophism by which they claim Protestant Christians as belonging to the one infallible and undivided church. Protestant Christians do indeed exhibit too many proofs of belonging to it; and this we say, not in the spirit of sarcasm, but of sober and sad reflection.

It is time to ask—since the term is so vaguely used and for such purposes—What is infidelity? Let the modern Orthodox luminaries of Germany, Storr and Flatt, answer for us; for they answer wisely and with discrimination. 'The question,' say they, 'is not, Shall we believe the doctrines of Jesus under the same conditions that we believe the declarations of any other teacher, namely, provided our reason discovers them to be true; but the question is, Shall we believe the instructions of Jesus, under circumstances in which we would not believe any other teacher, who was not under the special influence of God. It is useless to speak of a *revelation*, if we attribute to Jesus no other inspiration than what the Naturalist will attribute to him, and which may just as well be attributed to the Koran, and to every other pretended revelation; nay, to all teachers of religion; that is, if we receive only those doctrines, whose truth is manifest to the eye of reason, and call them divine only because all truth is derived from God, the author of our reason.'* It is in this vague sense that some Infidels have called the scriptures divine; that Bolingbroke has denominated them 'the word of God,' and that Rousseau has seemed to acknowledge so much, in those eloquent testimonies of his, to the beauty of the scriptures and of our Saviour's character, which put the coldness of many christian teachers to shame. But now let the question be fairly stated;—Does, or did, any Infidel ever admit the divine, supernatural, miraculous origin of that system of interpositions and instructions, that is recorded in the Bible? And was anything ever heard of, in all the annals of theological extravagance, more monstrous, than to charge men, who devoutly and gratefully profess to receive the Bible in this supernatural character, with being Infidels?

Let not our brethren in the christian faith be shaken from their steadfastness, by this senseless cry, or the vague horror

* Bibl. Theol. § 16. II. 3.

which it is designed to spread abroad among the people. Let them examine the glorious temple of their faith, too clear in their perceptions, too strong in their admiration, to be disturbed by the slight appendages which the tastes and styles of different ages have gathered around it. Let them study the sublime and precious record of heaven-inspired truth, with a freedom, with a faith, with a feeling, that standeth not in the letter, but in the spirit.

We cannot think it a hard case to be classed in our faith on this subject, with such men as Grotius and Erasmus, with Paley and Burnet. And we are really curious to know, we wish that our accusers would tell us, what they are to do with such men. Erasmus and Grotius, Burnet and Paley Infidels! It is indeed a discovery in the christian world.

We shall now take up a few moments in making some further references of this nature; for it is time, as we have already said, to refer to some of the most able defenders of our faith, and to inquire whether their names, too, are to fall under this newly devised opprobrium.

St Jerome says, 'The prophet Amos was skilled in knowledge, not in language.' And then in a comment on the third chapter he adds, 'We told you that he uses the terms of his own profession, and because a shepherd knows nothing more terrible than a lion, he compares the anger of God to lions.' Did not Jerome, then, regard the language as 'purely human?' Did he regard it as 'rhetorically the best language?'

The learned Le Clerc, whose writings occupy a distinguished place in all our theological libraries, says, with a latitude of expression, indeed, beyond what we should use—'Thus, then, according to my hypothesis, the authority of the Scripture continues in full force. For you see I maintain, that we are obliged to believe the substance of the history of the New Testament, and generally,—all the doctrines of Jesus Christ, all that was inspired to the apostles, and also whatsoever they have said of themselves, so far as it is conformable to our Saviour's doctrine and to right reason. It is plain that nothing farther is necessarily to be believed in order to salvation. And it seems also evident to me, that those new opinions brought into the christian religion since the death of the apostles, which I have here refuted, being altogether imaginary and ungrounded, instead of bringing any advantage to the christian religion, are really very prejudicial to it. An inspiration is attributed to the apostles,

to which they never pretended, and whereof there is not the least mark left in their writings. Hereupon it happens, that very many persons who have strength enough of understanding to deny assent to a thing for which there is no good proof brought—(though preached with never so much gravity)—it happens, I say, that these persons reject all the christian religion, because they do not distinguish true Christianity from those dreams of fanciful divines.*

For the opinion that we are to look to the substance of the scriptures, and not to the letter—not to every exact mode of phraseology, let us see what countenance we have from Dr Lightfoot, by universal consent allowed to be one of the most learned and eminent men in the English Church. After saying that the evangelists and apostles used the Greek version of the Old Testament in their quotations from it, he speaks of that version in the following terms. 'I question not but the interpreters (the LXX.), whoever they were, engaged themselves in this undertaking (the translation of the Old Testament), with something of a partial mind, and as they made no great conscience of imposing on the Gentiles, so they made it their religion to favor their own side; and according to this ill temperament and disposition of mind, so did they manage their version, either adding or curtailing at pleasure, blindly, lazily, and audaciously enough; sometimes giving a very foreign sense, sometimes a contrary, oftentimes none; and this frequently to patronize their own traditions, or to avoid some offence they think might be in the original, or for the credit and safety of their own nation. The tokens of all which, it would not be difficult to instance in very great numbers, would I apply myself to it.* Now admitting all, or anything of this to be true, is it possible to suppose that the apostles held the authority of the scriptures, as is now done, to depend on their verbal accuracy? There is reason, indeed, with Le Clerc, to denominate these views of inspiration, 'new opinions brought into the church since the death of the apostles.'

But our present business is with authorities. Bishop Atterbury, in his sermon on 2 Peter iii. 16, writes thus;—'For consider we with ourselves, what manner of men the apostles were in their birth and education, what country they lived

* Essay on Inspiration.

† Vol. 11. p. 401.

in, what language they wrote in ; and we shall find it rather wonderful that there are so few, than that there are so many things that we are at a loss to understand. They were men (all except Paul) meanly born and bred, and uninstructed utterly in the arts of speaking and writing. All the language they were masters of, was purely what was necessary to express themselves upon the common affairs of life, and in matters of intercourse with men of their own rank and profession. When they came, therefore, to talk of the great doctrines of the cross, to preach up the astonishing truths of the gospel, they brought, to be sure, their old idiotisms [idioms] and plainness of speech along with them. And is it strange, then, that the deep things of God, should not always be expressed by them in words of the greatest propriety and clearness ?

Bishop Chandler says, speaking of Paul's reasonings on certain points, ' In all this he saith no more than that the *subject* of his mystical reasons, as they relate to Christ, was taught them by the Spirit ; the *doctrines* were *divine* ; yet the *means* and *topics*, from whence they were sometimes urged and confirmed, were *human*.'

The following observations from Locke's Essay for the Understanding of St Paul's Epistles, we presume no judicious critic will gainsay, and we see not how the inference is to be rejected, that the manner and style were altogether his own, and purely human, and plainly imperfect.

' To these causes of obscurity common to St Paul with most of the other penmen of the several books of the New Testament, we may add those that are peculiarly his, and owing to his style and temper. He was, as it is visible, a man of quick thought, warm temper, mighty well versed in the writings of the Old Testament, and full of the doctrine of the New : All this put together, suggested matter to him in abundance on those subjects that came in his way ; so that one may consider him, when he was writing, as beset with a crowd of thoughts, all striving for utterance. In this posture of mind it was almost impossible for him to keep that slow pace, and observe minutely that order and method of ranging all that he said, from which results an easy and obvious perspicuity. To this plenty and vehemence of his may be imputed many of those large parentheses, which a careful reader may observe in his Epistles. Upon this account, also, it is that he often breaks off, in the

middle of an argument, to let in some new thought suggested by his own words: which having pursued and explained as far as conduced to his present purpose, he reassumes again the thread of his discourse, and goes on with it, without taking any notice that he returns again to what he had been before saying; though sometimes it be so far off that it may well have slipt out of his mind, and requires a very attentive reader to observe, and so bring the disjointed members together as to make up the connexion, and see how the scattered parts of the discourse hang together in a coherent well-agreeing sense, that makes it all of a piece.'

We should not proceed with these quotations merely for our own defence; but we think they deserve attention on their own account, upon a subject so little understood, and so likely to attract further notice, as the character in which the scriptures are to be received as containing a revelation from God. We shall therefore make one or two extracts from Bishop Burnet, and Dr Paley, in addition to those given in a former article.

In his Exposition of the Thirtynine Articles, Bishop Burnet thus writes. 'And thus far I have laid down such a scheme concerning inspiration and inspired writings, as will afford, to such as apprehend it aright, a solution to most of these difficulties with which we are urged on the account of some passages in the sacred writings. The laying down a scheme that asserts an immediate inspiration which goes to the style and to every tittle, and that denies any error to have crept into any of the copies, as it seems on the one hand to raise the honor of the scriptures very highly, so it lies open, on the other hand, to great difficulties, which seem insuperable in that hypothesis; whereas a middle way, as it settles the divine inspiration of these writings, and their being continued down genuine and unvitiated to us, as to all that, for which we can only suppose that inspiration was given; so it helps us more easily out of all difficulties, by *yielding* that which serves to answer them, without weakening the authority of the whole.*

We give an extract from Dr Paley's chapter on Erroneous Opinions imputed to the Apostles, referring our readers, who would learn his views in detail, to the whole chapter. 'We do not usually question the credit of a writer, by reason of

* P. 88. 2d fol. Edition, 1700.

any opinion he may have delivered upon subjects unconnected with his evidence ; and even upon subjects connected with his account, or mixed with it in the same discourse or writing, we naturally separate facts from opinions, testimony from observation, narrative from argument.

‘To apply this equitable consideration to the christian records, much controversy, and much objection has been raised concerning the quotations of the Old Testament found in the New ; some of which quotations, it is said, are applied in a sense, and to events, apparently different from that which they bear, and from those to which they belong in the original. It is probable, to my apprehension, that many of those quotations were intended by the writers of the New Testament as nothing more than *accommodations*. Such accommodations of passages from old authors are common with writers of all countries ; but in none perhaps were more to be expected, than in the writings of the Jews, whose literature was almost entirely confined to their scriptures.’—‘Those prophecies which are alleged with more solemnity, and which are accompanied with a precise declaration that they originally respected the event then related, are, I think, truly alleged. But were it otherwise, is the judgment of the writers of the New Testament in interpreting passages of the Old, or sometimes perhaps in receiving established interpretations, so connected either with their veracity, or with their means of information concerning what was passing in their own times, as that a critical mistake, even were it more clearly made out, should overthrow their historical credit? Does it diminish it? Has it anything to do with it?’*

It is well known, that the doctrine of inspiration has been exceedingly modified by the progress of biblical criticism, within the last half century. To this purpose we quote Jahn, in reference to the prevailing state of opinion in Germany. ‘Most of the Protestants formed a very strict idea of inspiration, and defended it as late as the middle of the eighteenth century. But after the publication of the learned work of Toellner on inspiration, in 1772, and of Semler’s examination of the Canon, 1771–3, many undertook to investigate the doctrine of inspiration, and gradually relaxed in their views of it, until at last they entirely banished the doctrine, so that at present but few admit it.’*

* Evidences, Part iii. ch. ii.

* Introduction to the Old Testament, § 23.

It would not be difficult to prove that there has been a similar, though not an equal, nor equally extended, progress of opinion in England. We have in a former article referred to Dr Powell and Bishop Marsh.

Dr Durell, Principal of Hertford College, Oxford, and Prebendary of Canterbury, said long ago, in speaking of the imprecations sometimes occurring in the Psalms,—‘How far it may be proper to continue the reading of these Psalms in the daily service of our church, I leave to the consideration of the legislature to determine. A Christian of erudition may consider these *imprecations* only as the natural sentiments of *Jews*, which the benign religion he professes, abhors and condemns. But what are the illiterate to do, who know not whence to draw the line between the Law and the Gospel? They hear both read one after the other, and, I fear, think them both of equal obligation, and even take shelter under scripture to cover their curses. Though I am conscious I here tread on slippery ground, I will take leave to hint, that, notwithstanding the high antiquity that sanctifies, as it were, this practice, it would, in the opinion of *a number of wise and good men*, be more for the credit of the christian church, to omit a few of those Psalms, and substitute some parts of the Gospel in their stead.’

Speaking of Paul’s manner of writing in his Epistles, Bishop Marsh says, ‘The erudition there displayed, is the erudition of a learned Jew. The argumentation there displayed, is the argumentation of a Jewish convert to Christianity, confuting his brethren on their own ground.’

Still more strongly, Dr Maltby, late preacher at Lincoln’s Inn, in his Sermons ;—‘Whatsoever doctrines connected with revelation, are clearly discoverable in the writings of St Paul, we receive with reverence and faith, as the will of God. But let us beware how we misunderstand the meaning of a writer, whose meaning from so many causes may be misunderstood. Let us discriminate when he is addressing his adversaries as a logician, and when he unequivocally expresses his own personal conviction.’*

The Quarterly Review, which has been considered as representing the sentiments of the English Church, in an article on Professor Buckland’s ‘*Reliquiæ Diluvianæ*,’ uses the following language. Addressing the friends of religion, it

* Maltby’s Sermons, Vol. I. p. 311.

is said,—‘ We would call to their recollection, also, the opinions formerly maintained, as to the plenary and even literal inspiration of scripture—the clamor raised against the first collections of various readings, in the copies of the New Testament, and still later against those of the Old.

‘ Well indeed is it for us, that the cause of revelation does not depend on questions such as these,—for it is remarkable that in every instance the controversy has ended in the gradual surrender of those very points, which were at one time represented as involving the vital interests of religion.’ *

But we have wearied ourselves, and our readers, we fear, with quotations. And truly what need of authorities? Let us quote Paul himself. So personal, so private many times, so peculiar always, so mixing up his natural feelings and interests with the ministration of the gospel, that one of the charms of his writings, is the charm of his own noble generosity and artlessness—how is it possible to think of him, in many of these passages, but as giving utterance to feelings entirely natural, in words and arguments purely human! Let us quote Paul, we say; and we may take a passage almost at random, and leave it to the judgment of our readers. ‘ Am I not an Apostle? am I not free? have I not seen Jesus Christ our Lord? are ye not my work in the Lord? If I be not an apostle unto others, yet doubtless I am to you: for the seal of mine apostleship are ye in the Lord. Mine answer to them that do examine me is this; Have we not power to eat and to drink? Have we not power to lead about a sister, a wife, as well as other apostles, and as the brethren of the Lord, and Cephas? Or I only and Barnabas, have we not power to forbear working? Who goeth a warfare any time at his own charges? who planteth a vineyard, and eateth not of the fruit thereof? or who feedeth a flock, and eateth not of the milk of the flock?’ †

We shall now leave the charge of infidelity, and shall enter upon a brief consideration of the Lectures which we have placed at the head of this article. We feel, in doing so, that we are breathing a new atmosphere, that we are passing from storm to sunshine, from a cloudy region to clearer light; and truly if we are to fall in any contest, we had rather be stricken down by the sunbeam, than by a driving mist. We see in

* Quarterly Review, No. LXVII. p. 142.

† Cor. ix. 1-7.

these Lectures the same fine and cautious discrimination, for which we have long considered Dr Woods as distinguished, and which, we believe, would render him eminent in any church; and though he has not cleared up our difficulties, though he has not, indeed, grappled with the difficulties that most press upon our own minds, yet, if we are wrong, we certainly should be more likely to be reclaimed, by his discriminating arguments, than by violent anathemas and wholesale denunciations. When will christian controversialists approach but so distantly to the kindliness of our common faith, as to recognise the claims of common humanity, and to pay any tolerable respect to the sincerity and worth of their opponents!

We understand Dr Woods. We know that he is no temporizer. We hear him speak of dangers. Perhaps we admit that there are dangers,—perhaps we feel it,—perhaps we pray for light and safety, and fear lest we should stretch out a rash hand to the ark of God to save it from the hands of the Philistines. All this may be; for when or where was the speculative or moral path of any human being free from dangers?

Dr Woods commences with ‘remarks on the proper mode of reasoning, and on the nature and source of the evidence, by which divine inspiration is to be proved.’ In the course of these remarks, he introduces with approbation a passage from Dr Knapp, which, as containing some important discriminations, we will quote. ‘These two positions; *the contents of the sacred books, or the doctrines taught in them, are of divine origin*; and, *the books themselves are given by inspiration of God*, are not the same, but need to be carefully distinguished. It does not follow from the arguments which prove the doctrines of the scriptures to be divine, that the books themselves were written under a divine impulse. A revealed truth may be taught in any book; but it does not follow that the book itself is divine. We might be convinced of the truth and divinity of the christian religion, from the mere genuineness of the books of the New Testament and the credibility of their authors. The divinity of the christian religion can therefore be conceived, independently of the inspiration of the Bible. This distinction was made as early as the time of Melancthon.’

On this passage we have two remarks to offer. In the first place, according to the obvious distinction here adopted by Dr Woods, we could take refuge within the pale of Christianity, even though we believed much less than we do. In the sec-

ond place, believing *as* we do, we have no difficulty in admitting the doctrine of inspiration in the general terms here laid down.

We do indeed differ from the author of the Lectures when he goes into detail. We believe that the truths of our religion were inspired, and that the teachers of our religion were divinely directed and assisted to communicate them; but we cannot see that such an inspiration is, or need be, a pledge for the perfect accuracy or correctness of every word they wrote, or of every illustration or argument by which they enforced their message.

But this brings us to the question; and on this question Dr Woods lays down the following, and only safe, rule, and, as we may venture hereafter to remind him, the *only* rule. 'The single argument,' he says, 'on which I propose to rest the doctrine of inspiration, is *the testimony of the sacred writers themselves.*'

With this rule before him, and after clearing the way to his main subject by several qualifications, to which we shall soon have occasion to refer, Dr Woods adduces arguments for the inspiration, first of the Old, and then of the New Testament. And we confess, that, if we did not read the illustrations of his arguments, or if we were not aware beforehand that our views differed from his—that if we took his arguments just as they stand in their simple statement, we should never suspect that they were designed to establish a position different from that in which we ourselves stand.

The first argument, of course, for the inspiration of the Old Testament, is from the passages—'For the prophecy came not in old times by the will of man, but holy men spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost,'* and 'All scripture is given by inspiration of God.'† Now, not to insist upon learned or minute criticisms on these passages, from which we certainly think we should derive some advantages in the argument, let them be taken for all that they can reasonably be supposed to mean, or that, without straining them, they can mean at all. 'Prophecy' and 'all scripture' refer to the Old Testament as a whole, as a collection of writings; and those writings had a divine and supernatural origin. They had a higher origin than the will of man. They form a body of divine communications; they are

* 2 Peter i. 21.

† Tim. iii. 16.

the authorised records of a divine religion. Such a commentary surely satisfies the obvious meaning of these passages. But can it be inferred that Peter and Paul, when they use this language, intend to claim every sentence and phrase as of divine inspiration? These passages are precisely like those general declarations which we constantly make about the general character of books, when we have no intention to embrace every minute particular. We give a meaning to those texts, then, a very natural and a most important meaning, without involving ourselves in what seems to us the inextricable difficulties of defending every word in the Old Testament. Storr and Flatt say, in commenting on the passage in Timothy, 'It is certain from the declarations of the apostle Paul, that those books are in such a sense inspired and given by God, that they are to be regarded as of divine authority; and for this reason they are entitled to credence. And this is the precise idea of divine inspiration, which, in the days of Timothy, was instilled into the minds of all the Jews from their earliest infancy.' What Josephus says of the Jewish faith in their scriptures, we are perfectly ready to assent to; that they 'esteem these books to contain divine doctrines,' and he says nothing stronger in the whole passage,* to which the German theologians, just quoted, refer.—But even if it were admitted that the texts in question mean all that they can mean—that the words, 'prophecy,' and 'all scripture,' mean every truth, every idea, contained in the Old Testament, still it would not follow that those 'holy men' were indebted for their style, or for any direction of their style, to inspiration.

Dr Woods's 'next argument to prove the inspiration of the Old Testament scriptures, is, that Christ and his apostles treat them as possessing an authority entirely different from that of any other writings.' To this we give entire assent; and we yield to the inference so far as we think it can fairly go. But that it goes to the sanctioning of every word or idea in those scriptures, we cannot see reason to admit. Without attributing to them any such perfection, they possess to our minds just such an authority;—that is to say, an 'authority entirely different from that of any other writings,' and this must, to us, of course, be a decisive consideration.

The arguments which Dr Woods uses to prove the inspira-

* Against Apion, Bk. I. 8.

tion of the New Testament, are the following. First, 'that Christ, who had all power in heaven and earth, commissioned his apostles to act in his stead, as teachers of the christian religion, and confirmed their authority by miracles;' secondly, 'that Christ expressly promised to give his apostles the Holy Spirit to assist them in their work;' and thirdly, 'that there are many passages in the New Testament to show, that the writers considered themselves to be under the infallible guidance of the Spirit, and their instructions to be clothed with divine authority.'

Now we wish not to seem perverse or paradoxical to any one, certainly not to an author whose reasoning powers we greatly respect; but it appears to us that we can admit all these propositions, and we have no doubt, indeed, of their truth, without coming to the conclusion to which Dr Woods would guide us. We believe that Jesus authorised the apostles to teach his religion, that he promised them special aid, and that they considered themselves as teaching the great truths of his religion under a guidance which, with reference to those truths, was infallible; that they considered their instructions as clothed with divine authority; and yet, to the accomplishment of all this, to the *bare making of the communication*, we cannot perceive it to be necessary that there should have been any constant and miraculous interference with the natural operations of their own minds—any supernatural guardianship over their reasonings about the truths they were to deliver, or over their illustrations of it, over their comparisons, figures, or their phrases.

He who maintains that inspiration does extend to these things, should bring express proof; should bring 'the testimony of the writers themselves.' Now here it is, to our minds, that the argument of Dr Woods is essentially deficient. It is a negative argument; and a negative argument, certainly, against the strongest positive presumption. The sacred writers say, that they were directed to make the communication, that they were commissioned to preach the gospel; but here their testimony ends. They do not say, that they were, or would be, directed minutely in every phrase, figure, and illustration, *how* to preach it. On the contrary, they preach in a manner, to all appearance, perfectly natural to them. They preach as occasions arise, and their writings are mostly called forth by exigences of trial and danger in the state of the churches. And, therefore, the presumption is against the extension of inspiration contended for.

We are aware, indeed, that Dr Woods insists, that 'as the writers of scripture nowhere limit the divine influence which they enjoyed, to the thoughts or conceptions of their own minds,' so neither should we. But can this canon of interpretation be supported? God's interposition in aid of human virtue, is taught without any express limit. Is there, therefore, no limit? Does this interposition extend to the immediate and miraculous control or guidance of all holy affections? So men are said to be inspired to teach the truth. But can it be fairly argued from thence, that the inspiring influence extends, beyond the truths revealed, to the words of the communication? Besides, if there were *no* limit, then there must have been an instant suggestion or prompting of every word, and the sacred writer must have been the mere amanuensis or secretary, so to speak, of the inspiring influence. Does Dr Woods believe this? We presume not; since he allows that the inspired writers 'use their own style,' and only maintains that they are 'under such direction,' as 'certainly to be secured against all mistakes.'

The truth is, undeniably, that the act of composition, the act of selecting words in a sentence, is as necessarily free, as much the writer's own act, as the act of choosing right from wrong. The very business of writing or speaking, therefore, implies all the limitation we contend for. A man may write, indeed, from verbal memory, or from an express dictation of words, and this is a different case; and we deny not that a portion of the scriptures fall under this condition. Some of the prophecies, that is, some sentences, may have been written from express dictation. A portion of the discourses of our Saviour were undoubtedly written from an exact remembrance of the words. And yet it is easy to see that this recollection often extends only to the sense. The words vary; and it is a remark to which we invite particular attention, that they vary according to the style of each particular writer. John is repetitious; and the discourses of Jesus under his report, though everywhere showing the same great and unequalled Master, take something of the form of his peculiar style. The introductory phrase, 'Verily I say unto you,' has the adverb repeated in John—'Verily, *verily*, I say unto you.' The repetition never occurs in the other evangelists; in John, it is constant and habitual. And in short, if any one would understand how strong is the aspect of naturalness in all their writings, and of

peculiarity in each individual writer, we would ask him to read the writings themselves—not to reason about what must be, or ought to be, but to read the writings themselves. He would rise from this perusal with an argument stronger than we can express, against the doctrine of verbal inspiration, or of special guidance in regard to the style of writing, and modes of illustration.

To us it is singular that Dr Woods admits the whole force of this presumption, and yet denies the inference. In truth, we know not what he might not admit, and yet, with the mode of reasoning he adopts, maintain his theory. He might admit, that the Bible is full of the evidences of human imperfection, that it is full of mistakes in style, in figures, in illustration, and yet maintain, to use his cautious phraseology, that the Bible is ‘just what God saw to be suited to the ends of revelation.’ Why, the conclusion is one which we have no difficulty of admitting on our own principles. It was best that the communication should be left to be made just as it was made.

But let us see what Dr Woods does admit; and we must confess, too, our honest surprise at the main and leading answer which he makes to his own concessions. He admits, what it has been thought so great an offence in us to assert, that ‘the language is completely human.’ He admits, that ‘in writing the scriptures, the sacred penmen evidently made use of their own faculties;’ that ‘the language employed by the inspired writers exhibits no marks of a divine interference, but is perfectly conformed to the genius and taste of the writers,’ and that ‘even the same doctrine is taught, and the same event described, in a different manner by different writers.’ And his constant answer is—Very well; why not?—Why should not the writers compose, each one, in his own style and manner? Why should they not, indeed, we say; but is this the proper answer to the objection? The objection is, that the style is natural, and therefore is not supernatural. The answer, admitting as it does the first quality, should show how the style can possess the other—or, in other words, how the same style could have been formed under influences at the same time natural and supernatural.

Dr Woods does indeed say,—‘Is it not evident that God may exercise a perfect superintendency over inspired writers as to the language they shall use, and yet that each one of them shall write in his own style, and in all respects accord-

ing to his own taste?' That is to say, is it not evident, that the thoughts may be perfectly free, and yet in their freedom, be perfectly controlled by an influence extraneous and foreign to them? To which we must answer,—No, certainly, it is not *evident*, even if it can be true. If it is evident, we wish that the Divinity Professor had shown it. We wish that he had taken us into that mysterious region, and disclosed to us the human mind acting freely under an absolute control—under a control so absolute as to secure the perfect accuracy of its operations. No man better than Dr Woods knows the way to this region, if there is any, or better knows there is no way.

Will he, then, approach it by analogies? Every analogy, we think, is fatal to his position. We quote a sentence from him, which he introduces in this connexion, and which, we think, is singularly unfortunate for his argument. The great variety, he says, 'existing among men as to their rational talents and their peculiar manner of thinking and writing, may, in this way, be turned to account in the work of revelation, as well as in the concerns of common life.' But have men any infallible direction in the common concerns of life?—or in the spiritual concerns of the soul, have they any? And yet in both divine aid is promised to the faithful, and promised without any limit. Till, therefore, some stronger proof is brought than the general promise of aid and guidance in teaching revealed truths, we cannot admit, against all the evidence that appears in the face of the record, that this guidance extended to the very form and phraseology of the communication. The nature of the action itself furnishes a limit.

'But,' it will be said, 'this infallible guidance in the mode of teaching, is necessary to insure to us a sufficient and satisfactory communication.' This, we cannot doubt, as we have said in a former article, is the great difficulty. 'Give us a perfect book,' we believe would be the language of our opponents, 'and we care not how it was made.' But is it right to make any *a priori* demand of this sort? We should rather say, 'Give us a glorious and unquestionable communication, and we are not solicitous as to the manner of it.' We do say,—'Give us such a communication as it has pleased God to make, and we are satisfied.' We could place ourselves reverently before the shrine, not to call in question its form, or the materials of which it is composed, but to listen to the voice that

proceeds from it. We would listen to the oracle, not to criticise the tone in which it speaks, but to gather the import of what it utters. Let us drink of the 'waters of life,' and we complain not if they are brought to us in 'earthen vessels.'

But let us hear the objection. Upon the supposition, that 'as far as language is concerned, the writers were left entirely to their own judgment and fidelity,' Dr Woods says,— 'Here,' we might say, 'Paul was unfortunate in the choice of words; and here his language does not express the ideas he must have intended to convey. Here the style of John was inadvertent; and here it was faulty; and here it would have been more agreeable to the nature of the subject, and would have more accurately expressed the truth, had it been altered thus.' But how seldom should we find occasion to say this! How seldom *do* we find occasion! If a communication made by human hands, must needs be so precarious and uncertain, why does not this skepticism appear in our commentaries and our controversies? Why does it not extend to all other books? Why are we not in constant and grievous uncertainty about the meaning of our familiar authors, because they have not had the aid of inspiration to form or modify their style?

Why also do we not find it difficult to distinguish between the point which they labor to prove, and the illustrations and arguments which they bring to bear upon it? Let any one look into the writings of Paul or John, and satisfy himself, as we think he easily may, that there is no difficulty whatever in separating what he teaches on his apostolic authority, and what he puts forth in the shape of argument addressed to the reason of his readers.

The truth is, after all, we are inclined to believe, that the different views taken of this point, arise from the different views that are entertained of the substance of the communication. If we believed that the New Testament contained a fine, extended, philosophical, or metaphysical theory, we might be anxious for the infallibility of every phrase and word. But even then our anxiety would be hypercritical. The works of Aristotle and Kant need no such pledge in order to satisfy the student that he understands their principles. How much less is this pledge necessary to satisfy us as to a few great facts, doctrines, and principles,—all practical, all so plain that he 'who runs may read,' all designed for the comprehension of

the poor, the ignorant, and unlearned ! And how is it possible for our opponents, on their principles, to rely as they do, on uninspired translations of the sacred text ! How can they send out imperfect translations and detached books of this volume, as they do to the heathen ! Nay, if the infallibility of every sentence and word is so essential to the validity of the communication, all men must be learned, before they can be put in a proper condition to receive it. Neither would this help them ; for the learned differ as much as others. Infallible sentences avail nothing without infallible interpreters ; and these we cannot have. And while the learned thus differ, as they always have and always will, what reliance can there be for the body of Christians, but on the substance of the communication—what reliance, in fact, that is satisfactory, but upon those views of inspiration which we maintain ?

On this subject of the sacred style, we must beg our readers to have patience with us a moment longer. We have said in a former article, that human language is, from its nature, essentially fallible ; and it does appear to us, that if this point were fully considered, it would settle the whole question about infallibility in the *words* of this communication. All human language, when referring to what is intellectual, to what is spiritual, is but an approximation to the truth. Words are conventional signs of thought. They are not pictures, and if they were, they could be pictures only of external objects. They are symbols, and they bear no relation to our intellectual conceptions, but what they bear by common agreement. Now this point we press. Was this agreement ever, in any age or country, perfect and invariable ? Were there ever two persons, to whom words expressive of spiritual qualities—to whom the same words, though purporting the same things in substance, did not bear different degrees and shades of meaning ? How then can the idea of absolute infallibility be attached to such an instrument of communication ?

Suppose, for example, that a revelation were now made to us in the English language. It is perfectly evident, on the one hand, that so far as the matters of that revelation were simple and practical, it would convey to us all, substantially the same general ideas. Such our scriptures do convey to all who read them, even though they come through the medium of a translation ;—for it is to be kept in mind, that we have only a human translation, and all this question about verbal inspiration

neither avails nor concerns anybody but the learned—a fact of itself sufficient to show that the validity and authority of a revelation designed for all nations, *cannot* depend on verbal inspiration. But to return;—we say, on the one hand, that from an inspired communication in our own language, all would receive the same *general* ideas. The substance of the communication, if it were an intelligible one, could not escape them, on a diligent reading; and this would be sufficient for their moral instruction and improvement. But on the other hand, it is equally evident that the moment they went into the minutiae of meaning, the moment especially that they went into matters of speculation, there would be shades of difference in their conceptions. For what would they have to do in this more particular, definite investigation? They would have to become critics. They must resort to their dictionaries. And what would they find there? Some words with ten, some twenty, some forty meanings. What principle could they possibly adopt, that would lead them to an unerring and uniform selection? What principle would enable them to determine the precise shade of thought which one word receives from its connexion with another? There is none; there never has been any to the most honest and faithful interpreters who read the scriptures in their original languages; and all this solicitude about the perfect verbal accuracy, the verbal authority of the Bible, in our apprehension, is as useless as it is unphilosophical.

Let no one say, 'The question is not about words.' Indeed it *is* about words. It is about the vehicle of communication, about style, about the manner of writing. The mode of communication is the point in debate; and this includes phraseology, figures, metaphors, illustrations, allegories, arguments. The question is,—Did the inspired teachers take the body of divine truth communicated to them, and then faithfully, indeed, but naturally, humanly, in the free and unforced exercise of their own faculties, deliver that sacred truth—or, were they so controlled or constrained, or supernaturally guarded, in this work, that every sentence they delivered is intrinsically, philosophically, divinely accurate and infallible?

And it is a most important question. To us, at least, with our views, it is one of inexpressible interest. For it is with such an interest that we cherish our belief in the scriptures as containing a divine revelation. It is with the deepest solicitude, therefore, that we have long pondered this question. The

conviction has been forced on our minds that we could not, in any fairness or impartiality, ascribe to the scriptures, that kind of verbal, illustrative, or logical perfection, which by many is claimed for them, and we have felt unspeakable relief in the conclusion, that it is not at all necessary to their character as authorised records of a communication from Heaven. If others entertain a different opinion, we complain not—nay, we rejoice for them, in this, that they stand ‘upon the foundation,’ though fencing themselves around with barriers that seem to us to be needless. And we hope that they will not be very much displeased that *we*, too, feel the ‘rock of our salvation’ to be strong and secure beneath us.

There may be skeptics, cold or contemptuous enough to look with indifference or with scorn upon this transcendent, this all-inspiring interest which we feel in the spiritual objects, and hopes, and destinies of our existence. They may think ‘this intellectual being’ too poor a thing to be the subject of such wide contemplation, and of such intense and overpowering concern. Yet, what avails the feeble hand that would repress and bind down the very laws of our nature? Still the thought, the feeling, the desire invincible and immortal springs within us, and craves its proper, satisfying, soul-sufficing good. No created might on earth is like the energy of that inward and undying want; no earthly blessing is like that which supplies it; and no sigh of human despondency could be so mournful as that with which we should sink from the holy light that cheers us. We stand amidst erring creatures, ourselves clothed with imperfection and conscious of sin, and the vision of perfect truth and perfect beauty and saving goodness in the person of Jesus, is ‘a light come into the world’ that would otherwise be dark to us. We stand amidst shadows and mysteries, amidst trials and sufferings; and the revelation of a gracious and pitying Father in Heaven is strength, assurance, consolation, which nothing else can give. We stand upon ‘this shore of time’—the beloved, the cherished, the hallowed in our sorrows, have gone from us—and the gospel that bringeth immortality to light, that places them in immortal regions, and invites us thither, is a message sufficient to bear us in rapture through the very shadows of death. Tell us that ‘God hath spoken’ all this to us—and we cannot question the manner, we cannot be solicitous about the words,—we can only ‘rejoice with joy unspeakable and full of glory.’

ART. VII.—*Lectures on Future Punishment.* By EDWARD R. TYLER. Middletown. 1829.

WE have no disposition to criticise any sincere expression of opinion. We are ready to extend to others the same indulgence which we claim for ourselves. Instead, therefore, of saying anything respecting the merits of this work, we shall speak somewhat at large on the subject of retribution; not intending, however, to give it a full discussion, but to make some suggestions, without which, regarded in some form or other, it cannot well be understood. There are popular and dangerous errors respecting the relation of man to God and eternity, which interfere with all right discernment of the truth. They exist in the shape of loose and floating impressions, and have a greater influence upon the judgment and actions, than if they were more distinctly presented to the mind.

Many of the prevailing religious systems, which professed to explain this great relation, have been so incomprehensible and contradictory, that men have generally been driven to illustrations of their own. Whoever has conversed much with the unenlightened, knows, that they often consider themselves as servants of God. In some respects, this illustration is correct enough, and to a certain extent is sustained by the language of scripture. But they carry it quite too far;—so far, as to feel that they are doing his work and not their own, and therefore feel no personal interest in what they are doing, but only in the promised reward. They feel as if it were of no consequence what their heart is, provided they go through a certain round of duties; no matter whether they have love to God and man, or any religious principle whatever. This naturally makes their duty seem like restraint and oppression, and makes them feel as if they were not free, but indented to the service of God. This view of our relation to the Father of our Spirits is untrue. He directs us to labor for ourselves, and not for him; and unless we labor as if we were laboring for ourselves, not with a cold complaining reluctance, but with all the heart, it will be long before we reach that happiness which follows only the service inspired by love; which is not, in fact, a reward, but a natural consequence of fidelity to the Most High.

Again; there are those, and they are not few, who carry their maxims of business into religion. According to them,

heaven is a payment for service rendered. They, too, feel as if they were selling their service, simply because they expect to gain something by it at last. They imagine that accounts are kept, where they are credited with all the good they do, and that every good action is so much added to their just demands. When a man of this description wishes to know how he stands with respect to God and eternity, he counts what he is pleased to call his good deeds, and compares them with his offences. If he thinks that he has upon the whole done more good than evil, he is happy. Even if not, if his sins outnumber his good deeds, he supposes that he shall be rewarded for the good he has done, though he may be punished for his transgressions. Though he cannot secure the whole payment, he has yet earned a part. These impressions are degrading to christian duty and to God. There is no propriety in these estimates of value. It is not true that God hires or pays men for doing their duty. It is the disposition which makes the deed acceptable, and here the disposition is invariably wanting. It is not the scattered deeds that are to be picked up and compared; it is the character, the prevailing tone of character, which determines whether a man shall or shall not be numbered with the blessed.

Such, or similar to these, are the prevailing impressions of unenlightened men. But is there no illustration which will help us to comprehend the way in which future happiness is given, if we can say that it is given? Certainly there is; one which the scripture labors to impress—the relation of a father to his children. God gives us the power of forming characters for heaven, just as parents give their children the means of preparing for life. If the child values and employs his means of improvement, if he forms the character which his parent desires, respectability, usefulness and happiness, will, in ordinary circumstances, be the result of that character which his father gave him the means of forming. There is no debt nor credit here. This respectability and happiness are not a payment. If they are called a reward, it is one that follows, not one that is given, and the child is serving himself all the while, though it is true that his excellence does honor to his father, as the excellence of the just gives glory to God. Exactly in the same way has God given us power to form characters for another existence; and, that we may know what preparation to make, has afforded us clear, full, and glowing

descriptions of the better, even the heavenly country. Here it would seem that there could be no room for error ; and men cannot sustain themselves in religious errors, without keeping out of view this relation, which is a key to all the mysteries which men have made or imagined in the word of God.

This representation is given in the scripture phrase, 'They shall eat the fruit of their own doings.' The fruit is not a thing given or added to the tree. It is as much a part of it as the blossom. Unless the tree is good, the fruit cannot be good. Precisely so does happiness follow a religious character, in the unalterable order of nature. Something of that happiness may be known in the present state. It follows hard on every good feeling we cherish, and every good deed we do. The low slave of passion can neither taste it, nor understand it. Take a thoughtless wretch from the street and place him in some house of God. There is certainly happiness there ; there are a few at least, whose hearts burn within them, as they meditate on the wonderful works and kindness of God. But to him, it is dreary as the wilderness or the grave. This may help our imagination of the suffering of a soul thrown unprepared into a spiritual world. All its happiness came from material things, and how can it be otherwise than wretched, when the world and its passions are gone forever? Certain it is, that the happiness which flows from religious, kind, and generous affections, is the happiness of heaven. Perhaps, however, we cannot fully comprehend it, till we are raised higher above the world than ever yet we have been. We cannot expect, in the depth of the valley, shut in by rocks and forests on every side, to form any idea of the vastness and glory of nature. We must climb the mountain till the horizon spreads and the heaven towers. And nothing comprehensive, nothing inspiring can enter our ideas of religious enjoyment, till we rise so high, that the joys and sorrows of the world are no longer boundaries to our view.

Those who are disposed to regard future happiness as something incomprehensible, fortify themselves by such words as, 'Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered the heart of man the things which God hath prepared for them that love him.' They are not aware, perhaps, that these words are quoted from the Old Testament, and were said when life and immortality were not yet brought to light. St Paul immediately says, 'God hath revealed them unto us by

his spirit ;' that is, in Christianity. Immortality, perhaps, was known from the earliest time ; but it was like some cold star, unregarded, if seen, in the heavens, till later discoveries measured its periods, revealed its real greatness, and made it a guide to wanderers on the sea. We fully believe that future happiness is revealed and may be understood. But there is a mysterious importance attached to the change of death. What is it but a release from the body and its passions ? What is it but an incident in life, and by no means the most important ? To us it seems, that the soul passes from death to life, when it dismisses things present and gives the earnestness of its affections to intellectual and spiritual, and therefore to immortal things. Feeling that we are immortal, we shall not set our hearts on perishing things, to be answerable when we leave them. Feeling that we are immortal, we shall not look on death as a passing away from life, nor as the beginning of any new existence. In the change of death, the soul leaves the mansion of clay, but remains unchanged, for aught we can discover, in its attainments, affections and powers ; and the hour when it begins its immortal preparation, is the time when the corruptible puts on incorruption and the mortal immortality.

When our lives begin, then we begin a course of immortal improvement, which ends not at the grave. It is idle to say that there is a limit to mortal attainment. There is ; but this improvement has nothing to do with mortality. This is the immortal improvement of the immortal part of our nature. There are bounds to the vigor of the frame. Much as it can be strengthened by exercise, there is a limit beyond which it cannot go. And for a good reason ; it is mortal, it is meant to last but a few years. But the immortal was meant to endure and to grow in strength forever. Death, which crushes the powerful frame and palsies the mighty arm, has no power whatever over the soul. Released from its earthly bondage, it goes on in improvement with less resistance ; with no cares nor sorrows to weigh it down. Now if it be admitted that the only sure happiness of man comes from religious and intellectual improvement, it is evident that his happiness depends on his preparation. In this world the foundations of that improvement must be laid. In this world, the joy of heaven, therefore, must begin. This life is the childhood and youth of our existence. Death is but the putting away of childish things. It is like the moment when the vessel which has tried its

strength near the shore, leaves its pilot and the narrow limits of its harbor, and stands out upon the broad blue sea.

In all this, we hope we have said nothing mystical. Our meaning is simply to illustrate that view which makes future happiness a natural result of present improvement; which regards the future life as bearing the same relation to the present, which manhood bears to childhood. But it will be said, This is making our salvation depend upon ourselves. Most certainly it does depend upon ourselves. Immortality is gained and offered. It is wholly a gift of favor. It is a gift out of all proportion to human merit or human exertion. But since it is offered, it can be secured by all those who will prepare themselves to enjoy it; and 'whither they go they know, and the way they know.' God does not fetter his children. He uses all moral means to lead them to their true interest. He unfolds the brilliant vision of heaven before them, shows them the character it requires, and leaves it to themselves to determine whether it is or is not worth securing. If they love something else better, they of course surrender this hope. But if they go to form those characters from which happiness naturally springs, it is clear that they say for themselves and not another, whether they shall or shall not be happy. In this world there are many circumstances which may prevent the guilty from being miserable, and the just from being happy. But in another life there is no bar, no help, nothing whatever to interfere with the natural results of the characters we have chosen to form.

We regard this view of the future state as one which ought to be kept before the eyes of men. If they feel that God has given them power to be architects of their own happiness, they will feel a new responsibility, and it may be a new inspiration. They will hesitate before they become the destroyers of their own peace and welfare. How they become so, may perhaps be made clearer by an illustration like this;—Suppose that every enjoyment strictly belonging to this world, were struck at once from existence. Religious and intellectual enjoyment would still remain. But would not he who has given all to riches or pleasure, be left with nothing to engage his affections? Would he not be tortured with the curse of a vacant, self-consuming heart? Would he not be at once in the depth of suffering, by reason of his neglect or refusal to form that character which would have been in him a perpetual fountain of enjoyment,

though the world and its glory were passed away. So must it be, when the world and its pleasures have sunk in their ashes. All must be a dreary blank to those who loved it too well. But there will be no change to those who have already begun the march of improvement. They can still exercise and enjoy their heavenly affections, still delight in meditating on the works of God, and doing good to men. And thus advancing, they can pass, as from star to star, through the different stages of excellence; for nothing less is meant, by being changed into the image of Jesus Christ from glory to glory.

This representation of the future state will serve to remove some standing objections to the doctrine of future retribution. There are many who cannot bear to hear that God punishes the guilty. And here it may be seen that there is no infliction on his part, and it is not proper to say that he punishes the guilty. He kindly reveals to men the great truth,—truth, whether they know it or not, that goodness leads to happiness, and sin to misery and shame; and almost exhausts the resources of moral power to influence them to choose the character which alone can make them happy. Shall the son, who has refused to listen to every warning, turn upon his father, when he falls and suffers, and accuse him as the author of his wo? His father did all that moral power could do, to save him from ruin; and if he says that it is unmerciful in a parent to let him suffer, he must see that it cannot be prevented; it is the fruit of his own doings. It cannot be prevented without breaking up that whole order of nature which brings peace and happiness to the just.

Besides, 'they err, not knowing the scriptures, nor the power of God.' They are bound to show what power can be exerted to save them from the consequences of their own choice. We cannot imagine anything like compulsion in one mind acting upon another. We cannot *make* our child receive knowledge. We can use compulsion upon his body, we can bind him to his book; but it is evident that compulsion cannot reach the mind. The difficulty is, that men have felt as if moral power were no power at all; as if to deny that God acts on men by compulsion, were the same as taking his sovereignty away. But our ideas of divine power should at least be borrowed from the highest human power we know. We accordingly find that the energy God exerts upon the human mind, is different from that which he exerts upon the senseless

elements of nature. We find that in Christianity, called 'the power of God,' he employs argument, inducement, and persuasion, which, men are but just beginning to discover, are the most stupendous force which can be brought to bear upon the mind, and yet exert no more compulsion to bend it in one direction or another, than the moonlight shadow across the brook exerts to stop the flowing of its waters. We would speak reverently of the divine perfections. All we say, is, that we can conceive of no power which can break up this order of nature; no power which can make him rest from labor, who has refused to labor; no power, which can make him who has refused to be holy, enjoy that happiness which nothing but holiness brings. These things seem to be no subjects of power.

Even if there were such a power, it would prove nothing. It will readily be allowed, that no one can be permanently happy without being good. But who ever heard of such a thing as compulsory goodness? It is plain, that the only goodness which deserves the name, must be wholly voluntary. It implies the choice and consent of our own hearts. Compulsion can only tie up the hands from offending, or peradventure force them to do distasteful duties. But to refrain or to obey in this way, is neither a reasonable nor acceptable service; and exactly so far as constraint, or unworthy motives enter into our obedience, it loses its grace and value. Goodness in men is what they have made themselves, not what any power has made them. The power of God, Christianity, is one which we have full power to resist, if we will. The prize is offered, but never will be forced into our hands. If we cast it rudely away, the loss and guilt will be our own. If we make the preparation, we write our own names in the Book of Life, by the power which God has given.

Some may look forward to another world for an opportunity of forming that character, which they have refused or neglected to cultivate in this. Still the scriptures represent the future as a state of retribution. True, it is an awful thought that the consequences of our characters should endure through the ages of eternity, stretching out far beyond the grave. But they must endure so long as the characters remain the same; and difficult indeed will be the task to alter them, after we have here enjoyed the full sunshine of God's goodness, which leads to repentance, in vain. But it is impossible to do more

than speculate on such a subject, where the scripture leaves us. It would be folly to depend on probabilities and chances, in a matter so momentous. We know that the child who has wasted the time of preparation for active life can never redeem it. He may repent, but he never can overtake those who started with him and improved their earliest and best hours. He never can stand where he might have stood.

But we shall be met with the charge, that we are ascribing the happiness of heaven to human merit. We have already said distinctly, that we consider immortality as a gift of favor; and we know not why human merit should cause so much alarm. But the reward, if we must call it so, is so infinitely beyond all possible human deserving, that if we deserve it as far as man can deserve it, it is evident that we shall not be the less indebted to the divine mercy. For we believe, that religion leads to happiness in the present life, in the same way, and to happiness of the same description, as in the life to come. It is every man's interest, whatever his destiny in life may be, to be good; and if it be said that there are cases in which the virtuous suffer, we say, while we acknowledge it, that if they were guilty, they would in the same circumstances suffer immeasurably more. Goodness has no right, then, to demand a future reward, and that such a reward is given, is wholly owing to the unmerited kindness of God.

But what is this reward but an extension of existence; an eternity added to the duration of life, under circumstances where the characters men have formed, shall inevitably lead to the results which follow them in the order of nature? Our Saviour says, 'Happy are the poor in spirit,' and they who cherish the other Christian virtues. Who will deny, that, if they cultivate the virtues, they are entitled to the happiness, or will say that such merit on their part, detracts from the gratitude they owe to God? But when we come to immortality—a thought vast, oppressive and overwhelming—a world, from which the world we dwell upon shall seem like the small globe of a cabinet, rolling far beneath our view—a world, where the withering sentence of mortality shall be lifted from all the pursuits and enjoyments of the just—it is idle to talk of human merit in view of such a reward as this. And yet surely there is no presumption in looking forward, with all the confidence which our nature will allow, from the place where we have labored, to the place where we shall rest forever from anxiety, sorrow, and sin.

We can imagine nothing so inspiring as the view we have given of the future state. We can, without much effort, conceive what a gloom was once cast upon all the pursuits of life, by the thought which sometimes prevailed in the most intelligent minds, that the way of wisdom, the path of virtue, and the irregular march of glory, all ended in the grave. And this imagination may make us feel, that Christianity has given new attractions to all the intellectual and moral pursuits of life, by assuring us that the grave is not their boundary; that we shall find it hardly an interruption in our never-ending way; that all once gained to our minds and hearts, is gained forever. But this inspiration is all destroyed by the thought of a mighty and mysterious change in death; by the thought of passing to a life unknown and unimagined; and the way of improvement is not one of pleasantness and peace, till we are assured that we shall walk in it forever. This makes us earnest in the pursuit of knowledge, especially the knowledge of God. It leads us to trace out his perfections in the magnificence of the heavens above, and the beauty of the world below. It makes us devoted to the service of our fellow men, whom we regard, not as the companions of a few days' way-faring, but as the associates of *our* immortality. It gives us a new impression of the value of scripture, teaching us to regard it, not merely as a staff meant to support us to the grave and there to be laid down, but as the source of immortal light, there being no excellence in the angels of the Son of God, the seed of which may not be found in the gospel. When the seal of immortality is thus set on everything good and great, we feel within us a new ambition. We gaze with new interest on the Sun of Righteousness, when we know that he is not risen merely to enlighten our pathway to the tomb, but that we may rejoice in his beams forever.

This view of future happiness as the result of character, is hardly less valuable in its power to remove false and pernicious hopes; hopes which only tend to mislead and destroy. How many there are who die with a firmness like that of the Christian,—some falling in the front of the battle, with seeming calmness, though their lives have been anything but good; some sustained by an iron pride, which the terrors of death cannot bow; some, in whom the excitement of disease is mistaken for the inspirations of Heaven, dying in triumphant gladness—passionate, because they dare not be rational—raptur-

ous, because their feeling must be tumultuous or nothing—entering with a triumphal march the valley of the shadow of death, though they have through all their lives been miserably unfaithful to their duty. Almost every public print brings us some disgusting narration of the death of the murderer, surrounded by ministers of religion, lifting up, on the scaffold, hands on which the blood he has shed is scarcely dry, and declaring his joy at passing from the most righteous doom of man, to the presence and blessing of God. When an insane delusion is thus preventing the course of human justice, and holding out the gallows as the surest path to glory, honor, and immortality, it becomes more needful than ever, to repeat, that the future destiny depends on the character formed on earth. The last hour of life is like any other hour. It is as possible to deceive ourselves in that, as in any other hour; perhaps more so, for the heart is less collected, more open to quick and violent emotions. The death proves little or nothing with respect to the life. The best men are sometimes depressed, and the most abandoned full of rapture. But there is no reason to think that a moment's feeling can alter the character. If not, it cannot change the sentence of God.

The consolations which this view of the future state gives to the mourning, are neither few nor small. It enables the imagination to follow the departed. They are not exulting in an aimless flight through the open fields of heaven; they are walking in the same path which they travelled here below, though exempt from its peculiar hardships and dangers. The old man who left us full of years, renews the childhood of his soul, restores the vigor which had begun to be weary and faint. The man who dies in the fulness of his strength, hardly suspends his intellectual labors and religious adoration. The child, whose eyes had hardly opened on the world, finds those among the happy who gladly supply the place of a parent's affection; who watch his unfolding powers, as they open in a promise never saddened by calamity nor profaned by sin. Thus a truth and reality is given to the delightful vision of heaven. It is the only representation that meets the full meaning of the words, 'He asked length of days of thee, and thou gavest it him; even length of days forever and ever.'

The great advantage of this representation, is, that it is directly practical. We say to those whom we would animate

in duty, not that they must persevere, for in a little while they shall lay down their burden ;—we tell them, not that they are finite and dying—we urge upon them that they are infinite and immortal ; that for all the practical purposes of life, they should regard themselves as immortal, and make a preparation widely different from that which a few years of existence would require. We speak not of death, but of immortality ; an immortality, in which the characters now formed shall endure, and nothing shall interfere with their just and natural results, forever. This inspires the young to add the beauty of holiness to the charm of childhood and of youth, and to look forward, not to manhood, but to eternity. And all, whatever their years may be, must regard improvement as something great and important, when they know that it shall outlast the world. We care little for systems ; but we think it essential to have it understood, that, after all that God has done, he entrusts our destiny to our own hands. If we refuse to prepare to enjoy immortal happiness, we take the consequences of that refusal ; with our own lips, as it were, we bid farewell to heaven and to Him.

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
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
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